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ABSTRACT 
My research interests focus on the economic behavior, choices, and actions of 
organizations as well as individuals given their incentives, and analyze the consequences of such 
decisions to the financial health of firms and the macro economy. A firm is incentivized by the 
value investors place on its operations; while employees, particularly the management team, is 
incentivized by the private benefits the firm gives them. Understanding the impact of such 
incentives will help alleviate the classic agency costs in modern organizations. 
Stock illiquidity raises the cost of share ownership to outside investors. The sizable 
adverse price impact of trading increases transactions costs and stock volatility. The reduced 
gains from informed trading discourages the acquisition of private information and impedes the 
price discovery process. The first essay substantiates that shares of financially constrained firms 
are significantly more illiquid than shares of similar but financially unconstrained firms. Acting 
as buyers of last resort for their own shares, share repurchases by financially constrained firms 
enhance stock liquidity, which alleviates the cost of external financing and underinvestment. 
Increased stock liquidity improves information efficiency, inducing higher value-added from 
incremental capital investments. Further, higher stock liquidity lowers stock volatility and allows 
financially constrained firms to issue equity. 
In the second and third essays, I investigate whether the incentives given to the 
employees and the management team at banks contribute to the financial crisis. I provide 
evidence that CEO compensation is weakly related to bank risk measures and risky bank 
activities. However, when looking at banks with regards to their reward cultures, I find that 
during the 2008 crisis period, banks either at the high or low reward culture groups perform 
worse, and are more risky than banks in the average reward culture group. The reward culture 
  
score represents the common factor in incentives across all levels of the bank, from CEO, Vice 
Presidents to all other employees. The findings are consistent with the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard associated with incentive misalignment when incentives are too low 
or too high. This shows the importance of reward culture in understanding the role of 
performance-based compensation. 
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I. Introduction 
 There is an intensive market microstructure literature focused on stock liquidity. This 
literature notes two different costs associated with stock illiquidity: adverse selection costs 
arising from information asymmetry and transactions costs associated with holding inventory. 
Investors require additional compensation for holding less liquid stocks, either in terms of greater 
stock returns or risks. Increased stock liquidity that reduces the adverse selection and transaction 
costs to shareholders reduces the firm’s cost of capital. By increasing the marginal value of 
private information, stock liquidity motivates market participants to engage in private 
information production. The reduction in information asymmetry contributes to stock price 
efficiency. If managers wish to maximize firm value, they should pursue financial policies that 
improve the liquidity of their stock. 
 In the first essay, I investigate whether firms attempt to enhance their stock liquidity via 
share repurchase programs, and the implications of this activity on other firm behavior. This is 
done in the context of firms that face costly external financing and have illiquid stocks and 
hence, would be expected to value stock liquidity more than other firms. Specifically, I draw 
upon the existing literature on financial frictions to identify a set of firms that have a higher cost 
of capital and less stock liquidity: financially constrained firms. I show how financially 
constrained firms with illiquid stocks utilize share repurchases to improve their liquidity, helping 
them issue additional equity, increasing investments, increasing value added from market 
perception per incremental investments, and reducing idiosyncratic risk. 
 The 2008 financial crisis raised questions about performance-based compensation 
practices at financial institutions. The public widely believed that excesses in compensation 
prevalent among banks were a catalyst to the crisis. Since then, academic research has studied 
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the link between compensation practices and risk-taking behaviors extensively, mostly focusing 
on CEO and the top management team compensation. Their findings are inconclusive. One 
branch of the literature finds that banks with better shareholder-aligned CEO compensation plans 
did worse in the crisis, generating significantly lower stock returns and returns on equity. 
Moreover, CEOs of better shareholder-aligned banks realized larger losses in their stock and 
option portfolios. But as other branches of the literature point out, the losses that CEOs suffered 
in the crisis were disproportionately less than the high compensation CEOs received prior to the 
crisis. There has been evidence about a positive relationship between a CEO’s stock and option 
grants and bank risk.  
 In the second and third essays of this dissertation, I study whether incentives at banks are 
a contributing factor to the recent credit crisis. The second paper shows that bank CEO 
compensation incentives to increase risk, and to increase risk relative to increase stock price, lead 
to comparatively risky investment and debt policies and increased risk. It shows that the relation 
between bank CEO compensation risk taking incentives tends to change between non-crisis vs. 
crisis periods. Bank CEO risk taking incentives lead CEOs to adopt riskier investments, 
including asset growth, loans to core deposits, and commercial real estate loans, to implement 
riskier debt policy by increasing leverage, and to increase bank risk, where bank risk is measured 
by the volatility of stock returns, non-performing loans to assets, and a bank risk factor score. I 
conclude that recent efforts by the press, politicians, and regulators, to portray bank CEO 
compensation incentives as the cause of excessive risk taking and financial collapse are 
premature. In the third paper, I construct and examine whether the “reward culture” of banks was 
a contributing factor to the 2008 credit crisis. Reward culture reflects three dimensions: (i) CEO 
incentives – total CEO compensation and the incentive effects of CEO stock and option 
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portfolios; (ii) tournament incentives – pay gap in total compensation between CEOs and Vice 
Presidents; and (iii) employee incentives – total compensation per employee. A reward culture 
factor score, constructed by applying factor analysis to the CEO, VP, and employee incentives, 
represents the common factor in incentives across all levels of the bank. I employ the reward 
culture factor to examine the impact of reward culture on bank performance and risk. First, I find 
strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between reward culture and bank returns and risk. 
Second, classifying banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups in the pre-crisis year 
2006, I find that during the 2008 crisis period, banks either at the high or low reward culture 
groups performed worse, and were more risky than banks in the average reward culture group. 
The findings are consistent with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard associated 
with incentive misalignment when incentives are too low or too high.
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II. Stock Market Liquidity: Financially Constrained Firms and Share Repurchase 
Abstract: Stock illiquidity raises the cost of share ownership to outside investors.  The sizable 
adverse price impact of trading increases transactions costs and stock volatility.  The reduced 
gains from informed trading discourages the acquisition of private information and impedes the 
price discovery process.  This study substantiates that shares of financially constrained firms are 
significantly more illiquid than shares of similar but financially unconstrained firms.  Acting as 
buyers of last resort for their own shares, share repurchases by financially constrained firms 
enhance stock liquidity, which alleviates the cost of external financing and underinvestment.  
Increased stock liquidity improves information efficiency, inducing higher value-added from 
incremental capital investments.  Further, higher stock liquidity lowers stock volatility and 
allows financially constrained firms to issue equity.
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A. Introduction 
 There is an extensive market microstructure literature focused on stock liquidity (see 
Vayanos and Wang, 2012, for a survey). This literature notes two different costs associated with 
stock illiquidity: adverse selection costs arising from information asymmetry, and transactions 
costs associated with holding inventory. Investors require additional compensation for holding 
less liquid stocks, either in terms of greater stock returns or risks1. Increased stock liquidity that 
reduces the adverse selection and transaction costs to shareholders reduces the firm’s cost of 
capital2. By increasing the marginal value of private information, stock liquidity motivates 
market participants to engage in private information production3. The reduction in information 
asymmetry contributes to stock price efficiency. If managers wish to maximize firm value, they 
should pursue financial policies that improve the liquidity of their stock4. During market 
downturns, firms can, for instance, utilize share repurchase programs to help increase depth on 
the sell-side of the market to improve liquidity5. The presence of the firm as a buyer gives 
confidence to other market participants and reduces the number of sellers in the market. 
Repurchase firms can be thought of as buyers of last resort – supporting their market-makers and 
                                                 
1 Brennan and Subramanyam (1996), Datar et al. (1998), Brennan et al. (1998), and Brennan et 
al. (2012) document a positive relationship between average stock returns and liquidity costs. 
Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) argue that 
illiquidity is a priced risk factor. 
2 Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Barclay and Smith (1988), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
provide theoretical models that predict a positive relationship between the cost of capital and the 
bid-ask spread. Empirical work by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Easley et al. (2002), 
Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Bekaert et al. (2007), Hasbrouck (2009), Duarte 
and Young (2009), and Lee (2011) provides support for this prediction. 
3 Kyle and Vila (1991), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), and Maug (1998), to name a few. 
4 Amihud and Mendelson (2012) argue that corporate managers should adopt liquidity-increasing 
corporate financial policies, including lower leverage ratios, the substitutions of dividends for 
stock repurchases, more effective disclosure, and increases in investor base. 
5 Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) find evidence that repurchases provide liquidity support in a 
declining market. 
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adding downside liquidity. In this paper, I investigate whether firms attempt to enhance their 
stock liquidity via share repurchase programs, and the implications of this activity on other firm 
behavior. This is done in the context of firms that face costly external financing and have illiquid 
stocks and hence, would be expected to value stock liquidity more than other firm. 
 Specifically, I draw upon the existing literature on financial frictions to identify a set of 
firms that have a higher cost of capital and less stock liquidity: financially constrained firms. 
Financial constraints arise due to frictions in the supply of capital, the chief source of friction 
being information asymmetries between investors and the firm (Tirole, 2006). Supply frictions 
increase costs of raising external capital, and, in the limit, the firm is shut out of the capital 
markets6. Since market liquidity captures information asymmetry among market participants, 
such firms are more likely to have less liquid stocks (Ascioglu et al., 2008). Researchers 
hypothesize that these constraints may have substantial effects on a variety of decisions, 
including firms’ investment and capital structure choices7. Campello et al. (2010) use the 2007 
credit crisis as a natural experiment to survey CFOs about the impact of financial constraints on 
corporate policies. They find financially constrained firms plan to cut more investment, 
technology, marketing, and employment relative to financially unconstrained firms during the 
crisis. Financial constraints also restrict firms’ pursuits of attractive projects, or force them to 
cancel valuable investments.  
 I hypothesize that financially constrained firms, facing costly external financing and 
                                                 
6 As Almeida and Campello (2002) put it, “constrained firms are at the point where the supply of 
capital becomes inelastic”. 
7 See, for example, Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Froot et al. (1993), Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), Gomes (2001), Almeida et al. (2004), Whited and Wu (2006), Rauh (2006), Almeida and 
Campello (2007), Hennessy and Whited (2007), Duchin et al. (2010), and Li (2011), among 
many others. 
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potential underinvestment, take steps to improve their stock liquidity to reduce information 
asymmetry and alleviate costs of financial constraint. The more illiquid a firm’s stock is ex-ante, 
the more valuable the enhanced liquidity is ex-post. Liquidity enhancements for such firms are 
also likely to have greater value than for other firms. As a corollary, if these firms do raise 
external financing, it is more likely to be equity financing because of a lower cost of equity. 
They overcome the underinvestment problem with additional financing. Furthermore, since 
improved liquidity increases price efficiency, the market will place higher value on their 
incremental investments. Concurrently, reduced liquidity costs could also result in reduced risk 
for these firms.  
 The corporate policy of choice in this paper is share repurchase. The existing literature 
argues that share repurchase programs can both improve and deteriorate stock liquidity. On the 
one hand, open market repurchase programs should be detrimental to market dynamics because 
the firm’s presence in the market increases the fraction of “informed” traders, which in turn gives 
rise to an adverse selection cost in the form of reduced stock liquidity8. On the other hand, share 
repurchases may actually improve stock liquidity by increasing depth on the sell-side of the 
market. Here firms repurchase shares as a form of disbursing cash to shareholders, acting as a 
market maker in their own stocks supplying additional liquidity9. Hillert et al. (2013) shed light 
on these conflicting results by relying on newly available data on realized share repurchases by 
                                                 
8 Barclay and Smith (1988) for U.S. firms, Brockman and Chung (2001) for Hongkong, and 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) for France find that repurchases reduce liquidity. Brockman et al. 
(2008) study the determinants of repurchases with regard to liquidity and document that firms 
with more liquid stocks tend to distribute more of their excess cash in the form of stock 
repurchases than dividends. 
9 Singh et al. (1994), Wiggins (1994), Miller and McConnel (1995), Franz et al. (1995), Cook et 
al. (2004) for U.S. firms, Chung et al. (2007) for Switzerland, Rasbrant and De Ridder (2013) for 
Sweden, and De Cesari et al. (2012) for Italy, all find a positive relationship between repurchases 
and liquidity. 
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U.S. firms. They find smaller repurchases consume liquidity; whereas larger repurchases provide 
liquidity, and liquidity provision is more likely for less liquid stocks. 
 Figure 1.1 plots average U.S. stock market liquidity based on Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
measure (the left axis) and the average share repurchase amount and equity issuance amount (the 
right axis) for all publicly traded firms on the CRSP and Compustat databases from 1989 to 
2011. This Figure shows U.S. stock markets became more liquid until 2007, then reached a high 
point in illiquidity during the financial crisis in 2009. At the same time, the repurchase amount 
increases substantially until 2007, then decreases dramatically to a low in 2009, and increases 
thereafter.  Equity issuance amount follows a generally similar pattern to that of repurchase 
amount. There is a positive association between stock market liquidity and each of share 
repurchase and equity issuance amounts. 
Insert Figure 1.1 here. 
 My research design has three parts. First, I confirm the relationship between financially 
constraint and illiquidity documented in the literature, and explore the impact of share repurchase 
on the constraint status. Second, I investigate the relationship between share repurchase and 
stock liquidity in a sample of financially constrained firms only, controlling for the endogeneity 
between the two. Finally, I study the impact of additional liquidity on different firm decisions in 
such firms, such as equity and debt issuance, investment, value added from incremental 
investments and firm risk. 
 My sample consists of 183 financially constrained firms from the CRSP and Compustat 
data over 1992 to 2006. My study starts with 1992 to avoid contaminating effects of the savings 
and loan crisis that started in 1989, and ends in 2006 to avoid the effects of the credit crisis that 
started in 2007. Firms selected in the sample must have all data available throughout the sample 
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period in order to alleviate the confounding effects of different factors. I classify firms as 
financially constrained by Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) index (hereafter, HP index)10. I focus on 
financially constrained firms because the effect of share repurchases on stock liquidity and the 
value of enhanced liquidity are likely greatest for financially constrained firms.  My variable of 
chief interest in measuring repurchase activity is repurchase intensity, calculated as repurchase 
amount divided by the total dollar trading volume over the fiscal year. Intuitively, this variable 
measures repurchase dollars per trading dollar volume. The higher the value, the greater the 
intensity of the repurchase. 
 Figure 1.2 plots Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure against repurchase intensity for 
unconstrained versus constrained firms. The positive relationship between stock illiquidity and 
repurchase intensity appears more pronounced for constrained firms, helping motivate my focus 
on constrained firms in this study. 
Insert Figure 1.2 here. 
 Using Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure as my primary measure of illiquidity, I first 
verify that financially constrained firms have less stock liquidity. In 1992, I find a one standard 
deviation above the mean level of illiquidity decreases the probability of a firm being financially 
unconstrained from 84.76% to 75.86%, an almost 9% decrease, holding all control variables 
constant at their mean levels. This is consistent with Ascioglu et al. (2008), who report that the 
more liquid a company’s stock is, the more likely that firm will be financially unconstrained. 
This finding suggests illiquidity is a characteristic of financial constraint. 
                                                 
10 Hadlock and Pierce (2010) point out the endogenous nature of common predictors in previous 
literature, such as leverage and cash flow, to constraint status, and recommend that researchers 
rely solely on firm size and age, two relatively exogenous firm characteristics, to identify 
constrained firms. 
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 Since being financially constrained is potentially detrimental to firm value, I hypothesize 
that financially constrained firms will engage in corporate policies that enhance their liquidity. In 
particular, these firms could repurchase shares, and the intensity of their repurchase activity 
could help determine the probability that they will become unconstrained, ex-post. Consistent 
with this, I find that of 183 constrained firms in 1992, the intensity of cumulative repurchase 
activity from 1992 to 2006 is a determinant of the probability that these firms will be 
unconstrained in 2006. Specifically, a one standard deviation above the mean value of 
repurchase intensity increases the probability of being unconstrained in 2006 for constrained 
firms in 1992, from 7.21% to 10.1%, an increase of 2.89%, ceteris paribus. 
 Firms use share repurchases to improve their stock liquidity to reduce financial 
constraint. Since financially constrained firms are more likely to have illiquid stocks, share 
repurchases provide stock liquidity by increasing market depth.  Knowing this, firms decide to 
repurchase when they observe that their stock liquidity is below some threshold. Given that firms 
make this decision endogenously, I identify evidence of a causal effect of share repurchases on 
improvements in liquidity by means of a two-stage-least-square (2SLS) model. I also correct for 
selection bias in decision making using Heckman’s (1979) inverse Mill’s ratio. Using this 
methodology, I show that the more illiquid a stock was in the prior year, the more likely the firm 
will repurchase its shares in the current year. This finding is inconsistent with Brockman et al. 
(2008), who document that higher market liquidity encourages share repurchases, but their 
analysis lumps financially unconstrained with constrained firms. Consistent with Hillert et al. 
(2013), I find that while lagged illiquidity prompts firms to repurchase shares, repurchase 
intensity enhances contemporaneous stock liquidity. 
 Enhanced stock liquidity can be beneficial for financially constrained firms through its 
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effects on a variety of corporate decisions. Specifically, improved liquidity firms are more likely 
to issue equity. Liquidity lowers costs of capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003; and Acharya and Pedersen, 2005), especially in raising equity, because 
flotation costs and investment banking fees are reduced (Butler et al., 2005). I test for and find 
evidence of this using Heckman’s inverse Mill’s ratio to control for selection bias in the decision 
to issue equity. Further, I find no such effect on debt issuance, suggesting improved stock 
liquidity is more likely to be beneficial for equity issues than bonds, consistent with Lipson and 
Mortal (2009) and Bharath et al. (2009). 
 With improved liquidity, formerly financially constrained firms are able to issue more 
equity, presumably to fund investments. As a result, improved stock liquidity should be 
accompanied by increased investments. Higher trading volume, a proxy for liquidity, is 
associated with higher investment (Munoz, 2013). This relationship is greater for firms with 
tighter financial constraints and better investment opportunities. Stock liquidity is significantly 
correlated with R&D activity (Vo, 2013). I find evidence supporting this prediction. 
 As stock liquidity improves, information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
investors decreases, and prices become more informative for managers, investors, and other 
stakeholders.  This implies markets now value the firm’s investments more than when their 
stocks were less liquid. I test for this by constructing a variable called value added (per dollar of 
incremental investments), measuring the increase in market value of assets, adjusting for net 
equity issuance and debt issuance, per dollar of investments. The intuition for this variable is that 
as a firm chooses to invest in different projects, the market observes this and reflects its 
perception of the values of such investments through stock price. When information asymmetry 
is reduced, the market is more informed and more likely to place higher value on those 
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investments, increasing the market value of assets. The increase in the market value of assets due 
to investments will be greater for firms with reduced information asymmetry. In other words, this 
variable captures value added from the market perception from improved transparency. Since 
improved liquidity reduces information asymmetry, this variable should be positively correlated 
with liquidity. I find evidence supporting this prediction. 
 Finally, improved liquidity should lead to reduced risk owing to lower liquidity costs. 
However, the effect of improved liquidity may differ for systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, 
given that systematic risk can be hedged. Baruch et al. (2007) and Baruch and Saar (2009) argue 
that when stocks are more liquid, investors rely more on market-wide information, while firm-
specific information is more difficult to observe, increasing systematic risk. This implies a 
positive correlation between systematic risk and improved liquidity. Chan et al (2013) confirm 
this prediction and demonstrate that this relationship is stronger for stock with higher 
information asymmetry. I find evidence to confirm my prediction that enhanced liquidity reduces 
idiosyncratic risk but increases systematic risk. 
 Overall, this paper shows how financially constrained firms with illiquid stocks utilize 
share repurchases to improve their liquidity, helping them issue additional equity, increasing 
investments, increasing value added from market perception per incremental investments, and 
reducing idiosyncratic risk. 
 My paper makes several contributions to the corporate finance literature. First, I provide 
conclusive evidence that firms influence and improve their stock liquidity. Although it has been 
argued that firms can and should improve their stock liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 2012), 
evidence on this has so far been sparse. As a result, stock liquidity is often regarded as 
exogenously determined. My results show firms do care about their stock liquidity and take steps 
 13 
 
to improve it, especially when achieving and maintaining higher stock liquidity is crucial for 
them. In this respect, my findings are closely related to those reported by Daas et al. (2012) that 
concludes managers actively influence the liquidity of their companies’ shares. Daas et al. (2012) 
show innovative firms – those primarily holding intangible assets and relying on external 
financing – have higher liquidity and take a variety of actions (e.g., frequent earnings guidance, 
stock splits, seasoned equity offerings, etc.) to maintain stock liquidity. My findings are also 
consistent with those of Balakrishnan et al. (2013), who show managers provide more earnings 
guidance after the loss of public information producers (analysts) following brokerage-firm 
closures. 
 Second, my results materially contribute to the literature on repurchases and liquidity by 
proving share repurchases improve liquidity, thereby providing a possible explanation why 
previous research appears inconclusive. I show that the liquidity enhancement effect of share 
repurchases is most pronounced for financially constrained firms, i.e., firms that value liquidity 
most. By not separating financially constrained from unconstrained firms, previous studies 
appear to have missed the effect of stock repurchases on liquidity. My results are consistent with 
Hillert et al. (2013), who find firms supply liquidity to the market when they repurchase a large 
number of shares, particularly in illiquid markets. However, my analysis builds on Hillert et al. 
(2013)’s by employing a 2SLS model to control for endogeneity compared to their lagged 
illiquidity in an OLS regression that does not control for selection bias. Also, they do not study 
the impact of improved liquidity on firm behavior, but instead focus on the market 
microstructure features of share repurchase. My results are inconsistent with Brockman et al. 
(2008), who find that market liquidity drives the repurchase decision. I find that a lack of stock 
liquidity drives the repurchase decision. 
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 Third, my study identifies benefits of improving liquidity through its effect on corporate 
decisions. My paper builds on literature linking stock liquidity and external financing (Lesmond 
et al., 2008; Lipson and Mortal, 2009; Butler et al., 2005), stock liquidity and investment 
(Becker-Blease and Paul, 2006; Li, 2011; Vo, 2013), stock liquidity and price efficiency 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Chordia et al., 2005; Chordia et al., 
2008), and stock liquidity and firm risk (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 
2005; Chan et al., 2013) by showing that these benefits are especially valuable to financially 
constrained firms. 
 Finally, my study complements the literature on payout decisions in financially 
constrained firms. Chen and Wang (2012) find that share repurchases by constrained firms lead 
to reduced cash and cash flow, and increased leverage, reducing investment. These firms also 
experience significantly weaker abnormal returns and operating performance post-repurchase. 
Why then do financially constrained firms engage in share repurchases when repurchases do not 
enhance shareholder wealth? Chen and Wang (2012) propose managerial overconfidence as a 
possible reason. Managers of these firms tend to overestimate their firms’ future investments and 
returns. I add to this discussion by proving another explanation, i.e., managers of financially 
constrained firms repurchase shares to improve share liquidity.  To my knowledge, my paper is 
the first to link liquidity to share repurchase among financially constrained firms. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section B develops my empirical predictions. 
Section C describes my data collection procedure and details the construction of my main 
variables. Section D investigates the relation between repurchase intensity and financial 
constraint status. Section E examines the relation between repurchase intensity and liquidity. 
Section F examines the effect of liquidity on firms’ behaviors. Section G concludes. 
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B. Testable Hypotheses 
 Drawing upon the arguments made in the literature, I hypothesize that firms take actions 
that influence their stock liquidity. To test this, I focus on a set of firms that are expected to most 
value stock liquidity. Specifically, I argue that financially constrained firms face costly external 
financing and have illiquid stocks due to high levels of information asymmetry. Since share 
repurchases provide liquidity for less liquid stocks, firms that repurchase more shares are less 
likely to remain constrained. This leads me to my first testable hypothesis, stated in alternate 
form: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): Ex-ante financial constrained firms that have greater share 
 repurchase intensity are more likely to become unconstrained ex-post. 
 I build on the notion that firms can influence the level of their stock liquidity. Given their 
higher cost of capital and underinvestment resulting from financial constraint, these firms will 
engage in share repurchases to improve their stock liquidity, and only do so when their stock 
liquidity is below some threshold. Specifically, my second testable hypothesis is: 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2): Lagged illiquidity increases the probability financially constrained 
 firms will do share repurchase, and consequently, the stock liquidity of firms improves. 
  Due to the strong preference of financially constrained firms for liquidity, I expected that 
the improvement in liquidity would be more valuable for these firms and would be reflected in 
better corporate decisions and market perceptions. Therefore, my next four testable hypotheses 
are: 
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 Hypothesis 3 (H3): Improved liquidity increases the probability firms issue equity and 
 the amount of equity issuance; but such impact is weaker, or nonexistent for debt 
 issuance. 
 Hypothesis 4 (H4): Improved liquidity is associated with increased firm investment. 
 Hypothesis 5 (H5): Improved liquidity is associated with greater value added from 
 market perception per dollar of incremental investments. 
 Hypothesis 6 (H6): Improved liquidity reduces risk via reduced idiosyncratic risk, and 
 increases systematic risk. 
C. Data and Methodology 
 In this section, I describe my sample selection procedure and primary variables. 
1. Sample Design 
 My sample starts with U.S. publicly traded firms between 1992 and 2006. According to 
Grullon and Michaely (2000), since the mid-1980s, more and more firms have decided to initiate 
share repurchase programs as a way to distribute cash flows to their shareholders. I start the 
sample in 1992 and end in 2006 to capture popularity of share repurchases and at the same time 
avoid contaminating effects of the savings and loans crisis that started in 1989 and the credit 
crisis that began in 2007, both of which adversely affect market liquidity. To be included in my 
sample, firms must be in both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat 
files. I exclude financials and utilities because they do not report on share repurchases and have 
essentially unique types of asset and capital structure, leverage, and regulatory supervision. I also 
require firms to have positive assets and market capitalization. 
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 I collect daily stock returns, prices and trading volumes from CRSP to calculate the 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, cumulative stock returns, and total risk. I include all ordinary 
common stocks (share code 10 and 11) traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (exchange code 
1, 2 and 3). Primes, closed-end funds, REITs, American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and 
foreign companies are excluded. I obtain firm financial characteristics from Compustat. 
  I require sample firms to have data available for the entire period 1992 through 2006. 
Because the focus of the paper is on financially constrained firms, i.e., firms that are already 
more likely to leave the sample, limiting my study to those that remain allows me to observe the 
effect of share repurchases via liquidity enhancement on their constraint status without the 
confounding effects of other factors. My final sample includes 1,082 firms that satisfy all 
criteria. I further exclude firms that are classified as financially sufficient to avoid contamination 
of financially unconstrained and constrained groups. My final sample consists of 786 firms, 603 
of which are unconstrained and 183 constrained in 1992. In analyses involving financial 
constrained firms, I only use these 183 firms. 
2. Measuring Stock Market Liquidity 
 Although there are numerous studies on liquidity, the stock liquidity concept itself is still 
evolving (Cholette et al., 2007) because it comprises several dimensions, including trading costs, 
turnover, bid-ask spread, and price impact. To capture stock liquidity, current finance literature 
generally examines liquidity in terms of the ability of investors to trade large quantities of stock 
quickly at low cost with little price impact (Liu, 2006; Chordia et al., 2009). Although this 
definition of multi-dimensional liquidity is generally accepted, a single liquidity measure may 
not capture all dimensions of liquidity (Cholette et al., 2007). I use Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
measure because it is widely used to measure liquidity at both the aggregate and the firm level, 
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as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Kamara et al. (2008), and Goyenko et al. (2009). This 
measure is easy to compute, and is highly correlated with other liquidity measures, such as bid-
ask spread, LOT, trading volume, and price impact measures. It is defined as the average ratio of 
the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day. This ratio gives the absolute 
(percentage) price change per dollar of daily trading volume, or the daily price impact of the 
order flow. 
 In this paper, the Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure is calculated as follows 
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where tiD ,  is the number of valid observation days for stock i  during fiscal year t , siR ,  is the 
absolute return on day s  for stock i . siP ,  and siVol ,  are respectively the daily price and trading 
volume of stock i  on day s . I multiply the above estimate by 106 for practical purposes. This 
measure is called an illiquidity measure because a high value indicates low liquidity. 
 I follow Amihud (2002)’s exclusion of firms with less than 200 trading days during the 
year t . I also require firms to have trading volume and market capitalization in year t  to 
calculate the Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure. Because the impact of repurchases on 
liquidity may vary depending on the exchange that the stock is traded, I adjust the Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure by subtracting exchange illiquidity from raw Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity during the period. 
3. Measuring Financial Constraint 
 To study the role of financial constraint on firm behavior, researchers are often in need of 
a measure of the severity of constraint. The literature suggests many possibilities, but is divided 
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on which measure best captures financial constraint. As a result, empirical studies tend to employ 
a range of measures for robustness. Judged by Google Scholar citations, the KZ index, as 
suggested by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Lamont et al. (2001), Baker et al. (2003), Chen et al. 
(2007), and Hennessy et al. (2007), is the most popular measure of financial constraints. Other 
popular measures of financial constraint are the cash-cash flow sensitivity of Almeida et al. 
(2004), the investment-cash flow sensitivity of Fazzari et al. (1988), the WW index of Whited 
and Wu (2006), and the HP index of Hadlock and Pierce (2010). 
 Ascioglu et al. (2008) argue that when a classification scheme for identifying constrained 
firms is based upon a measure correlated with net worth or internal funds, the characters of those 
firms, such as investment-cash flow sensitivity, are not consistent with firms with financial 
constraints. By collecting detailed qualitative information from financial filings to categorize 
financial constraints for a random sample of firms from 1995 to 2004, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) 
cast serious doubt on the validity of the KZ index, while offering mixed evidence on the validity 
of other common measures of constraint11. Concerned with the endogenous nature of common 
predictors such as leverage and cash flow to constraint status, they recommend researchers rely 
solely on firm size and age, two relatively exogenous firm characteristics, to identify constrained 
firms. Therefore, in this paper, I use HP index to classify financially constrained firms. The HP 
index is calculated as 
)040.0()043.0()737.0( 2 AgeSizeSizeHP   
where Size  equals the log of inflation-adjusted book assets, and Age  is the number of years the 
firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on Compustat. In calculating this index, Size  is 
                                                 
11 Hadlock and Pierce (2010) provide evidence that “the only truly new variable from the WW 
index that offers marginal explanatory power” over the KZ index is firm size. 
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capped at (the log of) $4.5 billion, and Age  is winsorized at 37 years. A firm with a high HP 
index is considered more financially constrained. 
 I construct the HP index for each firm in the universe of Compustat firms at the 
beginning of the sample period 1992, and then again at the end of the sample period 2006. To 
reduce the effects of a few extreme values, I Winsorize components of the HP index at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. For those two years of data, I sort all the firms in Compustat into terciles of 
40th and 60th percentiles (40-20-40) according to the value of their HP indexes. Firms with the 
lowest HP index values are placed in tercile one, and firms with the highest values in tercile 
three. I then assign my sample firms to these groups based on their HP terciles in 1992 and 2006. 
I consider firms in the highest HP tercile to be financially constrained, firms in the middle HP 
tercile to be financially sufficient and firms in the lowest HP tercile to be financially 
unconstrained. 
Insert Table 1.1 here. 
 Table 1.1, Panel A reports the frequency of firms for three groups: financially 
unconstrained, financially sufficient, and financially constrained, at the beginning of the sample 
period 1992, and at the end in 2006. Of my original sample of 1,082 firms, 55.7% are 
unconstrained in 1992, 21.1% sufficient in 1992, and 23.2% constrained in 1992. Their financial 
constraint status in 2006 evolves such that all unconstrained firms in 1992 remain unconstrained 
by 2006, while 86.0% of sufficient firms in 1992 improve to become unconstrained by 2006, 
while 39.4% of constrained firms in 1992 become unconstrained by 2006, and only 33.6% stay 
constrained. To some extent, sufficient firms behave more like financially unconstrained firms, 
potentially diluting the effect of the two extremes. I therefore exclude financially sufficient firms 
in my subsequent analyses, and report frequencies of only unconstrained vs. constrained firms in 
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Panel B. Of the 786 firms, all unconstrained firms in 1992 stay unconstrained in 2006, while 
54.1% of constrained firms in 1992 move up to being unconstrained in 2006, and the remainder 
stays the same. The fact that there is no movement from the 1992 unconstrained group suggests 
share repurchases during the period do little to their status, further motivating my focus on 
financially constrained firms. 
4. Measuring Share Repurchase 
 Measurement of the actual value of shares repurchased is not straightforward. The most 
accurate measure would be actual shares repurchased multiplied by the average price of 
repurchased shares as reported in the firm’s financial statements. Unfortunately, detailed 
disclosure of repurchase activity has only been a requirement since 2004. Early studies rely on 
Wall Street Journal announcements of share repurchases, while more recent studies identify 
repurchases from SDC and estimate the number of shares repurchased using either CRSP or 
Compustat data. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) discuss various estimates of actual repurchases 
using CRSP and Compustat data, and subsequent researchers have attempted to improve the 
accuracy of these estimates. Jagannathan et al. (2000) examine whether monthly decreases in 
shares outstanding from CRSP or purchases of common and preferred stock reported in 
Compustat more accurately reflect actual repurchases. They find that the CRSP measure 
understates actual repurchases, while the Compustat measure overstates them, but their final 
sample contains only 35 firms with both CRSP and Compustat data available and includes a 
number of outliers. Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Kahle (2002) adjust Compustat purchases 
of common and preferred stock by removing changes in the value of preferred stock to better 
measure purchases of common stock. More recently, Massa et al. (2007) ignore preferred stock 
adjustments because preferred stock activity is an insignificant portion of firms’ share repurchase 
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activity. Fama and French (2001) adjust the Stephens and Weisbach’s (1998) measure of changes 
in the dollar value of treasury stock to account for firms that retire treasury shares. In a hand 
collected sample of firms, Banyi et al. (2008) horse race various measures of share repurchases 
against share repurchases reported in firms’ financial statements: they find annual and quarterly 
Compustat purchases of common stock, after adjusting for preferred stock repurchases, are good 
measures of actual repurchases in the sense that the proportion of extremely inaccurate data 
points is low. 
 In this paper, I follow Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Massa et al. (2007) to calculate 
repurchase activity. I use data item PRSTKC from Compustat database as a measure of 
repurchase amount. Although by definition this item includes preferred as well as common stock, 
preferred stock repurchase activity is a minute fraction of overall repurchases. Furthermore, in 
some instances this item is reported as zero but there is a significant reduction in the redemption 
value of preferred stocks (item PSTKRV), suggesting a negative repurchase amount if I adjust 
for preferred stock repurchases following Grullon and Michaely (2002). Therefore, item 
PRSTKC best estimates common stock repurchase amount. My main variable measuring 
intensity of repurchase activity ( tiRI , ) is defined as the amount of share repurchased reported 
during the fiscal year (item PRSTKC) divided by the total dollar trading volume over the same 
period (data from CRSP). 
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where tiD ,  is the number of valid observation days for stock i  during fiscal year t , tiPRSTKC ,  is 
the repurchase amount reported by firm i  during fiscal year t . siP ,  and siVol ,  are respectively the 
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daily price and trading volume of stock i  on day s . I multiply the above estimate by 1000 for 
practical purposes. This measure is a repurchase intensity measure because a high value indicates 
greater repurchase dollars per thousand dollar trading volume. Hillert et al. (2013) construct 
similar measures of repurchase intensity, but use number of shares outstanding as the 
denominator. 
5. Control Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 To examine the effect of share repurchase on liquidity and subsequent firm behavior, I 
follow the current literature on financial constraint to control for a set of firm and industry 
characteristics that may affect their behavior. Specifically, I use the component variables of the 
KZ index, including cash flow, cash, dividend, leverage and Tobin’s Q. Cash flow is defined as 
cash flow over lagged book assets, cash as cash balances over lagged book assets, dividend as 
cash dividends over lagged book assets, leverage as sum of long-term debt and current debt over 
lagged book assets, and Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the market-to-book value of the firm’s assets. I 
also use the component variables of the WW index for robustness, including cash flow, dividend 
dummy, long-term debt, sales growth and industry sales growth. Dividend dummy equals one if 
the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise, long-term debt is defined as long-term debt 
over lagged book assets, sales growth as the firm’s sales growth and industry sales growth as the 
firm’s three-digit industry sales growth. I also include stock volatility and stock returns in 
selected analyses. Stock volatility is defined as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock 
returns, and stock returns as the cumulative of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. All the 
variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. 
Insert Table 1.2 here. 
 24 
 
 Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for firm characteristics for three groups of firms 
based on their constraint status: financially unconstrained, financially sufficient, and financially 
constrained firms, as of 1992, and as of 2006. There are significant differences among the three 
groups. Unconstrained firms are significantly bigger, have more income, more cash flow, less 
cash, higher leverage, smaller Tobin’s Q, and less investment. This is consistent with Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010), who suggest constrained firms choose to hold more cash and keep leverage 
low for precautionary reasons. In addition, the fact that constrained firms have higher Tobin’s Q, 
a proxy for growth opportunities, and higher investment, emphasizes the wedge between internal 
needs and external cost of funds at constrained firms. 
D. The Impact of Share Repurchase on Financial Constraint 
 Hennessy and Whited (2007) suggest the financial constraint status of firms has a 
substantial effect on a variety of firm decisions, including investment and capital structure 
choices. Similarly, given their constraints, such firms choose different payout methods with 
varying intensity. By restricting firms with available data throughout 15 years from 1992 to 
2006, I am able to observe a firm’s status coming into the period (in 1992), its payout behaviors 
during the period, and its status coming out of the period (in 2006). While unconstrained firms 
coming in and going out of the period experience no change in status, more than half of ex-ante 
constrained firms come out unconstrained. By controlling for other factors that can also affect 
constraint status, I study the effect of share repurchases on firm financial constraint status and 
subsequent firm behavior as hypothesized in Hypothesis 1. 
1. Univariate Analysis 
 I start my analysis by looking at three groups of firms based on their constraint status in 
1992 and their cumulative payout activity between 1992 and 2006 reported in Table 1.3. 
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Insert Table 1.3 here. 
 By classification, unconstrained firms have the lowest HP index, and constrained firms 
the highest. As a whole, each group’s HP index decreases from 1992 to 2006, reflecting 
improved financial status. This is not surprising given the HP index loads primarily on size and 
age. As firms grow, they become less constrained. In term of illiquidity, values are negative 
because they are adjusted by subtracting exchange illiquidity from raw Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
during the same period. The more negative the value, the more liquid the stock relative to the 
liquidity of its exchange. In general, unconstrained firms are more liquid than constrained firms. 
This is consistent with Cleary et al. (2007), who suggest information asymmetry between firms 
and uninformed investors is a primary root cause of financial constraint, and Ascioglu et al. 
(2008), who confirm market liquidity captures information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors and can thus be used to classify financial constraint.  
 In terms of liquidity trend, market liquidity improves from 1992 to 2006, regardless of 
firm group. This is consistent with Kamara et al. (2008), who observe that the substantial 
increase in institutional investing and index trading in in the past 50 years play a key role in 
increasing trading volume and liquidity in U.S. equity markets. The liquidity of financially 
sufficient firms more closely resembles that of unconstrained than constrained firms, consistent 
with the notion that financially sufficient firms behave more like unconstrained firms. This also 
motivates me to remove financially sufficient firms from my final sample of constrained firms. 
 Consistent with the free-cash-flow hypothesis of corporate payouts first proposed by 
Jensen (1986), financially unconstrained firms pay out much more than the other two groups, 
either in the form of dividends or share repurchases. These firms are more likely to have excess 
cash and fewer growth opportunities. Sufficient and constrained firms pay out much less, and 
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utilize more share repurchases than dividends. This is in line with Jagannathan et al. (2000) and 
Guay and Harford (2000), who suggest that share repurchases are used to distribute cash flows 
unlikely to reoccur. 
2. Cross-sectional Regression Analyses 
 Before focusing on constrained firms, I investigate the characteristics of financial 
constraints as these firms enter my sample in 1992. I limit my sample to 786 firms that are either 
unconstrained or constrained. I run probit regressions to assess whether the probability of being 
unconstrained is correlated with different characteristics of firms. The primary test variable here 
is firm illiquidity. I use the components of KZ index as additional explanatory variables in 
Column 1, and rerun the regression using WW index’s components as a robustness test in 
Column 2. I do not use log(Total Assets) as one of the WW index’s components because of 
multicolinearity given the HP index is also calculated based on total assets. The results are 
shown in Table 1.4. Intercepts are not reported. 
Insert Table 1.4 here. 
 All coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero, implying the HP 
classification is a good measure of financial constraint. Consistent with prior literature, 
unconstrained firms are more liquid, have more cash flow, pay more dividends, and have less 
growth opportunities. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue constrained firms hold more cash and 
keep financial slack for precautionary purposes. I also find unconstrained firms have less cash 
and more leverage. Consistent with Ascioglu et al. (2008), the more liquid a firm’s stock, the 
more likely it is unconstrained. High illiquidity implies high information asymmetry between the 
firm and the market, increasing costs of external financing and thus constraint. This relationship 
is statistically and economically significant. Holding all control variables constant at their mean 
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levels, a one standard deviation above mean level of illiquidity decreases the probability of a 
firm being unconstrained from 84.76% to 75.86%, an almost 9% decrease in likelihood.  
 Of 786 firms that enter my sample period in 1992, all 603 unconstrained firms come out 
as still unconstrained in 2006, and there is no significant cross-sectional change in financial 
constraint among unconstrained firms. However, of 183 constrained firms in 1992, 99 become 
unconstrained by 2006, and only 84 remain constrained.  
 Does repurchase intensity play a role in improving the financial status of more than half 
of the constrained firms? I test for Hypothesis 1 by running probit regressions on the group of 
constrained firms in 1992 only, modelling the probability of being unconstrained in 2006. The 
test variables are cumulative repurchase intensity and cumulative dividend ratio. Cumulative 
repurchase intensity is the repurchase intensity over 15 years, from 1992 to 2006, calculated as 
the sum of repurchase amount over 15 years divided by the total dollar trading volume over the 
same period. Cumulative dividend ratio is calculated as the sum of dividends paid throughout 15 
years divided by the sum of total assets in the years that dividends are paid. This variable is used 
to test for the dividend substitution hypothesis (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). The control 
variables are either all the KZ’s components (Column 1) or all the WW’s components in 2006 
(Column 2). Again, I do not use log(Total Assets) for WW variables. The results are shown in 
Table 1.5. Intercepts are not reported. 
Insert Table 1.5 here. 
 Similar to Table 1.4, unconstrained firms are more liquid, and have more cash flows and 
more leverage. The coefficient on Cash is not significant. According to Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), constrained firms have less internal funding, e.g. cash, whereas Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010) argue that constrained firms hold more cash as a precaution. In both of my columns, the 
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coefficients on cumulative repurchase intensity are positive and significant. The higher 
repurchase intensity, the more likely ex-ante constrained firm become unconstrained ex-post. 
Repurchase intensity helps reduce financial constraint. Keeping all other control variables at 
their mean values, a one standard deviation above the mean value of repurchase intensity 
increases the probability of being unconstrained by 2006 for constrained firms in 1992 from 
7.21% to 10.1%, a significant increase of 2.89% in likelihood. In contrast to the impact of 
repurchase intensity, the coefficients of cumulative dividend ratio are negative and statistically 
significant. The more dividends firms pay, the more likely they are constrained. This is 
inconsistent with the dividend substitution hypothesis of share repurchase, which implies that the 
effect of share repurchase and dividends are analogous. However, it is consistent with Brav et al. 
(2005), where CFOs acknowledge rigidity of dividends; regardless of the financial status of the 
firms, firms have to keep paying dividends, or risk sending unfavorable signals to the market; 
with higher cost of capital, this deteriorates the financial status of the firm, making it more 
constrained. 
 In sum, the results here are consistent with Hypothesis 1, showing the positive impact of 
share repurchase on alleviating firms’ constraint status. 
E. The Impact of Share Repurchase on Market Liquidity 
 Section D shows the impact of repurchase intensity on the financial status of a firm, in 
particular for ex-ante constrained firms. The higher repurchase intensity a firm has, the more 
likely it becomes unconstrained ex-post. Share repurchases therefore reduce financial constraint, 
but how? I argue that share repurchases enhance market liquidity, which lowers information 
asymmetry between the firms and uninformed investors, as stated in Hypothesis 2. By buying 
back shares, firms increase depth on the sell-side of the market. This effect should be more 
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pronounced for financially constrained firms, of which illiquid stocks benefit more from added 
market depth. Here, firms can be thought of as buyers of last resort – supporting their market 
makers and adding downside liquidity in a high information asymmetry environment. Further, 
the presence of a large buyer in a falling market gives confidence to market participants. Grullon 
and Ikenberry (2000) find evidence that stock returns of firms that actively repurchase their 
shares are less sensitive to market-wide movements in declining or bearish markets. In this 
section, I test for Hypothesis 2 for my sample of ex-ante financially constrained firms from 1992 
to 2006. I require all firms to have illiquidity data available throughout the whole period, limiting 
to 163 constrained firms in 1992, making it 2,445 firm-year observations.  
 There are two issues to be considered in this analysis. First, share repurchases imply a 
decision made by managers. Heckman (1979) proposes a two-stage estimation procedure using 
the inverse Mill’s ratio to take account of selection bias. Second, there is possible endogeneity 
between share repurchases and market liquidity. Brockman et al. (2008) observe that market 
liquidity plays a significant role in repurchase initiations, as well as recurring payout decisions, 
while Barclay and Smith (1988) examine liquidity changes following the repurchase decision. To 
address these two issues, I utilize Heckman-corrected two-stage-least-square (2SLS) regressions. 
In the first step, I model the probability of doing share repurchases in a given year with a probit 
model. Firms that do share repurchases are those that have positive repurchase intensity in a 
given year. Then I calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio from this probit estimation and use it in the 
2SLS estimation as an exogenous variable.  
 Table 1.6 reports the results of this approach. Intercepts are not reported. Column 1 
reports the results of the probit regression. Column 2 reports the first stage of the 2SLS, and 
column 3 reports the second stage. The endogenous variables are repurchase intensity and 
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change in illiquidity each year. Change in illiquidity is calculated as the illiquidity of the current 
year minus the illiquidity of the previous year. The more liquid a stock is, the more negative the 
change in illiquidity becomes. The instrument variables for repurchase intensity are lagged 
illiquidity and lagged firm characteristics. Firm characteristics are either KZ components or WW 
components. The model is: 
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Insert Table 1.6 here. 
 In terms of the decision to repurchase shares, the coefficient on lagged illiquidity is 
statistically significant and positive. This implies that the more illiquid a stock, the more likely 
the firm repurchases shares. This validates my notion that stock illiquidity motivates firms to 
repurchase share repurchases in the expectation that doing so increases stock liquidity, consistent 
with Hypothesis 2. This is inconsistent with Brockman et al. (2008), who suggest higher market 
liquidity encourages use of repurchases, but their analysis includes unconstrained and 
constrained firms. Prior literature suggests unconstrained and constrained firms behave 
differently, so combining both increases the chance that the effect of share repurchases on the 
liquidity of firms in one group could be masked. Firms with more cash flows, less leverage, less 
growth opportunities, and less risk, are more likely to repurchase share. The statistically 
significant negative coefficient on Tobin’s Q confirms the investment substitution hypothesis of 
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share repurchase noted in Brav et al. (2005). Firms do share repurchases when they exhaust good 
investment opportunities.  
 The 2SLS regressions disentangle the endogenous relationship between share repurchases 
and market liquidity. The specifications for Table 1.6 Panels A and B are robust to over-
identification, valid instruments, and truly endogenous variables restrictions. The key variables 
here are lagged illiquidity in Column 2 and repurchase intensity in Column 3. Both coefficients 
are statistically significant and carry predicted signs. The more illiquidity the previous year, the 
higher the repurchase intensity the current year. Consequently, the higher repurchase intensity, 
the more negative the change in illiquidity, i.e., the more liquid the stock becomes. In other 
words, lagged illiquidity prompts firms to repurchase shares, and repurchase intensity enhances 
market liquidity, consistent with Hypothesis 2. This is also consistent with Hillert et al. (2013), 
who postulate that firms supply liquidity to the market when they repurchase a large number of 
shares, and this effect is most pronounced for illiquid markets12. My analysis improves upon 
Hillert et al. (2013) in that I employ 2SLS to control for endogeneity, while they use lagged 
illiquidity in their OLS regressions and do not control for selection bias. 
F. The Impact of Market Liquidity on Corporate Decisions and Market Perception 
 So far, I have shown that financially constrained firms repurchase shares to enhance their 
stock liquidity. The more illiquid their stock the prior year, the higher the repurchase intensity 
the current year, and the more liquid their stock becomes. Why would constrained firms care 
about market liquidity? Fang et al. (2009) investigate the relation between stock liquidity and 
firm performance and show that firms with liquid stocks have better performance, as measured 
                                                 
12 Goettler et al. (2009) argue that limit orders (via share repurchase) are advantageous in illiquid 
markets because they allow traders to avoid paying the spread. 
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by the firm market-to-book ratio. This effect is greater for liquid stocks with high business 
uncertainty (high operating income volatility or high R&D intensity). They suggest stock 
liquidity improves firm performance through a feedback effect where liquidity stimulates the 
entry of informed investors who make prices more informative to stakeholders. Liquidity also 
improves firm performance by increasing the efficiency of performance-sensitive managerial 
compensation13. Additionally, Gopalan et al. (2012) document a positive and economically large 
relation between stock liquidity and asset liquidity, and the relation is more positive for firms 
with fewer growth opportunities and financial constraints.  
 This implies stock liquidity enhancement from share repurchases affect asset liquidity 
and subsequent financial performance.  I test for this argument in the next Section by looking at 
the impact of improved illiquidity on the characteristics of financially constrained firms, i.e. 
costly external financing (supply side) and underinvestment (demand side)14. Since improved 
liquidity also implies lower information asymmetry, I also look at market perception of the value 
added of incremental investments, and firm risk. The predictions for these tests are stated in 
Section B, Hypothesis 3 through Hypothesis 6. 
                                                 
13 In Khanna and Sonti (2004), informed traders factor the effect of their trades on managerial 
behavior into their trading strategy, trading more aggressively, and thus making prices more 
informative to firm managers and other stakeholders. This feedback effect improves operating 
performance and relaxes financial constraints. Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) establish that 
feedback is more important when the relationship between non-financial stakeholders and the 
firm is fragile or there is high cash flow uncertainty with respect to existing projects. 
14 Campello et al. (2010) document that constrained firms have deeper cuts in tech spending, 
employment, and capital spending. They also burn through more cash, draw more heavily on 
lines of credit, and sell more assets to fund their operations. In additional, the inability to borrow 
externally causes many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities. 
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1. External Financing 
 While financial constraints limit a firm’s ability to access external capital, improved 
stock liquidity reduces transaction costs, reducing the cost of capital. Butler et al. (2005) find that 
stock liquidity is an important determinant of the cost of raising external capital because both 
flotation costs and investment banking fees are lower when stock liquidity improves. I examine 
the effect of improved liquidity on a firm’s equity and debt issuances in the period from 1992 to 
2006 using Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regression to control for selection bias. In the first 
stage, I model the probability a firm issues equity or debt in a given year with a probit model. 
Firms that issue equity (debt) are those that have positive equity (debt) issuance. Then I calculate 
the inverse Mill’s ratio from this probit estimation and use it in the OLS estimation as an 
additional explanatory variable. Specifically, I use the following specification: 
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 (4) 
where FinanceExternal  is either equity issuance or debt issuance of firm i  in year t . Equity 
issuance is defined as sales of common and preferred stocks over lagged book assets. Debt 
issuance is defined as sum of long-term debt issuance and change in current debt over lagged 
book assets. yIlliquidit  is the change in illiquidity, calculated as the illiquidity in the current 
year minus the illiquidity in the previous year. Firm characteristics are either KZ’s components 
or WW’s components. 
 Table 1.7 reports results of this analysis, predicted by Hypothesis 3. Panel A and B look 
at equity issuance, while Panel C and D look at debt issuance. The first column in each panel 
reports results of the first stage of the Heckman model. The second and third columns report the 
second stage: the second column uses reported change in illiquidity; and the third column uses 
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predicted and residual change in illiquidity. All regressions control for industry fixed effects and 
cluster by year. Intercepts are not reported. 
Insert Table 1.7 here. 
 For Table 1.7 Panel A of equity issuance, in Column 1, the coefficient on change in 
illiquidity is negative and statistically significant. The more negative the change in illiquidity, i.e. 
the more liquidity improves, the more likely a firm issues equity. This is in support of Butler et 
al. (2005), since the cost of raising equity when liquidity improves is lower. Firms also are more 
likely to issue equity when they have less cash flow, more cash, pay less dividends. These are the 
characteristics of constrained firms, the very ones that are in need of external capital. In 
additional, firms are more likely to issue equity when they have growth opportunities as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, consistent with the notion that firms need more capital to fund their 
investments. The negative and significant coefficient on stock volatility is in support of Larrain 
and Varas (2013), who observe that among stocks with high return volatility, those that issue are 
more likely to have highly negative expected returns. This implies firms are more likely to issue 
equity when their volatility is low. Column 2 and 3 confirm the probit model in column 1. Firms 
issue more equity when their liquidity improves. 
 In Table 1.7, none of the coefficients on change in illiquidity are significant for debt 
issuance (Panel C and D), implying no relationship between change in illiquidity and debt 
issuance. There are two caveats to this. First, these are constrained firms only, which tend to be 
small and less likely to issue public debt. Brown and Petersen (2009) observe that in the last few 
decades, there has been a sharp increase in the use of public equity finance by young firms, 
suggesting that stock issues may have become a closer substitute for internal finance. Vo (2013) 
documents that small firms tend to raise more external equity than debt. Second, improved 
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liquidity is more likely to be beneficial for equity market than debt market. Lipson and Mortal 
(2009) examine the relation between market liquidity and capital structure and find that firms 
with more liquid equity have lower leverage and prefer equity financing when raising capital. 
Similarly, Bharath et al. (2009) show that firms that use a higher percentage of financing through 
debt, have lower liquidity in the stock market. Firms with higher leverage raise more debt, 
implying that these are underleveraged firms, consistent with the notion that constrained firms 
have lower leverage to keep financial slack for precautionary purposes (Hadlock and Pierce, 
2010). 
 In sum, the results shown in this section are consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
2. Internal Investment 
 With improved liquidity, constrained firms are able to issue more equity, presumably to 
fund investment. As a result, their investments should increase with the improved liquidity. 
Using a panel of Latin American firms, Munoz (2013) find evidence that higher trading volume, 
a proxy for stock liquidity, is associated with higher firm investment. This relationship is greater 
for firms with tighter financial constraints and better investment opportunities. Vo (2013) shows 
that stock liquidity is significantly correlated with R&D activity. 
 I test for this argument with the following specification: 
),,( ,1,,, titititi sticscharacteriFirmyIlliquidityIlliquiditfsInvestment      (5) 
where sInvestment is defined as the sum of the firm’s capital expenditure and R&D expense over 
lagged book assets. yIlliquidit  is the change in illiquidity, calculated as the illiquidity in the 
current year minus the illiquidity in the previous year. Firm characteristics are either KZ’s 
components or WW’s components. Table 1.8 reports the estimates of this panel regression. All 
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regressions are controlled for industry fixed effects and clustered by year. Intercepts are not 
reported. 
Insert Table 1.8 here. 
 In Table 1.8, the coefficients on change in illiquidity are negative and statistically 
significant. The more negative the change in illiquidity, i.e. the more liquidity improves, the 
more investments a firm makes. This result is robust to reported change in illiquidity and 
predicted and residual change in illiquidity. Lagged illiquidity is included as a control. Its 
coefficient’s sign is negative and significant, implying firms reduce investment if their stock was 
illiquid the previous year. However, improved liquidity, potentially from stock repurchases, is 
associated with greater investment, consistent with Hypothesis 4.  Signs on control variable 
coefficients are consistent with the literature. Firms will invest more if they have more cash, less 
cash flows, more leverage and more growth opportunities. 
3. Value Added from Market Perception 
 Ascioglu et al. (2008) suggest market liquidity captures information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors. As market liquidity improves, prices become more 
informative to firm managers and other stakeholders, implying markets now value firm 
investment more than when their stocks were less liquid. I test for this by constructing a variable 
called value added (per dollar of incremental investments). 
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 This variable measures the increase in market value of assets, adjusting for net equity 
issuance and debt issuance, per dollar of investments. The intuition is that as a firm chooses to 
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invest in different projects, the market observes this and reflects its perception of the values of 
such investments through stock price. When information asymmetry falls, the market is more 
informed and more likely to place higher value on those investments, increasing the market value 
of assets. Therefore, changes to the market value of assets due to investments will tend to be 
greater for firms with reduced information asymmetry. In other words, this is the value added 
from market perception associated with better transparency. The change in market value of assets 
needs to be adjusted for net external finance (after share repurchase and/or debt repayment) 
because market value of assets can also be increased by additional external finance. Since 
improved liquidity reduces information asymmetry, I anticipate an increase in the value added 
variable, stated in Hypothesis 5. I test for this prediction using the following specification: 
),( ,,, tititi sticscharacteriFirmyIlliquiditfAddedValue   (6) 
 Table 1.9 reports estimates of this panel regression, controlling for industry fixed effects 
and clustering by year. Intercepts are not reported. The sample period is from 1992 to 2006, for a 
sample of 163 constrained firms in 1992. The control variables are either the KZ’s components 
or the WW’s components. The first column uses calculated change in illiquidity, and the second 
uses predicted and residual changes in illiquidity. 
Insert Table 1.9 here. 
 In Table 1.9, the coefficient on change in illiquidity is negative and statistical significant. 
The more negative the change in illiquidity, the greater the value added from investments. In 
other words, as liquidity improves, the market places higher values on firms’ investments, 
consistent with Hypothesis 5. Fang et al. (2009) use Tobin’s Q (calculated as market value of 
assets divided by book value of assets) as the main measure of firm performance and show that a 
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positive relationship between stock market liquidity and Tobin’s Q. Since this variable can also 
be considered to measure how the market values the book assets, their finding is consistent with 
my results. The signs on control variables are also as predicted. Firms with more cash flows and 
more cash are viewed more positively by market. Firms that pay dividends are not. This is 
consistent with the lack of information content of dividends. Firms with more growth 
opportunities are also viewed more positively. 
4. Risk 
 Investors are concerned about stock liquidity. It affects their ability to trade the quantity 
of stocks they want to buy or sell within their desired time-framework at low cost and without 
price impact. Most importantly, investors fear that in the event of a financial crisis, they may not 
be able to exit the market fast enough to contain their losses. These considerations may lead 
them to avoid illiquid securities, or require a liquidity-related risk premium to hold them (Pastor 
and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). This implies risk is higher for illiquid 
stocks. As share repurchases enhance liquidity, I expect reduced risk. However, the effect of 
improved liquidity may be different for systematic and idiosyncratic risk, given that systematic 
risk can be hedged. Baruch et al. (2007) and Baruch and Saar (2009) argue that stock return co-
movement affects the trading activity of a stock and therefore its liquidity. This is because the 
correlation of stock returns with the market measures the amount of market-wide information 
relative to firm-specific information. While market makers can observe the market-wide 
information easily, it is more difficult for them to observe firm-specific information. When an 
individual stock is highly correlated with the market, market makers can rely more on the 
information they observe from market movements, so stock price adjustments are less sensitive 
to its own order flow. Conversely, when stocks are more liquid, investors rely more on market-
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wide information, increasing their systematic risk. This implies a positive correlation between 
systematic risk and improved liquidity. Chan et al (2013) confirm this prediction and 
demonstrate that this relationship is stronger for stock with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry. Therefore, I predict enhanced liquidity reduces risk via reduced idiosyncratic risk, 
and increases systematic risk, as stated in Hypothesis 6. 
 I test for this prediction using the following specification: 
),,( ,1,,, titititi sticscharacteriFirmyIlliquidityIlliquiditfRisk    (7) 
where Risk  is either total risk, systematic risk or idiosyncratic risk. Total risk is defined as the 
annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns during the fiscal year. Systematic risk is 
defined as the market return slope coefficient (beta) estimated from Fama-French's (1993) 3-
factor model. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals 
from Fama - French's (1993) 3-factor model. Table 1.10 reports the OLS results for this analysis, 
controlling for industry fixed effects and clustering by year. Intercepts are not reported. The 
control variables are either KZ’s components or WW’s components. 
Insert Table 1.10 here. 
 In Table 1.10, signs of coefficients on change in illiquidity confirm my predictions, and 
are all statistically significant. The more negative the change in illiquidity, the less the total risk 
and idiosyncratic risk, and the greater the systematic risk. As liquidity improves, total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk are reduced, and systematic risk increases, consistent with Hypothesis 6. 
Lagged illiquidity is included as a control for the level of illiquidity in the previous year. The 
signs of the coefficients on this variable are also consistent with previous literature. Illiquid 
stocks have more idiosyncratic risk and less systematic risk. Other control variables also show 
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consistent signs. Firms with more cash flows, more dividends and lower leverage have lower 
risk. Firms with greater growth opportunities have more risk, due to the uncertainty of their 
future cash flows. Additionally, even after controlling for factors affecting risk, liquidity still 
shows up as an important factor. This is consistent with the notion of liquidity risk documented 
in the previous literature (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Martinez et 
al., 2005; Amihud et al., 2006). Lin and Paravisini (2012) argue that financial constraints 
increase cash flow volatility by making investments sensitive to internal cash and reduce a firm’s 
ability to mitigate the impact of aggregate shocks on dividend streams. As financial constraints 
increase a firm’s risk, share repurchase alleviates this problem by enhancing liquidity, reducing 
risk. 
G. Conclusions 
 In this paper, I study the liquidity choice of firms. Although many of the firm’s actions 
are known to influence stock liquidity, the literature tends to view stock liquidity as an 
exogenously determined variable. I directly test for firms’ influence on stock liquidity by 
focusing on firms most likely to value stock liquidity due to their costly external financing and 
stock illiquidity, i.e., financially constrained firms. The existing literature shows such constraints 
have substantial effects on a variety of corporate decisions, including investment and capital 
structure choices. Financially constrained firms take actions that help improve their stock 
liquidity, notably by engaging in share repurchases. 
 I find strong empirical evidence in support of this prediction in my sample of 183 
financially constrained public U.S. firms between 1992 and 2006. Financially constrained firms 
have less liquid stocks, but those that have greater repurchase intensity are more likely to become 
unconstrained ex-post. This suggests these firms take steps to improve stock liquidity. I find 
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lagged illiquidity prompts firms to engage in share repurchase, concurrently improving their 
stock liquidity. The preference of financially constrained firms for greater liquidity is reflected in 
a variety of favorable corporate decisions and market perception. I find that increases in liquidity 
are related to more equity issuance, greater investment, greater value added from market 
perception per dollar of incremental investments, and reduced idiosyncratic risk. 
 Overall, I find strong evidence of firms being able to influence stock liquidity by 
engaging in share repurchases that mitigate information asymmetry. This is especially true for 
firms that are most vulnerable to and most affected by informational asymmetries. This paper 
also explains a counter-intuitive fact about share repurchase in constrained firms. While share 
repurchases reduce cash balances and add financial leverage, constrained firms seem to be 
especially sensitive to this decline in corporate liquidity. However, by acting as buyers of last 
resort, these firms see their stock liquidity improves and advance their financial status. These 
findings show economic meaning linking market microstructure with corporate finance.
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I. Appendix 
Variable Definition 
Amihud illiquidity The average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar 
trading volume on that day. 
Cash Cash balances over lagged book assets 
Cash flows Cash flow over lagged book assets 
Debt issuance Sum of long-term debt issuance and change in current debt 
over lagged book assets 
Dividend Cash dividends over lagged book assets 
Dividend dummy Equals one if the firm pays cash dividend and zero otherwise 
Equity issuance Sales of common and preferred stock over lagged book assets 
HP index Hadlock and Pierce's (2010) index 
Idiosyncratic risk Annualized standard deviation of the residuals from Fama - 
French's (1993) 3-factor model 
Income Income before extraordinary items 
Industry sales growth The firm's three-digit industry sales growth 
Investment Sum of capital expenditure and R&D expense over lagged 
book assets 
Leverage Sum of long-term debt and current debt over lagged book 
assets 
Long-term debt Long-term debt over lagged book asssets 
Market capitalization Market value of common equity 
Repurchase amount Item PRSTKC in Compustat - purchase of common and 
preferred stocks 
Repurchase intensity Repurchase amount divided by the total dollar trading 
volume over the fiscal year 
Sales growth The firm's sales growth 
Stock volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns 
Systematic risk Market return slope coefficient (beta) estimated from Fama-
French's (1993) 3-factor model 
Tobin's Q The ratio of the market-to-book value of the firm's assets 
Total assets Book assets 
Value added Value added per dollar of incremental investment 
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J. Figures 
Figure 1.1 – Stock market liquidity, share repurchase and equity issuance over time 
This graph shows the mean values of stock market liquidity against share repurchase and equity 
issuance amount from 1989 to 2011. Stock market liquidity is based on Amihud (2002)’s 
illiquidity measure of all firms in the CRSP database during that period. Repurchase amount is 
the repurchase amount of all firms reported in Compustat. Equity issuance is mean sales of 
common and preferred stocks of all firms reported in Compustat. 
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Figure 1.2 – Stock liquidity and repurchase intensity on financial constraint status 
This graph plots the mean value of Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure against repurchase 
intensity from 1992 to 2006 for unconstrained vs. constrained firms. Repurchase intensity is 
measured as repurchase amounts divided by dollar volume trading of repurchase firms. 
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K. Tables 
Table 1.1 – Firm distribution 
This table reports the frequency of firms for three groups of firms: financially unconstrained, 
financially sufficient and financially constrained at the beginning of the sample period 1992 and 
at the end of the sample period 2006. 1,082 sample firms have to have data available throughout 
1992 – 2006. Firms are classified for financial constraint status based on their HP index. 
Financially constrained firms are firms in the 60th tercile of the HP index, and financially 
unconstrained firms in the 40th tercile. Financially sufficient firms are the remaining firms in the 
middle tercile. 
  Panel A: Full Sample  
  1992  
  Unconstrained Sufficient Constrained Total 
2006 
Unconstrained 603 196 99 898 
Sufficient 0 24 68 92 
Constrained 0 8 84 92 
 Total 603 228 251 1082 
 
 
Panel B: Unconstrained vs. Constrained Sample 
  1992   
  Unconstrained Constrained Total 
2006 Unconstrained 603 99 702 Constrained 0 84 84 
 Total 603 183 786 
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Table 1.2 – Financial constraint and firm characteristics 
This table reports mean values of firm characteristics for three groups of firms: financially 
unconstrained, financially sufficient and financially constrained. 1,082 sample firms have to have 
data available throughout 1992 – 2006. Firms are classified by financial constraint status based 
on their HP index. Financially constrained firms are firms in the 60th tercile of the HP index, and 
financially unconstrained firms in the 40th tercile. Financially sufficient firms are the remaining 
firms in the middle tercile. Variables are described in the Appendix. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics in 1992 per financial constraint status
 Unconstrained Sufficient Constrained Unconstrained vs. Constrained 
Market value 4,466.37 283.97 94.71 4,371.66*** 
Total assets 3,381.30 146.18 31.26 3,350.04*** 
Income 159.66 5.79 -0.50 160.16*** 
Cash flows 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.09*** 
Dividend 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02*** 
Cash 0.11 0.20 0.33 -0.22*** 
Leverage 0.24 0.22 0.14 0.09*** 
Tobin’s Q 2.16 2.20 3.56 -1.40*** 
Investment 0.10 0.13 0.17 -0.07*** 
     
N 603 228 251  
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics in 2006 per financial constraint status
 Unconstrained Sufficient Constrained Unconstrained vs. Constrained 
Market value 5,319.27 133.14 39.63 5,279.64*** 
Total assets 5,844.74 79.53 21.13 5,823.61*** 
Income 292.28 -3.98 -1.92 294.20*** 
Cash flows 0.11 -0.01 -0.05 0.16*** 
Dividend 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Cash 0.16 0.30 0.32 -0.16*** 
Leverage 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.06*** 
Tobin’s Q 1.80 1.97 2.40 -0.60** 
Investment 0.09 0.13 0.16 -0.07*** 
     
N 898 92 92  
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Table 1.3 – Financial constraint and corporate payouts 
This table reports the mean values of firm cumulative payout activity for three groups of firms: 
financially unconstrained, financially sufficient and financially constrained in 1992. 1,082 
sample firms have data available throughout 1992 – 2006. Firms are classified by financial 
constraint status based on their HP index. Financially constrained firms are firms in the 60th 
tercile of the HP index, and financially unconstrained firms in the 40th tercile. Financially 
sufficient firms are the remaining firms in the middle tercile. Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity adjusted for the three main exchanges NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Variables are 
described in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Unconstrained firms in 1992 
 N Mean Standard Deviation 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile 
HP-Index 1992 603 -3.85 0.42 -4.23 -3.89 -3.45 
Illiquidity 1992 603 -3.76 5.42 -9.71 -1.03 -1.02 
       
HP-Index 2006 603 -4.37 0.29 -4.63 -4.49 -4.12 
Illiquidity 2006 603 -0.13 1.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
       
Cumulative dividend amount 603 1,254.13 2,589.87 41.40 204.19 920.48 
Cumulative dividend ratio 603 1.65% 2.37% 0.64% 1.42% 2.05% 
       
Cumulative repurchase amount 603 1,182.05 2,057.23 31.44 237.54 1,331.31 
Cumulative repurchase intensity 603 21.13 30.81 4.32 12.20 25.03 
Panel B: Sufficient firms in 1992 
HP-Index 1992 228 -2.87 0.14 -3.00 -2.86 -2.76 
Illiquidity 1992 228 -4.10 11.53 -10.58 -8.82 -0.96 
       
HP-Index 2006 228 -3.66 0.30 -3.86 -3.70 -3.49 
Illiquidity 2006 228 -0.17 2.20 -1.01 -0.89 -0.02 
       
Cumulative dividend amount 228 51.77 168.00 0.00 3.17 34.06 
Cumulative dividend ratio 228 1.43% 3.16% 0.00% 0.44% 1.46% 
       
Cumulative repurchase amount 228 191.24 601.63 2.58 17.54 87.94 
Cumulative repurchase intensity 228 16.60 31.98 1.05 5.90 15.27 
Panel C: Constrained firms in 1992 
HP-Index 1992 251 -2.10 0.45 -2.48 -2.21 -1.82 
Illiquidity 1992 251 -1.96 15.66 -10.54 -8.74 -1.01 
       
HP-Index 2006 251 -3.18 0.49 -3.56 -3.24 -2.88 
Illiquidity 2006 251 0.35 3.27 -1.01 -0.94 -0.02 
       
Cumulative dividend amount 251 7.77 26.24 0.00 0.00 4.34 
Cumulative dividend ratio 251 0.80% 2.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.70% 
       
Cumulative repurchase amount 251 37.36 146.01 0.00 1.61 13.85 
Cumulative repurchase intensity 251 8.51 19.57 0.00 1.13 8.05 
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Table 1.4 – Predicting Firms’ “Financial Constrained” Status in 1992 
This table reports the estimates of probit regressions, predicting whether a firm is financially 
unconstrained or constrained in 1992 given its firm characteristics and illiquidity measures in 
1992. The probability that a firm is unconstrained is modeled. 786 sample firms of either 
unconstrained or constrained have data available throughout 1992 – 2006. Firms are classified by 
financial constraint status based on their HP index. Financially constrained firms are firms in the 
60th tercile of the HP index, and financially unconstrained firms in the 40th tercile. Illiquidity is 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity adjusted for the three main exchanges NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. Variables are described in the Appendix. Intercepts not reported. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Predicted signs are indicated in parentheses. 
 
 Prob(Unconstrained in 1992)  (1) 
Prob(Unconstrained in 1992) 
 (2) 
Illiquidity 1992      ( – )  -0.035***   -0.02***  
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash flows 1992  2.4***   1.428***  
 (0.61) (0.48) 
Cash 1992  -1.49***     
 (0.36)  
Dividend 1992  43.648***     
 (5.82)  
Leverage 1992  1.758***     
 (0.42)  
Tobin’s Q 1992  -0.222***     
 (0.04)  
Dividend Dummy 1992     1.704***  
  (0.13) 
Long-term Debt 1992     2.628***  
  (0.42) 
Sales Growth 1992     -0.566***  
  (0.17) 
Industry Sales Growth 1992     -0.895  
  (0.88) 
   
Number of firms 786 786 
Prob > chi-square <.0001 <.0001 
Pseudo R2 0.511 0.529 
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Table 1.5 – Predicting Firms’ “Financial Constrained” Status in 2006 
This table reports the estimates of conditional probit regressions, predicting whether a firm is 
financially unconstrained in 2006 given that it is constrained in 1992. The probability that a firm 
is unconstrained is modelled. The sample consists of 183 constrained firms in 1992. Firms are 
classified by financial constraint status based on their HP index. Financially constrained firms 
are firms in the 60th tercile of the HP index, and financially unconstrained firms in the 40th 
tercile. Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity adjusted for three main exchanges NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ. Variables are described in the Appendix. Intercepts not reported. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Predicted signs are indicated in parentheses. 
 
Given firms are constrained in 1992 Prob(Unconstrained in 2006) (1) 
Prob(Unconstrained in 2006) 
(2) 
Cumulative repurchase intensity        ( + )  0.019**   0.018*  
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cumulative dividend ratio                ( – )  -0.482***   -0.535***  
 (0.16) (0.17) 
Illiquidity 2006                             ( – )  -1.078***   -0.994***  
 (0.25) (0.23) 
Cash flows 2006  1.98***   2.174***  
 (0.61) (0.52) 
Cash 2006  0.137     
 (0.38)  
Leverage 2006  2.308***     
 (0.86)  
Tobin’s Q 2006  -0.076     
 (0.08)  
Long-term Debt 2006     2.122***  
  (0.77) 
Sales Growth 2006     0.965**  
  (0.45) 
Industry Sales Growth 2006     1.112  
  (1.21) 
   
Number of firms 183 183 
Prob > chi-square <.0001 <.0001 
Pseudo R2 0.562 0.596 
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Table 1.6 – Illiquidity and Repurchase Intensity 
This table reports the estimates of Heckman-corrected 2SLS regressions on the relationship between repurchase activity and the 
exchange-adjusted Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure. The sample period is from 1992 to 2006 for all 163 financially constrained 
firms in 1992. The endogenous variables are repurchase intensity and change in illiquidity. Firms are classified by financial constraint 
status based on their HP index. Financially constrained firms are firms in the 60th tercile of the HP index. Illiquidity is Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity adjusted for the three main exchanges NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Change in illiquidity is the illiquidity in the 
current year minus the illiquidity in the previous year. The independent variables are firm characteristics. Variables are described in 
the Appendix. Intercepts not reported. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Predicted signs are indicated in parentheses. 
 
Given firms are constrained in 1992 
Panel A: KZ variables Panel B: WW variables 
 Probit 2SLS  Probit 2SLS 
 Prob 
(Repurchasei,t) 
(1) 
Repurchase 
 Intensityi,t 
(2) 
∆Illiquidityi,t 
(3) 
 Prob 
(Repurchasei,t) 
(4) 
Repurchase 
 Intensityi,t 
(5) 
∆Illiquidityi,t 
(6) 
Repurchase Intensityi,t     ( – )   -0.556** Repurchase Intensityi,t     ( – )   -0.572** 
   (-2.07)    (-2.01) 
Illiquidityi,t-1                        ( + ) 0.007** 1.161**  Illiquidityi,t-1                        ( + ) 0.00638* 0.933**  
 (2.12) (1.97)   (1.94) (2.09)  
Inverse Mill’s ratio  14.890 -10.820*** Inverse Mill’s ratio  -22.32 -7.235*** 
  (1.02) (-3.07)   (-1.13) (-2.62) 
Cash Flowsi,t-1 1.164*** 29.070  Cash Flowsi,t-1 1.328*** -12.39  
 (5.24) (1.64)   (5.89) (-0.52)  
Cashi,t-1 -0.152 -5.483**  Dividend Dummyi,t-1 0.247*** 2.469  
 (-1.32) (-2.04)   (3.16) (0.32)  
Dividendi,t-1 -0.0333 -10.800  Long-term Debti,t-1 -0.576*** 9.700  
 (-0.03) (-0.23)   (-2.97) (0.83)  
Leveragei,t-1 -0.773*** -31.970**  Sales Growthi,t-1 -0.458*** 5.966  
 (-3.61) (-1.96)   (-3.88) (0.68)  
Tobin’s Qi,t-1  -0.070*** -1.568  Industry Sales Growthi,t-1  -0.172 -1.674  
 (-4.41) (-1.58)   (-0.57) (-0.14)  
Stock Volatilityi,t-1 -0.808*** -30.200  Stock Volatilityi,t-1 -0.720***   
 (-6.00) (-1.50)   (-5.30)   
Cash Flowsi,t  -3.194 -3.097 Cash Flowsi,t  2.568 2.671 
  (-0.63) (-0.98)   (0.57) (0.73) 
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Table 1.6 – Illiquidity and Repurchase Intensity (cont.) 
 
Given firms are constrained in 1992 
Panel A: KZ variables Panel B: WW variables 
 Probit 2SLS  Probit 2SLS 
 Prob 
(Repurchasei,t) 
(1) 
Repurchase 
 Intensityi,t 
(2) 
∆Illiquidityi,t 
(3) 
 Prob 
(Repurchasei,t) 
(4) 
Repurchase 
 Intensityi,t 
(5) 
∆Illiquidityi,t 
(6) 
Cashi,t  -2.047 -0.939 Dividend Dummyi,t  4.236 5.505 
  (-0.98) (-0.48)   (0.48) (1.50) 
Dividendi,t  113.600 71.401* Long-term Debti,t  -0.0860 2.150 
  (1.56) (1.73)   (-0.01) (0.48) 
Leveragei,t  19.060 6.004 Sales Growthi,t  -4.177*** -3.376** 
  (1.22) (0.97)   (-2.85) (-2.01) 
Tobin’s Qi,t  -0.881*** -0.546 Industry Sales Growthi,t  -13.91 -12.13 
  (-2.59) (-1.50)   (-1.37) (-1.54) 
Stock Volatilityi,t  -12.340** -0.578 Stock Volatilityi,t  -13.42** 0.472 
  (-2.28) (-0.14)   (-2.44) (0.13) 
    Stock Returni,t  -1.945*** -2.019*** 
      (-2.76) (-2.88) 
        
N 2,282 2,282 2,282 N 2,282 2,282 2,282 
        
H0: Under-identification Chi-square = 14.021**  H0: Under-identification Chi-square = 10.519* 
H0: Valid instruments Chi-square = 7.163  H0: Valid instruments Chi-square = 4.442  
H0: Endogenous variables are exogenous  Chi-square = 11.147*** H0: Endogenous variables are exogenous  Chi-square = 9.717*** 
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Table 1.7 – Illiquidity and External Financing 
This table reports the estimates of Heckman-corrected OLS regressions on the relationship between the exchange-adjusted Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure and external financing. The sample period is from 1992 to 2006 for all 163 financially constrained firms in 
1992. External financing is defined as either equity issuance or debt issuance. Firms are classified by financial constraint status based 
on their HP index. Financially constrained firms are firms in the 60th tercile of the HP index. Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
adjusted for the three main exchanges NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Change in illiquidity is the illiquidity in the current year minus 
the illiquidity in the previous year. The independent variables are firm characteristics. Variables are described in the Appendix. 
Intercepts not reported. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Predicted signs are indicated in parentheses. 
Equity Issuance – Given firms are constrained in 1992 
Panel A – KZ Variables Panel B – WW Variables 
 
Prob(Equity 
 Issuancei,t) 
(1) 
Equity  
Issuancei,t 
(2) 
Equity  
Issuancei,t 
(3) 
 
Prob(Equity 
 Issuancei,t) 
(1) 
Equity 
Issuancei,t 
(2) 
Equity 
Issuancei,t 
(3) 
∆Illiquidityi,t                           ( – ) -0.009*** -0.002***  ∆Illiquidityi,t                          ( – ) -0.001*** -0.001***  
 (-2.75) (-3.05)   (-2.96) (-3.36)  
Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t ( – )   -0.002*** Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t ( – )   -0.001*** 
   (-3.11)    (-3.40) 
Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t  (– )   -0.002*** Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t ( – )   -0.001*** 
   (-3.04)    (-3.32) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio  0.172** 0.172** Inverse Mill’s ratio  0.007 0.008 
  (2.51) (2.55)   (0.12) (0.13) 
Cash Flowsi,t-1 -0.404* -0.378*** -0.378*** Cash Flowsi,t-1 -0.660*** -0.518*** -0.519*** 
 (-1.92) (-4.51) (-4.52)  (-3.45) (-4.15) (-4.16) 
Cashi,t-1 0.432*** -0.028 -0.028 Dividend Dummyi,t-1 -0.081 -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (3.31) (-1.30) (-1.30)  (-0.95) (-3.51) (-3.50) 
Dividendi,t-1 -2.232* -0.453*** -0.453*** Long-term Debti,t-1 -0.246 -0.072 -0.072 
 (-1.89) (-3.54) (-3.52)  (-1.57) (-1.25) (-1.25) 
Leveragei,t-1 -0.274 -0.030 -0.030 Sales Growthi,t-1 0.424*** 0.050** 0.050** 
 (-1.42) (-0.53) (-0.52)  (4.32) (2.60) (2.61) 
Tobin’s Qi,t-1 0.090*** 0.052*** 0.052*** Industry Sales Growthi,t-1 -0.550** 0.128* 0.128* 
 (5.23) (6.62) (6.65)  (-2.02) (1.88) (1.88) 
Stock Volatilityi,t-1 -0.680***   Stock Volatilityi,t-1 -0.748***   
 (-7.30)    (-8.04)   
        
N 2,282 2,282 2,282 N 2,282 2,282 2,282 
Adjusted R-square  0.274 0.274 Adjusted R-square  0.128 0.128 
        
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES 
Cluster by Year  YES YES Cluster by Year  YES YES 
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Table 1.7 – Illiquidity and External Financing (cont.) 
 
Debt Issuance – Given firms are constrained in 1992 
Panel C – KZ Variables Panel D – WW Variables 
 
Prob(Debt 
 Issuancei,t) 
(1) 
Debt  
Issuancei,t 
(2) 
Debt  
Issuancei,t 
(3) 
 
Prob(Debt 
 Issuancei,t) 
(1) 
Debt 
Issuancei,t 
(2) 
Debt 
Issuancei,t 
(3) 
∆Illiquidityi,t                                  ( – ) -0.002 -0.000  ∆Illiquidityi,t                                  ( – ) -0.001 0.000  
 (-0.61) (-1.46)   (-0.44) (1.46)  
Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t      ( – )   -0.001* Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t      ( – )   0.000 
   (-1.81)    (0.94) 
Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t      ( – )   -0.0001 Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t      ( – )   0.001 
   (-1.30)    (1.61) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio  0.169 0.165 Inverse Mill’s ratio  -0.507*** -0.510*** 
  (0.98) (0.96)   (-4.48) (-4.48) 
Cash Flowsi,t-1 0.166 0.048 0.048 Cash Flowsi,t-1 0.480*** -0.123** -0.123** 
 (1.15) (1.21) (1.22)  (3.72) (-2.43) (-2.43) 
Cashi,t-1 -0.561*** -0.104 -0.102 Dividend Dummyi,t-1 -0.212*** 0.043* 0.043* 
 (-7.12) (-1.52) (-1.49)  (-2.95) (1.96) (2.03) 
Dividendi,t-1 -3.298** -0.662 -0.649 Long-term Debti,t-1 1.370*** -0.194* -0.197* 
 (-2.46) (-1.52) (-1.48)  (10.64) (-1.99) (-2.01) 
Leveragei,t-1 2.020*** 0.487** 0.482** Sales Growthi,t-1 -0.043 0.021** 0.021** 
 (12.46) (2.24) (2.21)  (-1.08) (2.20) (2.16) 
Tobin’s Qi,t-1 -0.012 0.000 0.000 Industry Sales Growthi,t-1 -0.219 0.005 0.006 
 (-1.28) (0.13) (0.13)  (-0.93) (0.11) (0.12) 
Stock Volatilityi,t-1 -0.039   Stock Volatilityi,t-1 0.105   
 (-0.45)    (1.26)   
        
N 2,282 2,282 2,282 N 2,282 2,282 2,282 
Adjusted R-square  0.096 0.096 Adjusted R-square  0.090 0.091 
        
Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES Industry Fixed Effects  YES YES 
Cluster by Year  YES YES Cluster by Year  YES YES 
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Table 1.8 – Illiquidity and Investments 
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions on the relationship between the exchange-
adjusted Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure and the firm’s investments. The sample period is 
from 1992 to 2006 for all 163 financially constrained firms in 1992. Investments is defined as the 
sum of the firm’s capital expenditure and R&D expense over lagged book assets. Firms are 
classified for financial constraint status based on their HP index. Financially constrained firms 
are firms in the 60th tercile of the HP index. Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity adjusted for 
the three main exchanges NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Change in illiquidity is the illiquidity in 
the current year minus the illiquidity in the previous year. The independent variables are firm 
characteristics. Variables are described in the Appendix. Intercepts not reported. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Predicted signs are in parentheses. 
 
Given firms are constrained in 1992 
Panel A – KZ Variables Panel B – WW Variables
 Investmenti,t (1) 
Investmenti,t 
 (2)  
Investmenti,t 
(3) 
Investmenti,t 
 (4) 
∆Illiquidityi,t                 ( – ) -0.002***  ∆Illiquidityi,t                              ( – ) -0.002***  
 (-4.88)   (-5.18)  
Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t    ( – )  -0.001*** Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t     ( – )  -0.002*** 
  (-5.35)   (-5.37) 
Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t     ( – )  -0.002*** Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t    ( – )  -0.002*** 
  (-4.90)   (-5.20) 
Illiquidityi,t-1 -0.002*** -0.001*** Illiquidityi,t-1 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-4.60) (-4.66)  (-5.62) (-5.53) 
Cash Flowsi,t -0.194*** -0.194*** Cash Flowsi,t -0.269*** -0.269*** 
 (-8.09) (-8.11)  (-12.36) (-12.37) 
Cashi,ti,r 0.144*** 0.144*** Dividend Dummyi,t -0.014* -0.014* 
 (5.39) (5.39)  (-1.98) (-2.01) 
Dividendi,t -0.189 -0.190 Long-term Debti,t 0.063*** 0.063*** 
 (-1.68) (-1.70)  (3.04) (3.02) 
Leveragei,t 0.043** 0.042** Sales Growthi,t 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (2.65) (2.64)  (3.97) (4.00) 
Tobin’s Qi,t 0.010*** 0.010*** Industry Sales Growthi,t 0.023 0.024 
 (11.33) (11.18)  (0.67) (0.69) 
      
N 2,282 2,282 N 2,282 2,282 
Adjusted R-square 0.405 0.405 Adjusted R-square 0.290 0.290 
      
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster by Year YES YES Cluster by Year YES YES 
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Table 1.9 – Illiquidity and Value Added 
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions on the relationship between the exchange-
adjusted Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure and Value Added per dollar of incremental 
investments. The sample period is from 1992 to 2006 for all 163 financially constrained firms in 
1992. Value added per dollar of incremental investment is calculated as 
titi
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Firms are classified by financial constraint status based on their HP index. Financially 
constrained firms are firms in the 60th tercile of the HP index. Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity adjusted for the three main exchanges NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Change in 
illiquidity is the illiquidity in the current year minus the illiquidity in the previous year. The 
independent variables are firm characteristics. Variables are described in the Appendix. 
Intercepts not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Predicted signs are indicated in parentheses. 
 
Given firms are constrained in 1992 
Panel A – KZ Variables Panel B – WW Variables
 
Value 
Addedi,t 
(1) 
Value 
Addedi,t 
 (2) 
 
Value 
Addedi,t 
(3) 
Value 
Addedi,t 
 (4) 
∆Illiquidityi,t                               ( – ) -0.671**  ∆Illiquidityi,t                                  ( – ) -0.638**  
 (-2.44)   (-2.23)  
Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t     ( – )  -0.584** Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t     ( – )  -0.619** 
  (-2.19)   (-2.18) 
Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t    ( – )  -0.682** Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t    ( – )  -0.644** 
  (-2.51)   (-2.27) 
Cash Flowsi,t 39.25*** 39.21*** Cash Flowsi,t 24.71*** 24.64*** 
 (7.80) (7.83)  (4.18) (4.14) 
Cashi,ti,r 23.00** 23.12** Dividend Dummyi,t -3.106 -3.187 
 (2.27) (2.28)  (-1.10) (-1.11) 
Dividendi,t -92.21** -92.83** Long-term Debti,t 1.580 1.569 
 (-2.90) (-2.98)  (0.19) (0.19) 
Leveragei,t -7.380 -7.459 Sales Growthi,t 5.180** 5.216** 
 (-0.60) (-0.60)  (2.18) (2.21) 
Tobin’s Qi,t 2.461*** 2.471*** Industry Sales Growthi,t 40.82* 41.00* 
 (4.04) (4.11)  (1.82) (1.81) 
      
N 2,282 2,282 N 2,282 2,282 
Adjusted R-square 0.027 0.027 Adjusted R-square 0.013 0.013 
      
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster by Year YES YES Cluster by Year YES YES 
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Table 1.10 – Illiquidity and Risk 
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions on the relationship between the exchange-adjusted Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
measure and risk. Risk is defined as either the total risk, measured as annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns, or 
systematic risk, or idiosyncratic risk. The sample period is from 1992 to 2006 for all 163 financially constrained firms in 1992. 
Financially constrained firms are identified based on its HP index. Financially constrained firms are firms in the 60th tercile of the HP 
index. Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity for the three main exchanges NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Change in illiquidity is 
the illiquidity in the current year minus the illiquidity in the previous year. The independent variables are firm characteristics. 
Variables are described in the Appendix. Intercepts not reported. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Predicted signs are indicated in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: KZ variables 
Given firms are constrained in 1992 Total Riski,t (1) 
Systematic Riski,t 
(2) 
Idiosyncratic Riski,t 
(3) 
Total Riski,t 
 (4) 
Systematic Riski,t 
(5) 
Idiosyncratic Riski,t 
(6) 
∆Illiquidityi,t                                  ( ± ) 0.015*** -0.014*** 0.015***    
 (8.30) (-3.03) (8.52)    
Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t        ( ± )    0.016*** -0.010** 0.016*** 
    (9.31) (-2.20) (9.62) 
Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t       ( ± )    0.015*** -0.013** 0.015*** 
    (8.41) (-2.93) (8.63) 
Illiquidityi,t-1 0.020*** -0.016*** 0.021*** 0.020*** -0.015*** 0.021*** 
 (11.90) (-5.42) (11.65) (12.63) (-5.02) (12.39) 
Cash Flowsi,t -0.202*** 0.154 -0.211*** -0.202*** 0.156 -0.211*** 
 (-7.43) (1.54) (-8.89) (-7.40) (1.57) (-8.85) 
Cashi,t 0.027 0.328*** 0.002 0.028 0.334*** 0.003 
 (0.73) (9.21) (0.08) (0.75) (9.25) (0.11) 
Dividendi,t -1.046*** -2.076*** -0.979*** -1.049*** -2.093*** -0.982*** 
 (-4.12) (-3.61) (-4.06) (-4.18) (-3.80) (-4.12) 
Leveragei,t 0.067* 0.177 0.040 0.066* 0.172 0.039 
 (2.11) (1.73) (1.34) (2.07) (1.74) (1.31) 
Tobin’s Qi,t 0.004* 0.040*** 0.003 0.004* 0.040*** 0.003 
 (1.92) (4.49) (1.43) (1.97) (4.60) (1.49) 
       
N 2,282 2,282 2,282 2,282 2,282 2,282 
Adjusted R-square 0.408 0.164 0.422 0.409 0.172 0.423 
       
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 1.10 – Illiquidity and Risk (cont.) 
 
Panel B: WW variables 
Given firms are constrained in 1992 Total Riski,t (1) 
Systematic Riski,t 
(2) 
Idiosyncratic Riski,t 
(3) 
Total Riski,t 
 (4) 
Systematic Riski,t 
(5) 
Idiosyncratic Riski,t 
(6) 
∆Illiquidityi,t                                  ( ± ) 0.0150*** -0.015*** 0.015***    
 (8.78) (-3.39) (9.04)    
Predicted ∆Illiquidityi,t        ( ± )    0.015*** -0.013** 0.0160*** 
    (9.51) (-2.92) (9.81) 
Residuals ∆Illiquidityi,t       ( ± )    0.015*** -0.0150*** 0.015*** 
    (8.87) (-3.31) (9.14) 
Illiquidityi,t-1 0.020*** -0.018*** 0.020*** 0.020*** -0.017*** 0.020*** 
 (12.89) (-6.39) (12.54) (13.77) (-5.80) (13.42) 
Cash Flowsi,t -0.207*** -0.092 -0.204*** -0.207*** -0.095 -0.205*** 
 (-8.85) (-0.88) (-8.97) (-8.84) (-0.92) (-8.95) 
Dividend Dummyi,t -0.129*** -0.088*** -0.126*** -0.130*** -0.092*** -0.127*** 
 (-11.42) (-4.37) (-11.02) (-11.73) (-4.43) (-11.39) 
Long-term Debti,t -0.036 0.086 -0.057*** -0.036 0.087 -0.057** 
 (-1.63) (0.96) (-3.02) (-1.62) (0.98) (-3.00) 
Sales Growthi,t 0.002 0.091*** 0.000 0.003 0.095*** 0.001 
 (0.21) (3.60) (-0.00) (0.28) (3.88) (0.06) 
Industry Sales Growthi,t 0.225 0.509*** 0.217 0.228 0.522*** 0.220 
 (1.28) (3.05) (1.44) (1.31) (3.12) (1.47) 
       
N 2,282 2,282 2,282 2,282 2,282 2,282 
Adjusted R-square 0.425 0.112 0.442 0.427 0.121 0.443 
       
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster by Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 65 
 
III. Bank CEO Compensation Incentives and Risk: Evidence from Recent Credit Crisis 
Abstract: This paper uses the recent financial crisis (2007-08) as a natural experiment to show 
bank CEO compensation incentives to increase risk, and to increase risk relative to increase 
stock price, lead to comparatively risky investment and debt policies and increased risk. It shows 
that the relation between bank CEO compensation risk taking incentives tends to change between 
non-crisis vs. crisis periods. Bank CEO risk taking incentives lead CEOs to adopt riskier 
investments, including asset growth, loans to core deposits, and commercial real estate loans, to 
implement riskier debt policy by increasing leverage, and to increase bank risk, where bank risk 
is measured by the volatility of stock returns, non-performing loans to assets, and a bank risk 
factor score. We conclude that recent efforts by the press, politicians, and regulators, to portray 
bank CEO compensation incentives as the cause of excessive risk taking and financial collapse 
are premature.
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A. Introduction 
Two of the most important measures of incentives discussed in the recent academic 
literature on executive compensation are: (1) the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price 
volatility, typically captured by vega, or the partial derivative of the Black Scholes (1973) option 
pricing model adjusted for dividends with respect to stock volatility, multiplied by 0.01; and (2) 
the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price, typically captured by delta, or the partial 
derivative of Black Scholes multiplied by 1% of stock price. In theory, higher vega offsets the 
underinvestment problem by encouraging risk-averse CEOs to undertake more relatively risky 
projects. Higher delta better aligns CEO interests with those of shareholders, but exposes CEOs 
to greater personal risk, potentially leading risk-averse CEOs to reject positive net present value 
risky projects. This implies shareholders tend to favor CEO compensation structures with higher 
vega (or perhaps vega-to-delta) to encourage CEOs to adopt value-maximizing risky policies and 
thereby optimize firm risk. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find that vega, after controlling for 
delta, is positively related to risky investment policy, leverage, and firm risk, among sample 
industrial firms between 1992 and 2002. Rogers (2002) uses vega-to-delta to show higher 
relative risk taking to stock price increase incentives leads CEOs to hedge less.  
The need for CEO incentive structures with higher vega (or higher vega-to-delta) is 
arguably greatest in opaque industries like banking. However, surprisingly little empirical 
evidence currently exists on the association between bank CEO compensation incentives, policy, 
and risk, and the evidence that does exist is mixed. Bebchuk and Spamann (2009) show bank 
CEO pay incentives effectively render CEO wealth to be a call option on the value of bank stock, 
and suggest bank CEOs increase their personal wealth by adopting riskier investment and debt 
policies, thereby increasing bank risk (measured as standard deviation of stock returns). 
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Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) use a cross-section of banks to show CEO pay that more closely 
aligns manager and shareholder interests tends to be accompanied by lower bank return on equity 
and lower stock returns. 
The academic literature is silent on CEO incentive changes over time. In Figure 2.1, we 
show mean CEO total compensation, cash compensation (salary plus bonus), other compensation 
(including other annual, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options grants, 
long-term incentive payouts and other), vega, delta and vega-to-delta, by year, for all 
Execucomp-listed U.S. banks between 1992 and 2010. Bank CEO total and other compensation 
increase steadily between 1995 and 2000, decrease between 2000 and 2008, and begin increasing 
again in 2009. Bank CEO salary and bonus increase gradually between 1995 and 2004, decrease 
between 2005 and 2008, and begin increasing thereafter. Bank CEO vega increases between 
1996 and 2002, declines to a low in 2006, increases briefly in 2007, decreases again in 2008, and 
increases thereafter. Bank CEO delta increases between 1994 and 2000, declines between 2000 
and 2001, and steeply declines between 2006 and 2008. Clearly, bank CEO compensation 
incentives change over time.  
This paper uses the financial crisis of 2007-08 as a natural experiment to observe how 
bank CEO compensation incentives to take risk drive bank investment and debt policy, and bank 
risk, and how these relations change between non-crisis (2000-06, 2009-10) and crisis (2007-08) 
periods. We focus on the period 2000-10 owing to the availability of finely detailed FR Y-9C 
data starting in 2000. Our test sample consists of 866 bank-year observations for 121 U.S. bank 
holding companies. To control for secular trends among all firms, we use a control sample of 908 
firm-year observations for 121 U.S. industrial firms matched to banks on size (prior year market 
value of equity) and performance (prior year return on assets).We use Compustat-based policy 
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and risk measures for both groups firms, but also use FR Y-9C data for finer measures of bank 
policy and risk than are typically used in the banking literature. We anticipate bank CEO risk 
taking incentives, measured by vega, and vega-to-delta, will be positively related to relatively 
risky investment and debt policy and bank risk. In the absence of theoretical models predicting 
precisely how some these risk variables act as complements or substitutes, or why they change 
over time, our results on some of our bank risk measures and changes over time are largely 
exploratory. 
We employ a three-part study design. First, we discuss univariate evidence and trends 
among banks, and among banks controlling for changes among matched industrial firms, and 
examine links between CEO compensation risk taking incentives and subsequent investment and 
debt policy. Second, as an additional control for endogeneity, we investigate whether CEO 
compensation incentives are determined simultaneously with policy. Third, we explore whether 
CEO compensation risk taking incentives determine investment and debt policy and bank risk, 
and check whether these incentives are also simultaneously determined with policy and risk. As 
a robustness check, we also verify that our results hold when we use of an alternative measure of 
bank risk, namely a bank risk factor score derived from common rather than total variation in 
select bank risk variables. 
We show that bank CEO compensation risk taking incentives, and risk taking incentives 
relative to incentives to increase stock price, lead to increased risky investing, leverage, and firm 
risk. We also show that investment policy, leverage, and firm risk are at least partly 
contemporaneously determined with CEO risk taking and stock price increasing incentives. 
Using one standard deviation increases in vega, we show the economic significance of changes 
in incentives on policy and risk can be substantial. 
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This paper makes three contributions to the empirical banking and corporate finance 
literature. First, it is the first to link precise measures of the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes 
in stock price volatility (vega), and vega-to-delta, while controlling for CEO wealth to changes in 
stock price (delta), to bank investment and debt policy and risk for a panel of banks. Coles et al. 
(2006) work with a panel of industrial firms excluding financials. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) 
only examine a cross-section of banks for fiscal year 2006.15 Unlike Fahlenbrach and Stulz, we 
construct vega and delta using the method of Core and Guay (2002). Our paper also differs from 
Coles et al. (2006) in that we define investment policy in terms of asset growth (common to 
banks and industrial firms), or bank loans to core deposits and bank commercial real estate loans 
to assets that are unique to banks.16 We also use bank-specific risk measures, including interest 
paid on large CDs, non-core funding to assets, non-performing loans to loans, and 1-year GAP, 
consistent with risk measures used by Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager (2008). Our stock return 
volatility measure follows Coles et al. (2006), but we use annual standard deviation of daily 
stock returns instead of the natural log of annual variance of stock returns, for consistency with 
our other measures of bank risk.  
Second, this paper is the first to show that the relation between CEO risk taking 
incentives, policy, and risk, change over time. New CEOs typically receive large amounts of 
option grants when first hired, as boards of directors seek to quickly align interests of new CEOs 
to those of shareholders. Subsequent option grants tend to be granted in batches, changing CEO 
                                                 
15 Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) use measures of CEO compensation incentives somewhat 
analogous to our vega and delta called “Dollar Equity Risk Sensitivity” and “Dollar Ownership 
Sensitivity.” 
16 We use FR Y-9C data because of the unique nature of banks, and because Coles et al.’s 
investment policy measures of Capital Expenditures (and R&D Expense) are reported for few 
(no) banks. 
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compensation incentives. Changes in investment needs, financing arrangements, asset 
transparency, and information asymmetry, together with economic, business, and financing risks, 
also change CEO incentives. Importantly, the financial crisis of 2007-08 affects most firms but 
especially banks, rendering this event an ideal candidate for a natural experiment to observe how 
the relation between CEO compensation incentives, policy, and risk, changes over time.  
Third, this paper makes methodological contributions to the CEO compensation, policy, 
and risk literature. It extends Core et al. (2006), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010), and others, to 
include the Rogers (2002, 2005) vega-to-delta measure of relative risk taking. It is one of the first 
banking papers to use a sample of size- and prior-performance matched industrial firms to 
control for secular trends in executive compensation. It is one of the first papers to make 
extensive use of FR Y-9C data for detailed bank policy and risk information. It is also one of the 
first banking papers to use common factor analysis to generate a parsimonious estimate of bank 
risk.  
Overall, this paper shows bank CEO incentives to take risk (vega, and vega-to-delta) are 
positively related to risky investment and debt policy and bank risk. Many but not all changes 
observed among banks are related to secular changes among industrial control firms, 
highlighting the need for the use of control samples of matched industrial firms when searching 
for evidence of changes over time. Relations between vega, and vega-to-delta, and bank policy 
and risk change between non-crisis and crisis periods. Bank risk has many dimensions, not all of 
which are readily apparent, but common variation among proxies for these dimensions helps 
capture bank risk. We conclude that recent attempts by the popular press, politicians, and 
regulators, to portray bank CEO compensation incentives as the cause of recent excessive bank 
risk taking, and the 2007-08 financial collapse, appear premature.   
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 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section B contains a review of the relevant 
literature and identifies testable hypotheses. Section C describes sample selection, variable 
definitions, and methodology. Section D reports empirical results. Section E describes our bank 
risk factor score. Section F discusses and concludes. 
B. Literature Review and Testable Hypotheses 
1. CEO Compensation Incentives, Policy, and Risk 
 In theory, shareholders design executive compensation plans to align the interests of risk-
averse under-diversified executives with those of shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Myers (1977), Smith and Stulz (1985), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Smith and Watts (1992), 
Gaver and Gaver (1993), Core and Guay (1999), Guay (1999), and Murphy (1999) all suggest 
shareholders design compensation contracts to influence managerial behavior. If under-
diversified managers’ utility functions are concave to wealth, they will tend to be risk-averse. 
Executive pay packages normally have four components: cash salary; cash bonus (normally tied 
to accounting measures of performance); stock options; and long-term incentive plans (including 
restricted stock, and multi-year accounting-based performance plans). Cash compensation 
(salaries and bonuses) creates incentives for managers to reduce cash flow and earnings variance, 
whereas stock options and long-term incentive plans can either deter managers from undertaking, 
or encourage managers to undertake, risky projects. Shareholders can therefore design 
compensation plans to influence managers to undertake policies that avoid risk, are risk-neutral, 
or increase risk.  
 The empirical literature employs several different approaches to estimate CEO 
compensation-based risk taking and other incentives. Early approaches rely on the proportion of 
the value of executive holdings to total compensation. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) study the 
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ratio of the dollar value of common stock and stock options held to total annual compensation, 
the ratio of the dollar value of common stock and options held to annual salary plus bonus, and 
the ratio of senior manager owned stock to total stock outstanding. Recent approaches focus on 
vega, the partial derivative of the Black Scholes (1973) option pricing model adjusted for 
dividends with respect to the standard deviation of stock returns multiplied by 0.01, where the 
CEO dollar incentive to increase risk is vega times the number of CEO stock options. Core and 
Guay (2002), Coles et al. (2006), and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) use vega to measure CEO 
risk taking incentives. However, CEO compensation also includes incentives to increase stock 
price, typically measured by delta, the partial derivative of Black Scholes with respect to stock 
price multiplied by 1% of stock price, where the CEO dollar incentive to increase stock price is 
total CEO portfolio delta (the sum of his/her deltas of options and stock held) times the number 
of his/her shares. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Core and Guay (1999) focus on delta, and 
Coles et al. (2006) control for it. Vega scaled by delta has also been used by Rogers (2002, 2005) 
as a measure of CEO relative risk taking incentive, offering the advantages of being 
parsimonious (a single ratio instead of two separate measures of risk taking and stock price 
maximizing incentives) and helping mitigate size, CEO risk aversion, illiquidity, early exercise, 
and other measurement problems associated with the application of Black Scholes-based option 
pricing models to executive stock options.  
 CEOs change the risk and value propositions of their firms through investment and debt 
policy decisions, not just hedging. Coles et al. (2006) suggest shareholders select vega and delta 
through CEO compensation to encourage CEOs to select risk-optimizing and value-maximizing 
investment and financing decisions. What constitutes a risk-optimizing or value-maximizing 
decision depends on market, industry, and firm characteristics. The probability distribution of 
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cash flows and stock returns is determined by the combination of these characteristics and the 
vega and delta (or in Rogers (2002, 2005) case, vega-to-delta) from CEO compensation. Agrawal 
and Mandelker (1987) show the value of CEO stock and option holdings is positively related to 
changes in the variability of firm asset returns and leverage, and relatively higher CEO stock and 
option holdings lead to higher variance in returns and leverage ratios. Berger et al. (1997) find 
increases in option holdings rather than stock ownership tend to be associated with higher 
leverage. Rogers (2002) documents a negative relation between risk taking incentives and 
hedging. Coles et al. (2006) demonstrate higher vega, while controlling for delta, leads CEOs to 
increase relatively risky investments (R&D expense or focus (estimated both as a Herfindahl 
Index and as a reduction in the number of segments), reduce relatively lower risk investments 
(net capital expenditures), and adopt relatively risky financing (book leverage). Rogers (2002) 
also finds a negative relation between risk taking incentives and hedging against risk. Firm risk is 
typically measured among non-banks as the annual standard deviation of stock returns (e.g., 
Coles et al., 2006). 
2. Bank CEO Compensation, Policy, and Risk 
 Banks are relatively more opaque than non-banks, owing to their sometimes “hard to 
value” financial assets and liabilities, as noted in Morgan (2002). Moreover, the depth of the 
surprise over the scale of the financial crisis of 2007-08 suggests many bank investment and 
financing decisions, and thus risk, are not easily observed. Difficulties associated with direct 
observation of bank risk contribute to the fact that the association between bank CEO 
compensation, policy, and risk is not yet widely studied.  
 The literature that does exist on this topic is fairly mixed. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) 
and Core and Guay (2002) treat banks like other firms, whereas Coles et al. (2006) exclude 
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financial firms altogether. Houston and James (1995) show bank CEOs receive less cash, and 
pocket smaller proportions of their pay in options and restricted stock, than CEOs from other 
industries. Coles et al. (2006) also find that factors affecting banking industry compensation are 
similar to factors affecting compensation in other industries. John and Qian (2003) find bank 
CEOs have lower pay-performance sensitivity than non-bank CEOs. Chen, Steiner, and Whyte 
(2006) document that executive compensation (measured by stock options as a percentage of 
total compensation) induces risk taking, and that risk affects compensation. Laeven and Levine 
(2009) analyze bank ownership structures, national banking regulations, and risk, and find that 
links between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance, and restrictions on bank 
activities, critically depend upon bank ownership structure and corporate governance. John, 
Mehran, and Qian (2010) find bank pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to 
monitoring intensity but negatively related to leverage. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) investigate 
the relation between bank CEO incentives and bank performance during the recent financial 
crisis, and find no evidence better alignment of CEO and shareholder incentives leads to better 
bank performance (higher buy-and-hold returns, return on assets, or return on equity), or that 
bank CEO option compensation causes poorer performance. 
 Policy and risk are different for banks than industrial firms. Whereas Coles et al. (2006) 
describe R&D expense as a relatively high risk investment policy and net capital expenditures to 
assets as a relatively low risk investment policy procedure, none of the bank holding companies 
listed in Execucomp between 2000 and 2010 report R&D expense, and less than 25 percent 
report net capital expenditures. Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager (2008) suggest asset growth is 
a good measure of bank risky investment, citing the use of asset-growth related variables by 
FDIC, bank supervisors, analysts, and examiners, and arguing that rapid growth in assets is 
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possible evidence of declining underwriting standards, lax risk management, or fraud. 
Consequently, we view bank asset growth as a relatively risky bank investment policy, together 
with bank loans to core deposits and commercial real estate loans to assets. Like Coles et al. 
(2006), we interpret book leverage to total assets to be a measure of financial risk. Coles et al. 
(2006) use annual stock return volatility to estimate risk among non-banks, and Houston and 
James (1995) and Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) use it for banks. Stojanovic, Vaughan, and 
Yeager (2008) also describe interest paid on large CDs, non-core funding to assets, non-
performing loans to loans, and 1-year GAP as measures of bank risk, in addition to loans to core 
deposits and commercial real estate loans to assets that we interpret to be risky investment 
policies. 
 An alternative way to estimate bank risk is to use one or more composite bank risk 
measures. Composite risk ratios discussed in the banking literature are usually derived from one 
of two proprietary econometric models of the Federal Reserve, collectively known as the System 
to Estimate Examination Ratings (SEER). The first model (the SEER risk rank model) combines 
financial ratios to estimate the probability a bank will fail within the next two years. The second 
model (the SEER rating model) estimates the bank’s composite CAMELS rating, where 
CAMELS stands for Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to 
market risk. According to the Federal Reserve Commercial Bank Examination Model, CAMELS 
ratings are used by regulators to identify banks whose financial conditions have changed 
between on-site examinations. Unfortunately, these composite risk ratios are confidential with 
the result that research using these measures tends to be restricted to authors linked to the Federal 
Reserve, as discussed in Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager (2008). Instead, we apply exploratory 
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common factor analysis to some directly observable bank risk measures to develop our own 
composite bank risk factor score. 
3. Testable Hypotheses 
 The literature contains strong evidence of an association between compensation 
incentives, policy, and risk, among industrial firms. This includes Coles et al. (2006)’s finding 
that vega, controlling for delta, is positively related to high risk investment policy, negatively 
related to low risk investment policy, positively related to high risk leverage, and positively 
related to firm risk. Similarly, Rogers (2002) shows risk taking incentives are negatively related 
to hedging. However, evidence among banks is not as clear. 
 We propose that shareholders of banks select CEO compensation structures with vega 
and delta, and relative vega-to-delta, to encourage investment and debt policy decisions that 
optimize risk and maximize value. Similar to the argument put forth in Coles et al. (2006) for 
non-banks, we suggest higher bank CEO vega (or vega-to-delta), ceteris paribus, encourages 
bankers to undertake relatively riskier investment projects (asset growth, loans to core deposits, 
and bank commercial real estate loans to assets), increasing bank risk (as measured by the 
standard deviation of stock returns or our bank-specific risk measures). This leads to our first two 
hypotheses, stated in alternate-form as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): Bank CEO vega (or vega-to-delta), ceteris paribus, is positively 
 related to relatively riskier investment projects (asset growth, bank loans to core 
 deposits, or bank commercial real estate loans to assets), and financial risk (book 
 leverage). 
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 Hypothesis 2 (H2): Bank CEO vega (or vega-to-delta), ceteris paribus, is positively 
 related to bank risk (stock return volatility and other measures of bank risk). 
 In the absence of theory about how individual components of bank-specific risk, 
including interest paid on large CDs, non-core funding to assets, non-performing loans to loans, 
and 1-year GAP, act as compliments or substitutes, discussion of the individual components of 
bank risk is exploratory.  
 Not yet studied in the literature is how the relation between CEO compensation 
incentives to take risk, policy, and risk, changes over time. As our study distinguishes between 
non-crisis (2000-2006, 2009-10) vs. crisis (2007-08) years, we expect heightened risk associated 
with rapidly deteriorating economic fundamentals, regulatory problems such as mark-to-market 
accounting, fixed income market illiquidity, contagion among bank stocks from observed 
financial services firm declines and failures (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Washington 
Mutual, IndyMac, and AIG), and declining real estate values, to seriously affect banks. As bank 
stock implied volatility soars and stock prices fall during financial crisis, we expect shareholders 
to want their CEOs to have reduced risk taking and relative risk taking incentives, engage in 
lower risk investing and reduce leverage, and reduce firm risk. In this environment, the relation 
between risk taking incentives (or relative risk taking incentives) and policy and risk could 
change. This leads to our third hypothesis, also stated in alternate-form: 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3): The relation between bank CEO vega (and vega-to-delta), investment 
 and debt policy, and risk, varies between the non-crisis (2000-2006, 2009-10) and crisis 
 (2007-08) years. 
 Bank CEO and firm characteristics, including CEO Cash Compensation levels, Tenure, 
Log(Sales), Market to Book, Sales Growth, Stock Returns and Stock Return Volatility, 
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Leverage, Return on Assets, and sector- and time-specific features, also potentially affect 
investment and debt policy decisions. In the absence of theory about how these relations change, 
our study of changes in the relation between vega (and vega-to-delta) and policy and risk 
between periods is also largely exploratory. 
C. Sample Selection, Variables, Methodology, and Summary Statistics 
1. Sample Selection 
For this paper, we draw CEO and managerial compensation incentive data from Standard 
& Poor’s Execucomp database. Execucomp provides details on levels of CEO cash 
compensation (salary plus bonus), stock options, and total compensation for the five highest paid 
executives for firms listed in the S&P 1500 (for 2000-10).17 We obtain financial accounting 
information from Compustat, and stock returns from the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP). Data necessary to estimate firm risk are obtained from Compustat and the Consolidated 
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C Reports). 
 Our sample period covers 2000 through 2010. It starts in 2000 because of the limited 
availability of many items in the FR Y-9C reports for bank holding companies in earlier years, 
and ends in 2010 because of limited availability of later data. To be included in the sample, we 
require information to be available for banks for at least two years in the sample period. Our test 
sample includes 877 bank-year observations for 121 U.S. bank holding companies between 2000 
and 2010. Almost all observations are from SIC 6020 (Commercial Banks and Financial 
Institutions), with a handful from SIC 6199 (Finance Services). Our control sample consists of 
908 firm-year observations for 121 U.S. industrial firms. Control firms are U.S. firms listed in 
                                                 
17 Technically, Execucomp also includes a few firms that are not listed in the S&P 1500 that 
have been added over the years at clients’ request. 
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Compustat SIC 2000-3999 (i.e., industrials) matched to test sample banks based on 90-110% of 
prior-year market value of equity (in all but two cases, and 80-120% for those two) and closest 
prior year return on assets. We match on size and prior performance to control for potential bias 
related to the mean reversion of accounting measures (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Kothari and 
Warner, 1997). We rely on market value of equity rather than market value of assets for size 
because of the complexity and opacity of bank assets. We also sub-divide our samples into non-
crisis (2000-06, and 2009-10) and crisis (2007-08) periods. 
2. Variable Definitions 
 We work with three measures (and one ratio) of CEO compensation: vega is the change 
in dollar value of the CEO’s wealth for a one percent change in annualized standard deviation of 
returns. This definition is consistent with Core and Guay (1999, 2002) who use the Black-
Scholes (1973) option valuation model modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividends 
when valuing stock options. Delta is the change in dollar value of the CEO’s wealth for a one 
percent change in stock price. This definition is also consistent with Core and Guay (1999, 
2002). Vega-to-delta is simply the ratio of vega divided by delta, and captures the relative risk 
taking to value maximizing incentive of CEO compensation, consistent with Rogers (2002, 
2005). CEO cash compensation is the sum of cash salary plus bonus. To differentiate between 
observations before crisis and during crisis, and between banks and industrial firms, we also 
define Crisis is an indicator variable set to 1 if the observation occurs in crisis years 2007-08, or 
0 if not, and bank is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation is a bank holding 
company, or 0 if not. 
We employ three measures of investment policy, and one measure of debt policy: asset 
growth is the log of total assets at time t scaled by total assets at time t-1, and is common to 
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banks and industrial firms.  Bank loans to core deposits and bank commercial real estate loans to 
assets are from FR Y-9C reports, and are bank specific. We interpret asset growth, bank loans to 
core deposits, and bank commercial real estate loans to assets to be relatively risky investment 
policies. We rely on Coles et al. (2006)’s debt policy variable book leverage, defined as 1 minus 
the ratio of equity over assets.    
 We use five measures of risk (see Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager, 2008): stock 
volatility is annual standard deviation of stock returns, and is common to banks and industrial 
firms. Interest on large CDs, non-core funding to assets, and non-performing loans to loans are 
from FR Y-9C Reports. 1-year GAP is the absolute value of the difference between assets and 
liabilities that reprice within 1 year, scaled by assets.   
 Consistent with prior literature, we include a variety of control variables in our tests: 
tenure is the natural log of CEO tenure, where tenure is measured in years. Size is the natural log 
of the market value of equity, measured as the closing price of the stock times common shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. Market to book is our proxy for firm growth 
opportunities, measured as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Sales 
growth is our proxy for growth in revenues, and is measured as the log of the ratio of the sum of 
total interest plus non-interest income scaled by sum of lagged total interest plus lagged non-
interest income (all from FR Y-9C reports) for banks, or the log of the ratio of sales to lagged 
sales for industrials. Stock Return is the annual return over the fiscal year. We also include two 
measures of information asymmetry to control for the opaque environment banks operate in. 
Analyst dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, and forecast error is 
defined as the difference between reported earnings and forecast earnings. We also utilize the 
interactive term of these two variables. 
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3. Methodology 
 In the first part of our study, we examine univariate statistics and trends among key 
variables, and investigate whether vega and vega-to-delta are positively related to risky 
investment (asset growth, bank loans to core deposits, and bank commercial real estate loans to 
assets) and risky debt (book leverage) for banks, and for banks net of industrial firms, based on: 
Investment or Debt Policyi,t = b0 + b1Crisisi,t + b2Crisisi,t x Banki,t + b3Vegai,t-1 + b4Vegai,t-1 x 
Crisisi,t + b5Vegai,t-1 x Crisisi,t x Banki,t + b6Deltai,t-1 + b7Deltai,t-1 x Crisisi,t + b8Deltai,t-1 x 
Crisisi,t x Banki,t + b9Vega-to-Deltai,t-1 + b10Vega-to-Deltai,t-1 x Crisisi,t + b11 Vega-to-Deltai,t-1 x 
Crisisi,t x Banki,t  + b12CEO Cash Compensationi,t + b13Tenurei,t + b14Sizei,t + b15MTBi,t + b16 
Sales Growthi,t + b17Stock Returni,t + b18Debt or Investment Policyi,t  + εit,   (1) 
 Regressions based on equation (1) are applied to the full sample for asset growth and 
book leverage with a bank indicator variable to differentiate between banks and industrial firms. 
Regressions similar to those described in equation (1) but excluding bank indicator variables are 
applied only to banks for bank commercial real estate loans to assets and bank loans to core 
deposits. While vega and vega-to-delta are the variables of primary interest, we include control 
variables for delta, CEO cash compensation,  tenure, size, market to book (MTB), sales growth, 
stock return, , and other policy variables (see, e.g.: Bizjak et al., 1993; Servaes, 1994; Gaver and 
Gaver, 1993; Bhagat and Welch, 1995; and Opler et al., 1999; Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 
1999; and Coles et al., 2006). We also include investment and debt policy variables as control 
variables. To control for omitted variables bias, we include firm fixed effects. While our use of 
control variables, lagged values of compensation variables, and fixed effects, helps isolate 
incentive effects on policy, like Coles et al. (2006), we assume compensation incentives and 
policy are also jointly determined. 
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 In the second part of our study, we use simultaneous equations models to check whether 
investment and debt policy are jointly determined with vega and delta. This approach has the 
advantage of eliminating bias that may have been introduced in earlier tests by using 
endogenously determined regressors along with independent variables. Specifically, we employ a 
series of 3SLS regressions of the form:   
Investment or Debt Policyit = b0 + b1Crisisi,t + b2Crisisi,t x Banki,t + b3Vegai,t-1 + b4Vegai,t-1 x 
Crisisi,t  + b5Vegai,t-1 x Crisisi,t x Banki,t + b6Deltai,t-1 + b7Deltai,t-1 x Crisisi,t + b8Deltai,t-1 x 
Crisisi,t x Banki,t + b9Vega-to-Deltai,t-1 + b10Vega-to-Deltai,t-1 x Crisisi,t + b11 Vega-to-Deltai,t-1x 
Crisisi,t x Banki,t + b12CEO Cash Compensationi,t + b13Tenurei,t + b14Sizei,t + b15MTBi,t + b16 
Sales Growthi,t + b17Stock Returni,t + b18Debt or Investment Policyi,t + εi,t,   (2) 
Vegait = c0 + c1Deltai,t  + c2Cash Compensationi,t + c3Sizei,t + c4MTBi,t + c5Asset Growthi,t + c6 
Book Leveragei,t + ei,t,          (3) 
Deltait = d0 + d1Vegai,t  + d2Tenurei,t + d3Sizei,t + d4MTBi,t + d5Asset Growthi,t + d6Stock 
Volatilityi,t + β7Book Leveragei,t + ei,t.      (4) 
 Policy decisions are asset growth, bank loans to core deposits, bank commercial real 
estate loans, and book leverage for firm i at time t. Controls are similar to those used in 
regressions based on equation (1). For asset growth and book leverage, data are available for 
banks and industrial firms, so we use the entire sample with a bank indicator variable to identify 
differences in banks from industrial firms. Policy variables exclusive to banks are run only for 
banks, without the bank indicator variable.  
In the third part of our study, we test whether vega and vega-to-delta affect bank risk 
directly, indirectly through policy, and whether firm risk is determined simultaneously with vega 
and delta. These regressions resemble those described in equation (1), and the system of 
simultaneous equations described in equations (2) through (4), except that firm risk is used as the 
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dependent variable instead of investment or debt policy. Firm risk is measured as stock volatility 
(for banks and industrial firms), interest on large CDs, non-core funding to assets, non-
performing loans to loans, and 1-year GAP (for banks).   
 Finally, we employ factor analysis for the purpose of identifying a parsimonious estimate 
of common variation in bank risk (the bank risk factor). The bank risk factor is estimated using 
Compustat and FR Y-9C bank data. We use the best bank risk factor score to verify that CEO 
compensation incentives, directly and through investment and debt policy, affect bank risk 
estimated in this manner. We also verify that the bank risk factor is simultaneously determined 
with vega and delta. Finally, we investigate whether the relation between vega and vega-to-delta 
and the bank risk factor varies between non-crisis and crisis period. 
D. Empirical Results 
1. Sample Description 
 Table 2.1 reports summary statistics on CEO compensation, policy measures, risk 
measures, and financial characteristics of sample firms. Similar to Guay (1999), Core and Guay 
(1999), and Coles et al. (2006), we Winsorize vega, delta, vega-to-delta, cash compensation, and 
market-to-book, at the 1% and 99% levels. Results are generally mixed. Bank mean (median) 
vega is $201,000 ($57,000) for non-crisis years, falling to $134,000 ($29,000) for crisis years. 
Industrial mean (median) vega is $170,000 ($68,000) for non-crisis years, falling to $119,000 
($49,000) for crisis years. Differences in means (medians) within sample (i.e., for banks or 
industrial firms, non-crisis vs. crisis) are statistically significant, but differences between sample 
(i.e., for non-crisis or crisis, banks vs. industrial firms) are mixed not only in sign but 
significance. Similar results are shown for mean (median) delta. Bank mean (median) vega-to-
delta is 0.309 (0.240) for non-crisis years, and 0.146 (0.311) for crisis years. Industrial mean 
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(median) vega-to-delta is 0.379 (0.326) for non-crisis years, and 0.328 (0.256) for crisis years. 
The difference in means (medians) within sample (i.e., between non-crisis and crisis periods) for 
banks is not statistically significant – evidently relative risk taking incentives, not raw vega or 
delta), is largely unaffected by crisis. Although not reported in Table 2.1 for brevity, we also 
estimate standard deviation of vega and delta for banks in non-crisis and crisis years as follows: 
during non-crisis (crisis) years, the standard deviation of vega is 0.344 (0.271), and the standard 
deviation of delta is 1.637 ( 0.823).  
 Additional information on trends in CEO compensation among banks vs. industrial firms 
is shown in Figures 2.2 through 2.4. Figure 2.2A reports plots of mean CEO total compensation, 
cash compensation (salary plus bonus), and other compensation (chiefly stock option grants), by 
year, for sample banks and matched industrial firms. There are downward trends in mean total 
compensation and other compensation between 2000 and 2004, upward trends between 2004 and 
2005-06, and downward trends to lows in 2009 (i.e., after the crisis). Mean total compensation 
and other compensation increased for industrial firms between 2000 and 2001, decreased 
between 2002 and 2003, and gradually decreased until 2005, and other compensation increased 
between 2005 and 2008, and cratered in 2009. Trends in cash compensation are similar for both 
groups of firms. However, plots of median CEO total compensation, cash compensation, and 
other compensation shown in Figure 2.2B, when compared with plots in Figure 2A, suggest 
some skewness in the data. Trends in median bank executive compensation are different from 
trends in median industrial executive compensation. However, Figure 2.3 plots of mean and 
median bank and industrial CEO vega, delta, and vega-to-delta, show similar patterns in mean 
and median vega, delta, and relative CEO risk taking incentives for banks vs. industrial firms. 
Figure 2.4 plots show similarities in the distribution of vega and delta between banks and 
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industrial firms. We conclude that there are some similarities (especially in vega, delta, vega-to-
delta, and cash compensation) but also some differences in trends in CEO compensation between 
banks and industrial firms.  
Information on trends in policy and risk is reported in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. Figure 2.5 
indicates substantially different trends in comparatively low risk asset growth for banks vs. 
industrial firms. Banks reduce asset growth less than industrial firms between 2000 and 2002, but 
reduce asset growth between 2004 and 2010. Industrial firms increase asset growth between 
2002 and 2007, reduce it in 2008, and increase it again in 2009-10. Among bank-only investment 
policies, banks reduce bank loans to core deposits between 2000 and 2002, and then again 
between 2008 and 2009, but leave bank commercial real estate loans to assets essentially 
unchanged. Similarly, banks hardly adjust their typically very high leverage ratios, whereas 
industrial firms vary leverage somewhat to a low in 2007. Figure 2.6 shows similarities in risk 
measured by mean stock return volatility between banks and industrial firms, with peaks in the 
financial crisis year 2008. Among bank-specific risk measures, mean non-performing loans to 
loans is most closely associated with high stock volatility and the financial crisis, and increases 
substantially between 2007 and 2009, and decreases only slightly in 2010. We conclude that 
there are substantially different trends in investment policy between banks and industrial firms, 
but similar patterns in risk as measured by stock return volatility. Non-performing loans to loans 
also appears to be a promising bank-specific risk measure. 
 Overall, the evidence suggests considerable heterogeneity exists within and between bank 
and industrial firm samples and periods. Some trends, particularly those involving elements of 
CEO compensation and stock returns volatility, have a potentially strong secular component, 
whereas others do not. To best understand the complex relations between CEO compensation 
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incentives, firm policy, and firm risk, and how they change over time, we rely on multivariate 
analysis. 
2. CEO Incentives and Investment and Debt Policy 
 In this section, we investigate whether CEO compensation incentives to take risk affect 
subsequent investment and debt policy. As stated in section B.3, we anticipate bank CEO vega 
(or vega-to-delta) to be positively related to risky investment projects (asset growth, bank loans 
to core deposits, and commercial real estate loans) and financial risk (book leverage). Table 2.2 
shows results of regressions of investment and debt policy on lagged vega, lagged delta, lagged 
vega-to-delta, and contemporaneous controls, for banks, and for banks controlling for industrial 
firms. 
 Table 2.2 Columns 1 through 3 show lagged vega, lagged vega x crisis, and lagged vega 
x crisis x bank, are not statistically significantly different from zero for any investment policy 
measures. This implies CEO risk taking incentives, measured by raw vega, have no direct effect 
on subsequent bank or industrial firm investment policy. However, Table 2.2 Column 1 shows 
the coefficient b9 (lagged vega-to-delta) is -0.085, statistically significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level, the coefficient b10 (lagged vega-to-delta x crisis) is -0.049, not statistically 
significant, and the coefficient b11 (lagged vega-to-delta x crisis x bank) is 0.167, significant at 
the 5% level. The effect of bank relative risk taking incentives on subsequent asset growth is 
b9+b10+b11 and is not statistically significant. The effect of bank relative risk taking incentives on 
subsequent asset growth during non-crisis years (b10) is -0.085, and the difference in the effect 
between crisis years and non-crisis years (b10+b11) is positive and statistical significant, 
suggesting that bank relative risk taking affect subsequent asset growth more during the crisis 
period than the non-crisis period. Also, crisis results for industrials (b9 + b10) are negative and 
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statistically significant, showing the negative relationship between relative risk taking and asset 
growth. Overall non-crisis results for industrials are consistent with findings in Core et al. 
(2006), although we find evidence of an association between relative rather than absolute risk 
taking incentives and asset growth (Core et al. (2006) did not look at relative risk taking 
incentives).  
 Table 2.2 Column 4 shows the coefficient b9 (lagged vega-to-delta) is -0.115, b10 (lagged 
vega-to-delta x crisis) is -0.221, and b11 (lagged vega-to-delta x crisis x bank) is 0.416, all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect of bank relative risk taking incentives on 
leverage is 0.080, consistent with expectations of a positive relation between relative risk taking 
incentives and risky debt policy. The effect of bank relative risk taking incentives on leverage is 
-0.115, during non-crisis years, and 0.195 during crisis years, both significant at the 1% level, 
and with differences significant at the 1% level. The effect of industrial relative risk taking 
incentives on leverage is negative overall, during non-crisis years, and during crisis years. The 
change in bank relative risk taking incentives on leverage after controlling for changes among 
industrial firms between crisis and non-crisis years is 0.416, significant  the 1% level. This result 
shows bank CEO relative risk taking incentives also become more positively related to risky 
leverage during crisis years after controlling for trends among industrial firms. 
3. CEO Incentives and Simultaneous Determination of Investment and Debt Policy 
We suspect bank CEO compensation risk taking and stock price maximizing incentives 
are simultaneously determined with investment and debt policy. Accordingly, we turn next to 
simultaneous equations models similar to those described in equations 2 through 4, and report 
results in Table 2.3. 
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 Table 2.3 Columns 1 through 9 report results of 3SLS regressions involving the 
simultaneous determination of investment policy (asset growth for banks and industrial firms, 
and loans to core deposits and commercial real estate loans to assets for banks), vega, and delta. 
In Column 1, the coefficient b3 (vega) is not statistically significant, but the coefficient b4 (vega x 
crisis) is -1.234, and the coefficient b5 is -0.217, both significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. Recall that b4 + b5 represents the extra impact of vega on asset growth in crisis period to 
non-crisis period. The negative coefficients of b4 and b5 suggest that during crisis period, the 
impact of vega on asset growth is less than that during non-crisis period. Industrial vega is 
negatively related to asset growth in crisis years, and the change in the relation between bank 
vega between crisis and non-crisis years, after controlling for trends among matched financial 
firms, is -0.217, significant at the 1 % level. Column 1 coefficients b9, b10, and b11 are -0.109, 
significant at the 1% level, -0.016, not significant, and 0.165, significant at the 1% level. Results 
suggest higher relative vega to delta increases asset growth for banks in crisis, consistent with 
expectations. 
 In Column 4, the coefficient b3 (vega) is not statistically significant, but the coefficient b4 
(vega x crisis) is -14.369, significant at the 1 % level. This suggests bank risk taking incentive is 
unrelated to loans to core deposits during non-crisis years, but becomes negatively related during 
crisis years. On the other hand, the coefficient b9 (vega-to-delta) is -7.641, and the coefficient b10 
is 6.152, both significant at the 1% level. These results suggest bank CEO relative risk taking 
incentives are negatively related to loans to core deposits during non-crisis periods, but are less 
negatively related during crisis periods (but the relation is still negative). In Column 7, the 
coefficient b3 (vega) is also not statistically significant, but coefficient b4 (vega x crisis) is 6.102, 
suggesting a positive relation between bank risk taking incentive and commercial real estate 
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loans during crisis. A positive coefficient b9 (vega-to-delta) and negative coefficient b10 (vega-to-
delta x crisis), significant at the 1% level, suggest bank CEO relative risk taking incentives are 
positively related to commercial real estate loans during non-crisis years, and less positively 
related during crisis years (the relation is still positive). Overall, the evidence suggests that the 
crisis period lessens any effect CEO incentives originally had on investment policies. 
 Table 2.3 Columns 10 through 12 report results of 3SLS regressions on book leverage, 
vega and delta. In Column 10, the coefficient b3 (vega) is not significant, thee coefficient b4 
(vega x crisis) is -0.173, significant at the 1% level, and the coefficient b5 (vega x crisis x bank) 
is not significant. These results suggest little relationship between bank vega and debt policy. 
However, the coefficient b9 (vega-to-delta), b10 (vega-to-delta x crisis), and b11 (vega-to-delta x 
crisis x bank) are -0.399, 0.197, and 0.198, all significant at the 1% level. These results suggest 
bank CEO relative risk taking incentives lead CEOs to adopt higher risk leverage during crisis 
and bank CEOs tend to adopt higher risk leverage than industrial firm CEOs. 
 To determine the economic significance of these results, we assess the effects of a one 
standard deviation increase in bank vega for non-crisis vs. crisis years on the systems of 
equations reported in Table 2.3. During non-crisis years, a one standard deviation increase in 
bank CEO vega results in a .288 (310%) increase in asset growth, a 9.549 (474%) increase in 
loans to core deposits, a 12.072 (6,067%) increase in commercial real estate loans, and a 0.107 
(12%) increase in debt, all consistent with the expected positive relation between risk taking 
incentives and risky investment and debt policy. During crisis years, a one standard deviation 
increase in bank CEO vega results in a -0.645 (1,289%) change in asset growth, an 11.472 
(780%) increase in loans to core deposits, a 6.714 (2,460%) increase in commercial real estate 
loans, and a 0.298 (33%) increase in debt, in all cases but asset growth still consistent with 
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expectations. However, after taking into account changes in vega-to-delta, the net effect of one 
standard deviation changes in bank CEO vega during non-crisis (crisis) years on asset growth is 
469% (2,371%), loans to core deposits is 906% (915%), commercial real estate loans is 3,867% 
(2,389%), and debt is 78% (33%). These results are consistent with expectations – incentives to 
increase risk, and increase risk relative to increase stock price, have the effect of increasing risky 
investment and debt policy. 
4. CEO Incentives and Bank Risk 
 We also expect bank CEO compensation risk taking and stock price maximizing 
incentives to take risk to be positively related to bank risk. Table 2.4 shows results of regressions 
of stock volatility, interest paid on large CDs, non-core funding to assets, non-performing loans 
to loans, and 1-year GAP on lagged vega, lagged vega-to-delta, and contemporaneous controls. 
 Table 2.4 Column 1 lagged vega, lagged vega x crisis, and lagged vega x crisis x bank 
coefficients are not statistically significant, suggesting lagged vega does not directly affect stock 
volatility. However, the coefficient on vega-to-delta x crisis is 0.010, and the coefficient on vega-
to-delta x crisis x bank is 0.020, both significant at the 1% level. The sum b9 through b11 is 
positive and significant, showing bank CEO relative vega encourages stock volatility during the 
crisis, consistent with expectations. However, lagged vega-to-delta is not significant, indicating 
this relation does not hold during non-crisis years. The sum b10 + b11 is also significant, showing 
the relation really does change between non-crisis and crisis years, and that relative vega 
increases stock volatility during crisis more than non-crisis. Column 2 shows little evidence of a 
relation between bank CEO vega or vega-to-delta and interest paid on large CDs. Column 3 
shows evidence of a negative relation between relative risk taking incentives and non-core 
funding to assets that becomes more negative during crisis years. Importantly, Column 4 shows 
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evidence of a negative relation between vega-to-delta and non-performing loans to loans during 
non-crisis years, and the expected positive relation between vega-to-delta and non-performing 
loans during crisis years, with differences statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Column 5 
shows no such evidence for vega or vega-to-delta and the 1-year GAP risk measure. We 
conclude that bank CEO vega-to-delta is positively related to subsequent stock volatility and 
non-performing loans to loans – our two most promising measures of bank risk based on our 
Figures reported in Section D.1 - during crisis years, consistent with expectations. 
5. CEO Incentives and Simultaneous Determination of Bank Policies and Risk 
 In Section D.3, we show that bank CEO compensation risk taking and stock price 
maximizing incentives are simultaneously determined with investment and debt policy, and in 
Section D.4, we show that bank CEO relative risk taking incentives are positively related to 
stock volatility and non-performing loans to loans during the crisis period. In this Section, we 
investigate whether firm risk is also jointly determined with vega and delta by means of five 
additional 3SLS regressions, with results reported in Table 2.5. 
 Table 2.5 Column 1 results suggest bank CEO vega becomes more positively related to 
stock volatility during crisis periods, and that vega-to-delta is generally positively related to 
stock volatility, consistent with expectations. Columns 4 and 7 show evidence of a negative 
relation between bank CEO vega in non-crisis periods, and risk as measured by interest paid on 
large CDs and non-core funding to assets. They also show mixed evidence on bank CEO relative 
risk taking incentives and these two measures of bank risk. Columns 10 and 13 suggest a 
negative relation between bank CEO vega and risk, as measured by non-performing loans to 
loans, and 1-year GAP, during the crisis period, and opposite results concerning vega-to-delta 
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during the non-crisis vs. crisis periods. Overall, the evidence suggests that during crisis, vega is 
selected to decrease risk (b4), while relative vega increases risks (b10).  
 To investigate the economic significance of these results, we assess the effects of a one 
standard deviation increase in bank vega for non-crisis vs. crisis years on the systems of 
equations reported in Table 2.5. During non-crisis years, a one standard deviation increase in 
bank CEO vega, after taking into account effects on delta and vega-to-delta, results in a 42% 
increase in stock volatility and an 1,155% increase in non-performing loans, consistent with our 
expectation that bank CEO incentives to increase risk, and relative incentives to increase risk, 
result in increased risk. During crisis years, a one standard deviation increase in bank CEO vega, 
after taking into account effects on delta and vega-to-delta, results in a 58% increase in stock 
volatility and a 9% increase in non-performing loans. While these results are consistent with 
expectations, we note that there is a sharp reduction in sensitivity of bank CEO incentives to 
increase risk, and relative incentives to increase risk, between the non-crisis and crisis periods.  
 During non-crisis years, a one standard deviation increase in bank CEO vega is also 
associated with an 802% decrease in interest on large CDs, 627% increase in non-core funding to 
assets, and 10,307% increase in 1-year GAP. During crisis years, a one standard deviation 
increase in bank CEO vega also results in an 832% decrease in interest on large CDs, 600% 
decrease in non-core funding to assets, and 114% decrease in 1-year GAP. 
E. Robustness Tests 
1. Common Factor Analysis Applied to Bank Risk Measures 
 The most appropriate measure of risk for a given situation could be the total variation of 
all dimensions of risk, or the common variation underlying these various dimensions. In this 
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section, we employ exploratory common factor analysis to determine whether a single common 
factor score that measures bank risk exists. 
 Results of our factor analysis of bank risk variables are reported in Table 2.6. Correlation 
coefficients for each of the five bank risk variables are reported in Panel A. Only stock volatility 
and non-performing loans to loans appear to be highly correlated with one another, with a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.351, significant at the 1 percent level. Recall from our 
discussion in Section D.1 that these two risk measures seemed to be the ones that changed most 
with the onset of the financial crisis. Accordingly, for the remainder of our factor analysis, we 
look at common variation among all five bank risk measures, and, alternatively, at common 
variation only among these two correlated measures. Panel B shows factor loading coefficients 
for factors generated both ways. Panel C shows stock volatility and non-performing loans to 
loans are both highly correlated (approximately 80%) with both factor scores, suggesting both of 
these individual measures of bank risk could be used as proxies for the common factors. 
However, Panel D shows the percentage of variation explained from the factor using all five 
bank risk variables is only 27.56%, leaving open the question of what else is happening with 
these variables. On the other hand, the percentage of variation explained from the factor 
generated from stock volatility and non-performing loans to assets explains 67.55% of the 
variation in these two variables. Figure 2.7 shows bank risk factor scores by year. Both versions 
vary similarly, increase during the 2000 recession, but sharply increase during the financial 
crisis, consistent with expectations. Given the high level of correlation between stock volatility 
and non-performing loans to loans (82.2%) with this factor (Factor 1B in the Table), we 
conclude that this factor is indeed a measure of bank risk, and use it in the remainder of our 
analysis. 
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2. Bank CEO Incentives, Bank Investment and Debt Policy, and Bank Risk 
 In this section, we investigate whether bank CEO risk taking incentives, and relative risk 
taking incentives, lead to subsequent increases in bank risk, where bank risk is estimated using 
the common bank risk factor score generated from stock volatility and non-performing loans to 
assets in the previous section. We also assess whether bank risk, measured this way, is 
simultaneously determined with bank CEO vega and delta. Results of two-way fixed effects and 
3SLS regressions are reported in Table 2.7. 
 Table 2.7 Column 1 contains evidence that bank CEO risk taking incentives, and relative 
risk taking incentives, lead to subsequent increases in bank risk, consistent with expectations. 
The relation between bank risk taking incentives and subsequent risk in crisis years is 
summarized by the sum of the coefficients b1 and b2, or 1.191, significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level. This relation in non-crisis years is summarized by the coefficient b1, 0.516, 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient b2 shows the relation becomes stronger in crisis vs. 
non-crisis years, also significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the relation between bank relative 
risk taking incentives and subsequent risk in crisis years is summarized by b5 + b6, or 0.887, 
significant at the 5% level. There is no evidence of such a relation in non-crisis years, as the b5 
coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero. However, the b6 coefficient 
captures the change, and shows the sensitivity of bank CEO relative risk taking incentives to 
subsequent risk increases between non-crisis and crisis years. All of these results are consistent 
with our expectation that bank CEO risk taking incentives, and relative risk taking incentives, 
lead to subsequent increases in bank risk, and that these relations change between non-crisis and 
crisis periods.  
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 Table 2.7 Column 2 shows evidence of a more negative relation between bank CEO vega 
and contemporaneous bank risk in crisis vs. non-crisis periods. On the other hand, it also shows a 
more positive relation between bank CEO vega-to-delta and contemporaneous bank risk in crisis 
vs. non-crisis periods. One limitation of the factor analysis approach is that we cannot assess 
economic significance in the manner done in Tables 2.3 and 2.5 because the factor score mean is 
0. However, our factor score results are certainly consistent with our hypothesis of changes 
between non-crisis and crisis years. 
F. Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this paper, we provide strong empirical evidence showing bank CEO compensation 
incentives to take risk, and to take risk relative to increase stock price, are positively related to 
subsequent bank risky investment and debt policy and bank risk. We demonstrate that bank 
investment policy, debt policy, and risk, are also determined contemporaneously with CEO vega 
and delta. Finally, we document that the relation between CEO risk taking incentives, policy, and 
risk, changes materially between non-crisis and crisis periods. 
In the process, this paper makes several contributions. First, it is among the first to link 
precise measures of bank CEO incentives to change in stock price volatility (vega, and vega-to-
delta) to bank policy and risk, extending Coles et al. (2006) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) to 
a panel of banks. Second, this paper is the first to show that the relation between CEO risk taking 
incentives, policy, and risk, change over time. We use the financial crisis of 2007-08 as a natural 
experiment to demonstrate that the incentive effects of CEO compensation to take risk, 
especially among banks, changes with changes. Third, this paper makes a number of 
methodological contributions, including the application of Rogers (2002, 2005)’ vega-to-delta 
measure of relative risk taking to studies of compensation incentives, policy, and risk, the use of 
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size- and prior-performance matched industrial firms to control for secular trends in executive 
compensation, and the use of FR Y-9C data for detailed information about bank policy and risk, 
and the use of factor analysis to generate a bank risk factor score as a parsimonious estimate of 
bank risk.  
 We note that the popular press, politicians, and regulators, attempt to portray bank CEO 
compensation incentives, particularly those associated with stock options, as the cause of 
excessive bank risk taking and thus the 2007-08 financial collapse. In this paper, we show that 
bank CEO incentives to take risk (as measured by vega, and vega-to-delta), are positively related 
to subsequent bank risky investment and debt policy, and bank risk. However, we also note that 
many of the changes in executive compensation that occur among banks also occur for prior-
size- and prior-performance matched industrial firms, i.e., they form part of broader secular 
trends across markets. Importantly, we show that relations between bank CEO risk taking 
incentives and policy and risk change between non-crisis and crisis periods. Bank risk has many 
dimensions that we are only just beginning to understand – attempts to blame CEO compensation 
incentives for financial collapse appear, in our view, to be premature. 
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H. Figures 
Figure 2.1 – Bank Executive Compensation over Time 
This figure plots the distribution of the mean of CEO’s Vega, Delta and Cash compensation 
(salary + bonus) in years. Data are from S&P Execucomp for banks between 1992 and 2010. 
Bank holding companies are listed in Compustat SIC 6020 and 6199. All dollar values are 
express in millions of 2010 constant dollars, adjusted for changes in CPI. 
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Figure 2.2A – Bank and Industrial Executive Compensation over Time 
This figure plots mean bank CEO’s total compensation, cash compensation (salary + bonus) and 
other compensation by year for sample banks and matched industrial control firms from 2000 to 
2010. Data are from S&P Execucomp. All dollar values are express in millions of 2010 constant 
dollars adjusted for changes in CPI. 
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Figure 2.2B – Bank and Industrial Executive Compensation over Time 
This figure plots median bank CEO’s total compensation, cash compensation (salary + bonus) 
and other compensation by year for sample banks and matched industrial control firms from 
2000 to 2010. Data are from S&P Execucomp. All dollar values are express in millions of 2010 
constant dollars adjusted for changes in CPI. 
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Figure 2.2C – Bank and Industrial Executive Compensation over Time 
This figure plots mean and median bank CEO’s Vega/Delta ratio by year for sample banks and 
matched industrial control firms from 2000 to 2010. Data are from S&P Execucomp. All dollar 
values are express in millions of 2010 constant dollars adjusted for changes in CPI. 
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Figure 2.3 – Executive Compensation for Banks and Matched Industrial Firms 
This figure plots the distribution of the mean of CEO’s Vega, Delta and Cash compensation (salary + bonus) in years. Data are from 
S&P Execucomp for banks between 2000 and 2010. Bank holding companies are listed in Compustat SIC 6020 and 6199. All dollar 
values are express in millions of 2010 constant dollars, adjusted for changes in CPI. Matched industrial firms are public traded U.S. 
industrial firms listed in Compustat under SIC codes 2000 – 3999. Each industrial firm is matched to each bank on size (90% - 110% 
of prior year market value of equity) and prior performance (closest prior year return on assets). 
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Figure 2.4 – Distribution of CEO Incentives 
This figure plots the histograms of bank CEOs’ Vega, Delta and cash compensation (salary + bonus), and those of industrial firm 
CEOs. Data are from S&P Execucomp for banks between 2000 and 2010. Bank holding companies are listed in Compustat SIC 6020 
and 6199. All dollar values are express in millions of 2010 constant dollars, adjusted for changes in CPI. Matched industrial firms are 
public traded U.S. industrial firms listed in Compustat under SIC codes 2000 – 3999. Each industrial firm is matched to each bank on 
size (90% - 110% of prior year market value of equity) and prior performance (closest prior year return on assets). 
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Figure 2.5 – Bank Policy Measures over Time 
This figure plots the distribution of the mean policy measures from 2000 to 2010. Policy measures include investment policy decisions 
captured by Asset Growth, Loans to Core Deposits and Commercial Real Estate Loans to Assets, and debt policy decisions captured 
by Book Leverage. Data are from S&P Execucomp, CRSP, and Consolidated Financial Statements for bank holding companies (FR 
Y-9C Reports) for banks between 2000 and 2010. Bank holding companies are listed in Compustat SIC 6020 and 6199.  
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Figure 2.6 – Bank Risk Measures over Time 
This figure plots the distribution of the mean risk measures from 2000 to 2010. Risk measures 
include Stock Return Volatility, Interest Paid on Large CDs, Non-core Funding to Assets, Non-
Performing Loans to Loans, and 1-year GAP. Data are from Consolidated Financial Statements 
for bank holding companies (FR Y-9C Reports) for banks between 2000 and 2010. Bank holding 
companies are listed in Compustat SIC 6020 and 6199. 
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Figure 2.7 – Bank Risk Factors over Time 
This figure plots the distribution of the mean Bank Risk Factor 1A and 1B in years. Bank Risk 
Factor is the result of the exploratory common factor analysis applied to five risk measures, 
including Stock Return Standard Deviation, Interest Paid on Large CDs, Non-core Funding to 
Assets, Non-Performing Loans to Loans, and 1-year GAP.  Principal factors extraction and the 
proportion of total variance explained criterion are used in the analysis. Data are from 
Consolidated Financial Statements for bank holding companies (FR Y-9C Reports) for banks 
between 2000 and 2010. Bank holding companies are listed in Compustat SIC 6020 and 6199 
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I. Tables 
Table 2.1 – Descriptive Statistics of Banks and Matched Industrial Firms 
Mean (median) values of CEO compensation, investment policy measures, debt policy measures, risk measures, and financial 
characteristics of firms are reported for bank holding companies and matched industrial control firms between 2000 and 2010. To be 
included in the sample of banks, firms had to have data in S&P Execucomp, Compustat (with SIC 6020 or 6199), and FR Y-9C 
reports. Industrial firms were from SICs 2000 to 3999, with data in S&P Execucomp and Compustat, matched to individual banks on 
firm size (90-110% of market value of equity), then on closest prior year return on assets. 119 out of 121 banks were matched on 90-
110% of market value of equity. The remaining three were matched on 80-120%, with the result that there are also 121 industrial firms 
in the control sample. Variables are defined in Section 3.2. All dollar values are reported in millions of 2010 constant dollars, adjusted 
for changes in CPI. Medians are reported in parentheses below means. p-values for differences in means (medians) within sample or 
between samples are reported in square brackets.  
 Banks Industrial Firms Differences within sample Differences between samples 
  Non-Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis 
Banks 
Non-Crisis 
vs. 
Crisis 
Industrials 
Non-Crisis 
vs. Crisis 
Non-Crisis 
Banks vs. 
Industrials 
Crisis 
Banks vs. 
Industrials 
Panel A: CEO compensation 
Vega ($millions) 0.201 0.134 0.170 0.119 [0.067]*** [0.051] *** [0.031]* [0.015] 
 (0.057) (0.029) (0.068) (0.049) [0.028] *** [0.019]** [-0.011] [-0.020]* 
Delta ($millions) 0.886 0.488 0.805 0.736 [0.398] *** [0.069] [0.081] [-0.248] 
 (0.340) (0.146) (0.257) (0.221) [0.194] *** [0.035]** [0.083]** [-0.075]* 
Vega/Delta 0.309 0.311 0.379 0.328 [-0.001]  [0.051] ** [-0.069] *** [-0.018] 
 (0.240) (0.263) (0.326) (0.256) [-0.023] [0.070] [-0.086]*** [0.007]  
Cash Compensation ($millions) 0.047 -0.349 0.244 -0.265 [0.396] *** [0.509] *** [-0.197] [-0.084] 
 (0.183) (-0.316) (0.182) (-0.142) [0.499] *** [0.324] *** [0.000] [-0.174] *** 
Panel B: Management team compensation 
Management Vega ($millions) 0.220 0.166 0.186 0.136 [0.054] ** [0.049] ** [0.034]* [0.029] 
 (0.066) (0.043) (0.075) (0.057) [0.023] *** [0.018]** [-0.010] [-0.014] 
Management Delta ($millions) 0.900 0.442 0.651 0.530 [0.458]*** [0.121]* [0.249] *** [-0.088] 
 (0.297) (0.129) (0.237) (0.199) [0.169] *** [0.039]** [0.060] *** [-0.070]* 
Management Vega/Delta 0.316 0.367 0.364 0.322 [-0.051]** [0.042]* [-0.048] *** [0.045]* 
 (0.266) (0.318) (0.319) (0.280) [-0.051] *** [0.039] [-0.052] ** [0.038]** 
Management Cash Compensation ($millions) 3.968 2.210 3.374 2.313 [1.757] *** [1.062] *** [0.593] *** [-0.102] 
 (2.575) (1.664) (2.593) (1.976) [0.911] *** [0.617] *** [-0.019] [-0.312] *** 
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Table 2.1 – Descriptive Statistics of Banks and Matched Industrial Firms (cont.) 
 
 Banks Industrial Firms Differences within sample Differences between samples 
  Non-Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis 
Banks 
Non-Crisis 
vs. 
Crisis 
Industrials 
Non-Crisis 
vs. Crisis 
Non-Crisis 
Banks vs. 
Industrials 
Crisis 
Banks vs. 
Industrials 
Panel C: Policy measures 
Asset Growth 0.093 0.050 0.059 0.057 [0.043] *** [0.002] [0.034]** [-0.008] 
 (0.044) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) [0.026] *** [0.004] [0.027] *** [0.005] 
Loans to Core Deposits 2.015 1.470   [0.546]    
 (1.136) (1.249)   [-0.113] ***    
Commercial Real Estate Loans to Assets 0.199 0.273   [-0.074] ***    
 (0.196) (0.258)   [-0.062] ***    
Book Leverage 0.911 0.909 0.581 0.552 [0.002] [0.029] [0.330] *** [0.357] *** 
 (0.911) (0.909) (0.574) (0.548) [0.002] [0.026] [0.337] *** [0.361] *** 
Panel E: Risk measures 
Stock Volatility 0.019 0.042 0.023 0.037 [-0.024] *** [-0.014] *** [-0.004] *** [0.005] ** 
 (0.017) (0.032) (0.020) (0.031) [-0.015] *** [-0.010] *** [-0.003] *** [0.001] 
CD Rate 0.035 0.044   [-0.010] ***    
 (0.029) (0.043)   [-0.014] ***    
Non-core Funding to Assets 0.500 0.500   [0.000]*    
 (0.472) (0.495)   [-0.023]    
Non-Performing Loans to Loans 0.015 0.020   [-0.005]    
 (0.008) (0.010)   [-0.002] ***    
1-year GAP 0.198 0.170   [0.028] ***    
 (0.182) (0.167)   [0.014] **    
Panel F: Financial Characteristics 
Total Assets ($millions) 95,889 89,859 9,817 8,896 [6,029] [920] [86,071] *** [80,962] *** 
 (13,652) (9,386) (2,265) (2,114) [4,265] *** [151] [11,386] *** [7,271] *** 
Return on Assets 0.010 0.004 0.097 0.040 [0.006] *** [0.057]  [-0.087] [-0.036] *** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.038) (0.053) [0.003] *** [-0.015] *** [-0.027] *** [-0.044] *** 
Market Value of Equity ($millions) 17,823 8,258 10,638 9,478 [9,564] *** [1,160] [7,185] *** [-1,219] 
 (2,623) (1,217) (1,988) (1,727) [1,405] *** [261] [634] *** [-510] 
Sales Growth 0.070 0.023 0.303 0.286 [0.048] *** [0.017] [-0.232] [-0.263] 
 (0.049) (0.022) (0.021) (0.043) [0.027] *** [-0.022] ** [0.028] *** [-0.021] 
N 676 190 695 213     
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Table 2.2 – CEO Incentives and Bank Investment and Debt Policy 
Firm investment policy and debt policy variables are regressed in two-way fixed effects regressions on lagged CEO compensation 
incentives Vega and Delta, with Crisis period and Bank indicator variables, CEO Cash Compensation and other controls. Dependent 
investment policy variables include Asset Growth, Loans to Core Deposits and Commercial Real Estate Loans to Assets, and the 
dependent debt policy variable is Book Leverage. Columns (2) and (3) are for banks only. Columns (1) and (4) include industrial 
control firms. T-test statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficients. Selected F-test statistics for restrictions on sums of 
coefficients are reported for full sample regressions. Intercepts are not reported.  
 Investment Policy Debt Policy 
 Asset Growthit (1) 
Loans to Core Depositsit 
(2) 
Commercial Real Estate Loansit 
(3) 
Book Leverageit 
(4) 
Crisis (b1) -0.003 0.513*** 0.019 -0.114*** 
 (-0.15) (2.82) (1.46) (-6.73) 
Crisis x Bank (b2) -0.001   0.174*** 
 (-0.03)   (7.90) 
Vega it-1 (b3) -0.018 -0.253 0.006 0.033 
 (-0.55) (-0.86) (0.26) (1.36) 
Vega it-1 x Crisis (b4) -0.084 -0.194 0.019 -0.01 
 (-0.93) (-0.27) (0.36) (-0.16) 
Vega it-1 x Crisis x Bank (b5) -0.016   -0.128 
 (-0.12)   (-1.32) 
Delta it-1 (b6) 0.000 0.144** 0.000 -0.006 
 (-0.02) (2.49) (0.02) (-1.50) 
Delta it-1 x Crisis (b7) -0.001 -0.221* -0.004 0.005 
 (-0.06) (-1.83) (-0.42) (0.81) 
Delta it-1 x Crisis x Bank (b8) 0.004   0.024 
 (0.11)   (1.02) 
Vega/Delta it-1 (b9) -0.085*** -0.088 -0.016 -0.115*** 
 (-2.93) (-0.30) (-0.75) (-5.52) 
Vega/Delta it-1 x Crisis (b10) -0.049 -0.53 -0.008 -0.221*** 
 (-1.06) (-1.35) (-0.29) (-6.85) 
Vega/Delta it-1 x Crisis x Bank (b11) 0.167**   0.416*** 
 (2.22)   (7.82) 
CEO Cash Compensation it 0.004 0.009 0.002 0 
 (1.41) (0.45) (1.43) (0.20) 
Tenureit -0.001 0.003 0 -0.004*** 
 (-0.52) (0.40) (0.63) (-4.51) 
Sizeit 0.007* 0.083 -0.049*** 0.014*** 
 (1.69) (1.43) (-11.80) (4.57) 
Market-to-Bookit 0.024* -1.497* -0.093 -0.179*** 
 (1.85) (-1.66) (-1.42) (-23.55) 
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Table 2.2 – CEO Incentives and Bank Investment and Debt Policy (cont.) 
 
 Investment Policy Debt Policy 
 Asset Growthit (1) 
Loans to Core Depositsit 
(2) 
Commercial Real Estate Loansit 
(3) 
Book Leverageit 
(4) 
Sales Growthit 0.001 0.47 0.097*** -0.001 
 (0.46) (1.19) (3.37) (-0.66) 
Stock Returnit 0.019** 0.082 0.004 0.016** 
 (2.18) (0.70) (0.49) (2.49) 
Asset Growthit    -0.005 
    (-0.24) 
Book Leverageit -0.01 11.403*** -1.09***  
 (-0.24) (3.94) (-5.19)  
Analyst Dispersionit -0.021 -0.012 -0.004 0.002 
 (-1.61) (-0.10) (-0.46) (0.23) 
Forecast Errorsit 0.006 0.028 0 -0.008** 
 (1.44) (0.91) (-0.14) (-2.49) 
Analyst Dispersionit x Forecast Errorsit -0.003 -0.012 0 0.003* 
 (-1.16) (-0.73) (0.12) (1.85) 
     
F-tests:     
H0: b1 + b2 = 0 0.03   9.80*** 
H0: b3 + b4 = 0 1.27 0.39 0.22 0.12 
H0: b6 + b7 = 0 0.01 0.49 0.20 0.01 
H0: b9 + b10 = 0 7.60*** 2.57 0.73 99.33*** 
H0: b3 + b4 + b5 = 0 0.91   1.40 
H0: b6 + b7 + b8 = 0 0.01   1.00 
H0: b9 + b10 + b11 = 0 0.30   3.22* 
H0: b4 + b5 = 0 0.61   2.27 
H0: b7 + b8 = 0 0.01   1.52 
H0: b10 + b11 = 0 3.53*   18.46*** 
     
Sample FULL SAMPLE BANKS ONLY BANKS ONLY FULL SAMPLE 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.040 0.390 0.487 
F-statistics 2.15*** 2.38*** 22.35*** 54.09*** 
N 1175 1205 1205 1175 
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Table 2.3 – CEO Incentives and Investment and Debt Policy Simultaneously 
3SLS simultaneous regressions of investment and debt policy decisions, Vega, and Delta, are reported. Crisis and Bank indicator 
variables, CEO Cash Compensation and other controls are included. Dependent investment policy variables include Asset Growth, 
Loans to Core Deposits, Commercial Real Estate Loans to Assets, and the dependent debt policy variable is Book Leverage. Columns 
(4) through (9) are for banks only; Columns (1) through (3) and (10) through (12) are for banks and matched industrial firms. t-test 
statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficients. Selected F-test statistics for restrictions on sums of coefficients are reported 
for full sample regressions. Intercepts are not reported.  
 Investment Policy Debt Policy 
 
Asset  
Growth 
(1) 
 
Vega 
(2) 
 
Delta 
(3) 
Loans to 
Core 
Deposits 
(4) 
 
Vega 
(5) 
 
Delta 
(6) 
Commercial 
Real Estate 
Loans 
(7) 
 
Vega 
(8) 
 
Delta 
(9) 
Book 
Leverage 
(10) 
 
Vega 
(11) 
 
Delta 
(12) 
Crisis (b1) 0.654***   -3.908***   2.018***   -0.371***   
 (25.96)   (-3.95)   (3.87)   (-11.51)   
Crisis x Bank (b2) -0.09***         0.224***   
 (-6.84)         (10.57)   
Vega it (b3) -0.791  2.789*** -15.048  3.241 -43.181  3.2 -0.245  3.43** 
 (-1.52)  (3.96) (-0.16)  (1.63) (-0.88)  (1.61) (-0.37)  (2.26) 
Vega it x Crisis (b4) -1.234***   -14.369***   6.103***   -0.173***   
 (-39.88)   (-19.66)   (38.11)   (-3.40)   
Vega it x Crisis x Bank 
(b5) -0.217***         0.05   
 (-4.77)         (0.67)   
Delta it (b6) 0.584*** 0.324***  13.208 0.063  24.461 0.059  0.162 0.057  
 (2.73) (4.10)  (0.23) (0.21)  (0.80) (0.19)  (0.46) (0.24)  
Delta it x Crisis (b7) -0.661***   8.93***   -5.131***   0.289***   
 (-255.18)   (40.73)   (-106.83)   (68.23)   
Delta it x Crisis x Bank 
(b8) 0.028***         -0.023   
 (2.65)         (-1.32)   
Vega/Delta it (b9) -0.109***   -7.641***   2.479***   -0.399***   
 (-14.35)   (-29.38)   (43.50)   (-32.47)   
Vega/Delta it x Crisis (b10) -0.016   6.152***   -2.379***   0.197***   
 (-0.74)   (11.07)   (-19.54)   (5.55)   
Vega/Delta it x Crisis x 
Bank (b11) 0.165***         0.198***   
 (5.31)         (3.90)   
CEO Cash  
Compensation it -0.01 0.002  -0.081 0.006  -0.322 0.006  0.000 0.009  
 (-1.25) (0.70)  (-0.14) (0.83)  (-1.04) (0.84)  (-0.01) (0.93)  
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Table 2.3 – CEO Incentives and Investment and Debt Policy Simultaneously (cont.) 
 Investment Policy Debt Policy 
 
Asset  
Growth 
(1) 
 
Vega 
(2) 
 
Delta 
(3) 
Loans to 
Core 
Deposits 
(4) 
 
Vega 
(5) 
 
Delta 
(6) 
Commercial 
Real Estate 
Loans 
(7) 
 
Vega 
(8) 
 
Delta 
(9) 
Book 
Leverage 
(10) 
 
Vega 
(11) 
 
Delta 
(12) 
Tenureit 0.002*  0.001 -0.038  0.002 -0.06  0.002 -0.004*  0.012 
 (1.89)  (1.27) (-0.23)  (0.31) (-0.69)  (0.31) (-1.82)  (0.54) 
Sizeit -0.038 -0.012 0.054 -3.672 0.106 0.021 -5.427 0.107 0.026 -0.024 0.057 -0.017 
 (-0.69) (-0.52) (0.92) (-0.27) (0.76) (0.08) (-0.74) (0.77) (0.10) (-0.25) (0.95) 
(-
0.12) 
Market-to-Bookit 0.093* -0.028 0.171 -34.807 0.105 1.758** -52.902 0.112 1.784** -0.229*** 0.024 0.642 
 (1.81) (-0.57) (1.23) (-0.27) (0.13) (2.33) (-0.77) (0.14) (2.36) (-2.82) (0.26) (0.75) 
Stock Returnit -0.001   0.25   -0.683**   -0.002   
 (-0.16)   (0.40)   (-2.28)   (-0.23)   
Asset Growthit  -1.088 2.955  -0.065 0.159**  -0.063 0.109 -0.02 -0.06** 0.262 
  (-1.27) (1.24)  (-1.19) (2.39)  (-1.10) (1.16) (-0.36) (-2.14) (1.37) 
Book Leverageit 0.316*** -0.024 0.504** -27.932 0.903** 0.461 23.187* 0.906** 0.407  0.261 2.657 
 (5.87) (-0.30) (2.17) (-1.27) (2.24) (0.22) (1.96) (2.25) (0.19)  (0.79) (0.48) 
Analyst Dispersionit 0.098***   -0.301***   0.21***   -0.007   
 (27.92)   (-2.60)   (8.28)   (-1.26)   
Forecast Errorsit 0.04***   -0.902***   0.589***   -0.016***   
 (31.34)   (-31.04)   (92.62)   (-7.86)   
Analyst Dispersionit x 
ForecastErrorsit -0.016***   0.34***   -0.218***   0.007***   
 (-23.00)   (22.38)   (-65.61)   (6.32)   
             
F-tests             
H0: b1 + b2 = 0 2.85*         3.35*   
H0: b3 + b4 = 0 0.09   0.00   0.00   0.07   
H0: b6 + b7 = 0 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.28   
H0: b9 + b10 = 0 0.22   0.28   0.00   6.19**   
H0: b3 + b4 + b5 = 0 0.11         0.05   
H0: b6 + b7 + b8 = 0 0.00         0.25   
H0: b9 + b10 + b11 = 0 0.02         0.00   
H0: b4 + b5 = 0 10.65***         0.83   
H0: b7 + b8 = 0 21.91***         41.90***   
H0: b10 + b11 = 0 0.22         16.54***   
     
Sample FULL SAMPLE BANKS ONLY BANKS ONLY FULL SAMPLE 
System Weighted R2 0.354   0.451   0.482   0.382   
N 1260   615   615   1260   
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Table 2.4 – CEO Incentives and Bank Risk 
Firm risk variables are regressed in two-way fixed effects regressions on lagged CEO 
compensation incentives Vega and Delta, with Crisis period and Bank indicator variables, CEO 
Cash Compensation, other controls, and Investment and Debt Policy variables. Dependent firm 
risk variables include Stock Volatility, Interest Paid on Large CDs, Non-core Funding to Assets, 
Non-Performing Loans to Loans, and 1-year GAP. Columns (2) through (5) are for banks only. 
Column (1) includes banks and industrial control firms. t-test statistics are reported in 
parentheses below coefficients. Selected F-test statistics for restrictions on sums of coefficients 
are reported for full sample regressions. Intercepts are not reported.  
 
Stock 
Volatility 
(1) 
Interest Paid 
on Large CDs 
(2) 
Non-core 
Funding to 
Assets 
(3) 
Non-Performing 
Loans to Loans 
(4) 
1-year GAP 
(5) 
Crisis (b1) 0.019*** 0.02*** 0.017 -0.009*** -0.034** 
 (14.18) (11.02) (0.87) (-4.78) (-2.30) 
Crisis x Bank (b2) 0.001     
 (0.41)     
Vega it-1 (b3) 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.011*** -0.001 
 (1.38) (0.58) (0.27) (3.53) (-0.05) 
Vega it-1 x Crisis (b4) -0.008 -0.017** -0.004 -0.003 0.043 
 (-1.59) (-2.36) (-0.06) (-0.40) (0.73) 
Vega it-1 x Crisis x Bank (b5) 0.01     
 (1.39)     
Delta it-1 (b6) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.015*** 
 (-0.23) (0.70) (0.06) (1.25) (-3.12) 
Delta it-1 x Crisis (b7) 0.001** 0.000 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.99) (0.17) (-0.65) (-0.98) (-0.10) 
Delta it-1 x Crisis x Bank (b8) 0.003     
 (1.53)     
Vega/Delta it-1 (b9) 0.001 -0.001 -0.052* -0.008*** -0.025 
 (0.57) (-0.23) (-1.71) (-2.76) (-1.04) 
Vega/Delta it-1 x Crisis (b10) 0.01*** -0.004 -0.034 0.01*** -0.032 
 (4.08) (-1.14) (-0.82) (2.61) (-1.00) 
Vega/Delta it-1 x Crisis x Bank 
(b11) 0.02***     
 (4.80)     
CEO Cash Compensation it 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 
 (0.13) (0.32) (0.39) (-1.35) (1.51) 
Tenureit 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002*** 
 (1.08) (0.12) (-0.86) (-1.10) (3.55) 
Sizeit -0.002*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.02*** 
 (-8.69) (-0.08) (-0.48) (-1.03) (4.32) 
Market-to-Bookit -0.001* -0.015* 0.255*** -0.121*** 0.076 
 (-1.81) (-1.67) (2.70) (-13.21) (1.02) 
Sales Growthit 0.000 0.013*** 0.054 -0.013*** -0.107*** 
 (-0.68) (3.00) (1.13) (-2.84) (-2.89) 
Stock Returnit 0.001 -0.003** -0.025** 0.001 0.003 
 (1.35) (-2.18) (-1.99) (1.16) (0.30) 
Asset Growthit -0.005*** -0.018*** 0.04 -0.007 -0.008 
 (-3.01) (-3.80) (0.79) (-1.42) (-0.19) 
Book Leverageit -0.006*** 0.004 2.981*** 0.053* 0.239 
 (-2.60) (0.14) (9.82) (1.81) (1.01) 
Analyst Dispersionit 0.004*** -0.001 -0.008 0.004*** 0.003 
 (5.18) (-0.80) (-0.63) (3.47) (0.32) 
Forecast Errorsit -0.001** 0.000 0.011*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (-2.26) (0.23) (3.37) (-5.14) (-0.24) 
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Table 2.4 – CEO Incentives and Bank Risk (cont.) 
 
 
Stock 
Volatility 
(1) 
Interest Paid 
on Large CDs 
(2) 
Non-core 
Funding to 
Assets 
(3) 
Non-Performing 
Loans to Loans 
(4) 
1-year GAP 
(5) 
Analyst Dispersionit x Forecast 
Errorsit 0.000*** 0.000 -0.005*** 0.000** 0.000 
 (3.15) (-0.08) (-2.90) (2.20) (0.33) 
      
F-tests:      
H0: b1 + b2 = 0 170.41***     
H0: b3 + b4 = 0 1.15 4.53** 0.00 1.11 0.52 
H0: b6 + b7 = 0 4.70** 0.30 0.45 0.17 2.98* 
H0: b9 + b10 = 0 17.38*** 1.79 4.51** 0.36 3.22* 
H0: b3 + b4 + b5 = 0 0.53     
H0: b6 + b7 + b8 = 0 4.19**     
H0: b9 + b10 + b11 = 0 83.82***     
H0: b4 + b5 = 0 0.12     
H0: b7 + b8 = 0 4.23**     
H0: b10 + b11 = 0 75.18***     
      
Sample FULL SAMPLE 
BANKS 
ONLY BANKS ONLY BANKS ONLY 
BANKS 
ONLY 
Adjusted R2 0.473 0.254 0.162 0.497 0.088 
F-statistics 48.84*** 11.75*** 7.12*** 32.18*** 4.03*** 
N 1174 569 569 569 569 
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Table 2.5 – CEO Incentives and Investment, Debt Policy and Firm Risk 
3SLS simultaneous regressions of firm risk measures, Vega, and Delta, are reported. Crisis and Bank indicator variables, CEO Cash 
Compensation and other controls are included. Dependent firm risk variables include Stock Volatility, Interest Paid on Large CDs, 
Non-core Funding to Assets, Non-Performing Loans to Loans, and 1-year GAP. Columns (4) through (15) are for banks only; 
Columns (1) through (3) are for banks and matched industrial firms. t-test statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficients. 
Selected F-test statistics for restrictions on sums of coefficients are reported for full sample regressions. Intercepts are not reported.  
 
 
Stock 
Volatility 
(1) 
 
 
Vega 
(2) 
 
 
Delta 
(3) 
Interest 
Paid on 
Large CDs 
 (4) 
 
 
Vega 
(5) 
 
 
Delta 
(6) 
Non-core 
Funding to 
Assets 
 (7) 
 
 
Vega 
(8) 
 
 
Delta 
(9) 
Non-
performing 
Loans to 
Loans 
 (10) 
 
 
Vega 
(11) 
 
 
Delta 
(12) 
1-year 
GAP 
 (13) 
 
 
Vega 
(14) 
 
 
Delta 
(15) 
Crisis (b1) 0.005*   0.063***   -0.146**   -0.08***   -0.507***   
 (1.91)   (12.16)   (-2.41)   (-13.57)   (-10.83)   
Crisis x Bank 
(b2) 0.006**               
 (2.32)               
Vega it (b3) -0.006  4.108** -1.388***  1.904 
-
23.805***  2.187 -0.226  1.445 -2.927  1.67 
 (-0.11)  (2.56) (-5.99)  (1.09) (-7.99)  (1.28) (-0.70)  (0.86) (-1.20)  (0.99) 
Vega it x Crisis 
(b4) 0.007   -0.026***   -2.388***   -0.205***   -1.536***   
 (1.00)   (-3.50)   (-29.85)   (-26.38)   (-24.91)   
Vega it x Crisis 
x Bank (b5) 0.027***               
 (2.82)               
Delta it (b6) 0.009 0.186  0.188*** -0.162  5.654*** -0.007  0.188*** -0.034  1.541*** -0.035  
 (0.51) (1.28)  (3.26) (-0.71)  (7.21) (-0.03)  (3.29) (-0.15)  (3.40) (-0.15)  
Delta it x Crisis 
(b7) 0.017***   -0.027***   0.632***   0.091***   0.633***   
 (31.16)   (-11.92)   (26.34)   (38.76)   (34.22)   
Delta it x Crisis 
x Bank (b8) 
-
0.006***               
 (-2.66)               
Vega/Delta it 
(b9) 0.004***   -0.025***   -1.679***   -0.131***   -0.878***   
 (2.79)   (-9.28)   (-58.98)   (-47.21)   (-40.03)   
Vega/Delta it x 
Crisis (b10) -0.004   0.024***   1.589***   0.115***   0.879***   
 (-0.86)   (4.23)   (26.12)   (19.50)   (18.75)   
Vega/Delta it x 
Crisis x Bank 
(b11) -0.004               
 (-0.66)               
CEO Cash 
Compensation it 0.000 0.003  0.006*** 0.011*  0.069*** 0.008  -0.001 0.008  0.003 0.009  
 (-0.50) (0.45)  (4.51) (1.72)  (3.89) (1.21)  (-0.63) (1.29)  (0.34) (1.29)  
Tenureit 0.000  -0.001 -0.001***  0.003 -0.028***  0.003 -0.001  0.003 -0.005  0.003 
 (0.80)  (-0.24) (-3.88)  (0.55) (-5.84)  (0.53) (-1.23)  (0.46) (-1.00)  (0.48) 
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Table 2.5 – CEO Incentives and Investment, Debt Policy and Firm Risk (cont.) 
 
 
 
Stock 
Volatility 
(1) 
 
 
Vega 
(2) 
 
 
Delta 
(3) 
Interest 
Paid on 
Large CDs 
 (4) 
 
 
Vega 
(5) 
 
 
Delta 
(6) 
Non-core 
Funding to 
Assets 
 (7) 
 
 
Vega 
(8) 
 
 
Delta 
(9) 
Non-
performing 
Loans to 
Loans 
 (10) 
 
 
Vega 
(11) 
 
 
Delta 
(12) 
1-year 
GAP 
 (13) 
 
 
Vega 
(14) 
 
 
Delta 
(15) 
Sizeit -0.005 0.022 -0.032 0.097*** 0.207** 0.217 0.614** 0.136 0.174 -0.052* 0.149 0.281 -0.278 0.15 0.249 
 (-0.92) (0.60) (-0.27) (4.51) (2.02) (0.95) (2.02) (1.33) (0.77) (-1.90) (1.41) (1.26) (-1.46) (1.41) (1.12) 
Market-to-
Bookit -0.008 -0.062 0.324*** -0.323*** 0.679 2.667*** 
-
11.541*** 0.258 2.449*** -0.637*** 0.337 2.863*** -3.971*** 0.338 2.737*** 
 (-1.43) (-1.42) (4.94) (-2.66) (1.26) (4.47) (-6.98) (0.48) (4.11) (-5.20) (0.60) (5.02) (-4.26) (0.60) (4.79) 
Asset Growthit -0.007 -0.107** 0.492** -0.13*** -0.056 0.223 -2.295*** -0.068 0.236 -0.06 -0.065 0.192 -0.526* -0.065 0.205 
 (-1.06) (-2.46) (2.34) (-5.13) (-0.82) (0.72) (-6.51) (-1.00) (0.77) (-1.49) (-0.96) (0.62) (-1.83) (-0.96) (0.67) 
Book Leverageit -0.015 -0.117 0.595*** 1.493*** 1.024** -1.547 22.375*** 0.932* -1.663 -0.117 0.944* -1.168 0.487 0.944* -1.319 
 (-1.50) (-1.44) (2.61) (6.17) (2.05) (-0.57) (6.95) (1.88) (-0.62) (-0.31) (1.90) (-0.44) (0.18) (1.90) (-0.49) 
Analyst 
Dispersionit 0.002***   0.001   -0.009   0.002*   -0.011   
 (2.74)   (1.13)   (-0.69)   (1.92)   (-1.17)   
Forecast Errorsit 
-
0.001***   0.005***   0.006*   -0.008***   -0.04***   
 (-5.04)   (17.02)   (1.93)   (-26.03)   (-16.30)   
Analyst 
Dispersionit x 
ForecastErrorsit 0.001***   -0.002***   -0.001   0.003***   0.016***   
 (5.22)   (-11.44)   (-0.62)   (17.44)   (12.17)   
                
F-tests                
H0: b1 + b2 = 0 4.29**               
H0: b3 + b4 = 0 0.00   5.29**   10.07***   0.08   0.24   
H0: b6 + b7 = 0 0.56   1.11   8.37***   1.12   1.61   
H0: b9 + b10 = 0 0.00   0.00   0.36   0.40   0.00   
H0: b3 + b4 + b5 
= 0 
0.05               
H0: b6 + b7 + b8 
= 0 
0.32               
H0: b9 + b10 + 
b11 = 0 
0.15               
H0: b4 + b5 = 0 5.44**               
H0: b7 + b8 = 0 6.37**               
H0: b10 + b11 = 0 0.64               
                
Sample FULL SAMPLE BANKS ONLY BANKS ONLY BANKS ONLY BANKS ONLY 
System 
Weighted R2 
0.292 
 
 0.538   0.313  
 
0.365   0.398   
N 1260   615   615   615   615   
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Table 2.6 – Common Factor Analysis of Bank Risk 
Exploratory common factor analysis is applied to five risk measures, including Stock Volatility, Interest Paid on Large CDs, Non-core 
Funding to Assets, Non-Performing Loans to Loans, and 1-year GAP.  Principal factors extraction and the proportion of total variance 
explained criterion are used to determine the relevant number of factors to retain (one). Panel A shows the correlation matrix of the 
five risk measures. Panel B shows Factor Loading Coefficients. Panel C reports Pearson Correlation Coefficients (with p-values 
shown below in parentheses) between the Bank Risk Factor and each of the five risk measures. Panel D summarizes descriptive 
statistics for the resulting Bank Risk Factor. 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of Risk Measures 
 Stock Volatility Interest Paid on Large CDs Non-core Funding to Assets Non-Performing Loans to Loans 1-year GAP 
Stock Volatility 1 0.009 -0.059* 0.351*** -0.019 
Interest Paid on Large CDs 0.009 1 -0.069** -0.021 -0.101*** 
Non-core Funding to Assets -0.059* -0.069** 1 -0.065* -0.157*** 
Non-Performing Loans to Loans 0.351*** -0.021 -0.065* 1 0.025 
1-year GAP -0.019 -0.101*** -0.157*** 0.025 1 
 
Panel B: Factor Loading Coefficients 
 Stock Volatility (1) 
Interest Paid on Large CDs 
(2) 
Non-core Funding to Assets 
(3) 
Non-Performing Loans to 
Loans 
(4) 
1-year GAP 
(5) 
Risk Factor 1A 0.568 -0.006 -0.238 0.578 0.115 
Risk Factor 1B 0.608   0.608  
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Table 2.6 – Common Factor Analysis of Bank Risk (cont.) 
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (p-values) for Risk Measures with the Bank Risk Factor 
 Stock Volatility (1) 
Interest Paid on 
Large CDs 
(2) 
Non-core Funding 
to Assets 
(3) 
Non-Performing 
Loans to Loans 
(4) 
1-year GAP 
(5) 
Predicted sign + + + + +/- 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient with the Common Bank Risk 
Factor 1A 0.782*** -0.008 -0.328*** 0.796*** 0.158*** 
(p-values) (0.0001) (0.821) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient with the Common Bank Risk 
Factor 1B 0.822***   0.822***  
(p-values) (0.0001)   (0.0001)  
 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics of Bank Risk Factor 
 Median Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Bank Risk Factor 1A -0.252 0.000 1 -1.682 13.969 
% Variation Explained 27.56% 
Bank Risk Factor 1B -0.290 0.000 1 -1.113 14.848 
% Variation Explained 67.55% 
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Table 2.7 – CEO Incentives and Bank Risk Factor  
The Bank Risk Factor is regressed in a one-way fixed effects regression on lagged CEO 
compensation incentives Vega and Delta, with Crisis period indicator variable, CEO Cash 
Compensation, other controls, and Investment and Debt Policy variables, in Column (1). 3SLS 
simultaneous regressions of the Bank Risk Factor 1B, Vega, and Delta, are reported in Columns 
(2) through (4). Crisis indicator variables, CEO Cash Compensation and other controls are 
included. All regressions in this Table are for banks only. t-test statistics are reported in 
parentheses below coefficients. Selected F-test statistics for restrictions on sums of coefficients 
are reported for full sample regressions. Intercepts are not reported.  
 2-way Fixed Effects  3SLS 
 
Bank Risk Factor 
1B 
(1) 
Bank Risk 
Factor 
 (2) 
Vega 
(3) 
Delta 
(4) 
Crisis 0.426*** -6.598***   
 (5.93) (-27.85)   
Vega it-1 (Vegait) (b1) 0.516*** -30.222  1.162 
 (4.44) (-1.53)  (0.69) 
Vega it-1 x Crisis (Vega it x Crisis) (b2) 0.675** -20.753***   
 (2.38) (-66.52)   
Delta it-1  (Delta it) (b3) 0.027 18.218*** -0.017  
 (1.19) (6.88) (-0.07)  
Delta it-1 x Crisis (Delta it x Crisis) (b4) -0.14*** 8.56***   
 (-2.93) (91.47)   
Vega/Delta it-1  (Vega/Delta it) (b5) -0.187 -12.61***   
 (-1.64) (-113.58)   
Vega/Delta it-1 x Crisis (Vega/Delta it x 
Crisis) (b6) 1.074*** 12.211***   
 (6.89) (51.47)   
CEO Cash Compensation it 0.000 0.042 0.008  
 (-0.05) (0.77) (1.23)  
Tenureit -0.002 -0.082  0.002 
 (-0.57) (-1.41)  (0.43) 
Sizeit -0.113*** -4.036* 0.141 0.322 
 (-4.94) (-1.74) (1.34) (1.45) 
Market-to-Bookit -4.074*** -54.588*** 0.287 3.021*** 
 (-11.44) (-7.14) (0.51) (5.30) 
Sales Growthit -1.016***    
 (-5.69)    
Stock Returnit 0.066    
 (1.42)    
Asset Growthit 0.181 -5.813* -0.067 0.175 
 (0.96) (-1.82) (-0.99) (0.57) 
Book Leverageit 2.326** -2.147 0.936* -0.98 
 (2.04) (-0.08) (1.89) (-0.37) 
Analyst Dispersionit 0.167*** -0.063   
 (3.41) (-1.28)   
Forecast Errorsit -0.043*** -0.576***   
 (-3.57) (-46.49)   
Analyst Dispersionit x ForecastErrorsit 0.016*** 0.219***   
 (2.63) (33.74)   
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Table 2.7 – CEO Incentives and Bank Risk Factor (cont.) 
 
 2-way Fixed Effects  3SLS 
 
Bank Risk Factor 
1B 
(1) 
Bank Risk 
Factor 
 (2) 
Vega 
(3) 
Delta 
(4) 
     
F-test:     
H0: b1 + b2 = 0 17.74*** 0.07   
H0: b3 + b4 = 0 6.61** 1.02   
H0: b5 + b6 = 0 33.81** 0.04   
     
Sample BANKS ONLY BANKS ONLY 
Adjusted R2 / System Weighted R2 0.607 0.353   
F-statistics 39.36***    
N 569 599   
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IV. Reward Culture in Banks and the Financial Crisis 
Abstract: In this paper, I construct and examine whether the “reward culture” of banks was a 
contributing factor to the 2008 credit crisis. Reward culture reflects three dimensions: (i) CEO 
incentives – total CEO compensation and the incentive effects of CEO stock and option 
portfolios; (ii) tournament incentives – pay gap in total compensation between CEOs and Vice 
Presidents; and (iii) employee incentives – total compensation per employee. A reward culture 
factor score, constructed by applying factor analysis to the CEO, VP, and employee incentives, 
represents the common factor in incentives across all levels of the bank. I employ the reward 
culture factor to examine the impact of reward culture on bank performance and risk. First, I find 
strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between reward culture and bank returns and risk. 
Second, classifying banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups in the pre-crisis year 
2006, I find that during the 2008 crisis period, banks either at the high or low reward culture 
groups performed worse, and were more risky than banks in the average reward culture group. 
The findings are consistent with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard associated 
with incentive misalignment when incentives are too low or too high.
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A. Introduction 
 The 2008 financial crisis raised questions about performance-based compensation 
practices at financial institutions. The public widely believed that excesses in compensation 
prevalent among banks were a catalyst to the crisis. Since then, academic research has studied 
the link between compensation practices and risk-taking behaviors extensively, mostly focusing 
on CEO and the top management team compensation. Their findings are inconclusive 
(Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Amstrong and Vashishtha, 2012; DeYoung et al., 2013). 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that banks with better shareholder-aligned CEO compensation 
plans did worse in the crisis, generating significantly lower stock returns and returns on equity. 
Moreover, CEOs of better shareholder-aligned banks realized larger losses in their stock and 
option portfolios. But as Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010) point out, the losses that CEOs 
suffered in the crisis were disproportionately less than the high compensation CEOs received 
prior to the crisis. DeYoung et al (2013) document a positive relationship between a CEO’s stock 
and option grants and bank risk. However, there is little research on the role of employee 
compensation and the interaction between CEO compensation and the remaining employee 
compensation. As critics on Wall Street Journal18 put it,  
 “Wall Street’s pay structure, in which bonuses are based on short-term profits, 
 encouraged employees to act like gamblers at a casino – and let them collect their 
 winnings while the roulette wheel was still spinning. […] To earn bigger bonuses, many 
 traders ignored or played down the risks they took until their bonuses were paid. Their 
 bosses often turned a blind eye because it was in their interest as well.”  
 Such bonus structure is arguably necessary when ability is unobservable and the pool of 
skilled labor relatively small. Bannier et al (2013) show that competition for talent increases the 
                                                 
18 “On Wall Street, Bonuses, Not Profits, Were Real”, Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2008. 
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incidence of performance awards and excessive risk-taking behavior. Benabou and Tirole (2013) 
suggest that the interaction of talent competition with incentives undermines work ethic. A 
highly competitive labor market makes it difficult to strike a proper balance between the benefits 
and costs of high-powered incentives. A pervasive reward culture in the workplace can generate 
distorted decisions and significant efficiency losses in the long run. In addition, Acharya and 
Naqvi (2009) conceptually show that when compensation that increases in loan volume is needed 
to induce effort, investment risks are underpriced to justify extensions of credit. Moral hazard is 
created when banks are flush with liquidity. To better understand incentives, I suggest it is 
essential to examine compensation throughout the organization set by top management and 
sometimes requiring board approval. 
  In this paper, I propose the notion of “reward culture”, which embodies the incentives 
that encourage performance throughout the organization, and examine whether it played a role in 
shaping the 2008 credit crisis. Corporate culture at its most basic level is the sum of an 
organization’s behaviors and practices. Typically defined using a combination of corporate 
personality traits (such as “aggressive”, “collaborative”, or “results-oriented”), it has been argued 
that corporate culture is a key driver of corporate performance (Gandossy et al, 2009). My 
research design has two parts. First, I quantify this culture notion by constructing a reward 
culture factor score by applying factor analysis on the incentives of CEOs, Vice Presidents 
(VPs), and all remaining employees. The reward culture factor score represents common 
variation in the incentives of all employees. Second, I explore the relation between the reward 
culture factor score and bank performance and risk during the credit crisis. 
  The test sample consists of 72 financial institutions, including both bank holding 
companies and investment banks, with data on incentives available in all three years from 2004 
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to 2006. Bank returns and risk are observed in the 18-month period of the credit crisis – i.e., from 
July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. The incentive measures used to construct the reward culture 
factor are CEO incentives, VP incentives, and employee incentives. CEO total compensation, 
CEO delta, and CEO vega are used to proxy for CEO incentives. The pay gap between the total 
compensation of the CEO and the median VP is used to proxy for the tournament incentives of 
VPs. Because of data limitations, I employ compensation per employee as a proxy for employee 
incentives. All incentive measures are standardized to be distributed over the closed interval [-1, 
+1] to reduce skewness of incentive variables. Factor analysis applied to these incentive 
measures reveals a single factor that characterizes the reward culture. Next, I explore the relation 
between the reward culture factor and bank performance and risk by regressing bank 
performance and risk during the credit crisis on the three-year average reward culture factor from 
2004 – 2006. Finally, using predicted factor scores, I classify my sample into high, average, and 
low reward culture groups to determine whether there is separation in performance and risk 
among these groups. I find that 13 banks fall into the high reward culture group, 27 into the 
average reward culture group, and 32 into the low reward culture group. 
  Evidence in this paper shows that the relation between reward culture and bank returns 
and risk is nonlinear, implying incentive misalignment and its adverse impact on return and risk 
can occur when performance-based compensation is too low or too high. More specifically, I 
find that banks with high or low reward culture experienced significantly more negative buy-
and-hold returns in the financial crisis than banks with an average reward culture. The standard 
deviation of daily stock returns in the financial crisis was also higher for banks with high or low 
reward culture compared to banks with average reward culture. 
  These findings are consistent with agency theory, which suggests that the relationship 
  
127 
 
between incentive and firm performance is not necessarily linear. On the one hand, paying agents 
a fixed wage that insures agents against idiosyncratic risk is optimal when principals are more 
willing and able to diversify and bear risk. But fixed wages do not encourage effort, and when 
agents differ in ability, induces adverse selection. Low ability agents prefer fixed wages. 
Introducing performance-based incentives will not only encourage effort but also attract high 
ability agents, both of which hopefully raise profit. But exposure to undiversifiable idiosyncratic 
risk will attract more risk tolerant agents. On the other hand, verification of unobservable effort 
is costly and outcomes can have a random component unrelated to effort. Performance-based 
incentives can prompt agents to expropriate shareholder wealth and to rent seeking behaviors 
that misallocate resources. This implies that incentive misalignment can happen at the two ends 
of incentives. This problem is most severe in the banking industry because moral hazard is 
perverse owing to deposit insurance and an implicit too-big-to-fail government guarantee. 
  This study contributes to the existing literature on bank compensation, risk, and the 
financial crisis in three ways. First, to my knowledge, this is the first study to consider 
compensation practices in financial institutions at all levels of the organization via the 
construction of a latent “reward culture” factor score that embodies common variation in 
incentives not only of CEOs but also VPs and employees. Second, this study shows that 
compensation practices at banks created a reward culture that raised the vulnerability of banks to 
economic shocks, thereby contributing to the financial crisis. And last but not least, this study 
shows evidence of incentive misalignment and its adverse impact on return and risk when 
performance-based compensation is too low or too high. 
  The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section B reviews the relevant literature on 
incentive misalignment and reward culture. Section C details how the reward culture factor score 
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is constructed and describes sample selection. Section D investigates the relation between the 
reward culture factor and bank performance and risk in the financial crisis. Section E concludes. 
B. Literature Review 
1. Incentive Misalignment 
 Incentives are the essence of economics (Prendergast, 1999) and the aim of incentive 
alignment is to induce agents to act in the best interests of the principal. When firms are risk 
neutral and employees are risk averse, the optimal allocation of risk implies that firms bear all 
the risks and fully insure employees (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). But workers will exert little 
effort when compensation is not based on output. The moral hazard problem in labor contracting 
when Pareto-optimal risk sharing is precluded is widely recognized (Holmstrom, 1979). To 
provide the firm with some amount of effort, the second-best option is to force workers to bear 
risk.  
 Lazear (1986) argues that pay for performance deters shirking and improves labor quality 
when workers have private information about their productivity at the point of hire. High ability 
workers will self-select into jobs that offer more performance sensitive compensation. Indeed, 
Lazear (2000) documents that the productivity improvements following introduction of 
performance contracts can be attributed in approximately equal parts to effort and selection 
effects. Low pay for performance contracts engenders moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 There are, however, costs associated with high pay for performance. Moen and Rosen 
(2005) argue that workers with stronger performance incentives and private information about 
their own productivity will exploit information asymmetry to extract higher rents. Moreover, 
when employment contracts encapsulate contributions to the firm imperfectly, workers can 
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‘game’ the compensation scheme for their benefit. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) note that 
when agents carry out multiple activities, the allocation of activities based on offered contracts 
will prompt workers to concentrate too much on tasks that give rise to performance pay and 
neglect tasks that do not, resulting in a misallocation of effort. Quality is neglected when output 
is measured only in terms of quantity and cooperation is inhibited when private effort forms the 
sole basis of bonuses.  
 In short, incentive misalignment arises when there is too little or too much pay for 
performance. Low pay for performance discourages effort and attracts unproductive labor. High 
pay for performance induces rent extraction when workers have private information about their 
type and misallocations of effort when workers are engaged in multiple activities but bonuses are 
awarded on a limited set of activities.   
 Furthermore, the costs associated with incentive misalignment are especially severe in 
financial services. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) point out that moral hazard is particularly acute 
in banks because banks, as intermediaries, have widely dispersed creditors – i.e., small 
depositors who have neither the competence nor incentive to monitor a bank’s risk-taking 
behavior when deposits are insured by federal agencies. As insurer of deposits in the event of 
bankruptcy, the government provides a put option that encourages excessive risk-taking 
(Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010). The systemic importance of the banking system to the real 
economy also gives rise to an implicit too-big-too-fail guarantee for large financial institutions 
that insulates them from market discipline. 
 The impact of executive compensation on risk taking at banks is unsettled. Until recently, 
federal and state regulations limited competition among banks and restricted bank activities. 
Absent risk-taking opportunities, incentives that heighten the moral hazard of deposit insurance 
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and too-big-to-fail were not regulatory concerns (Smith and Watts, 1992; Houston and James, 
1995). Prior to deregulation, Fields and Fraser (1999) find that CEO compensation at 
commercial banks was significantly less performance sensitive than CEO compensation at 
investment banks; and Adams and Mehran (2003), that commercial banks compensated CEOs 
with relatively large cash salaries and bonuses but with relatively small restricted stock and 
option grants. More recent studies, however, document linkages between compensation and risk-
taking at banks. Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) find that market risks increase with bank CEO 
option-based compensation; Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2010), that market risks tend to 
increase with the residual pay of top bank executives, and Minnick, Unal and Yang (2011), that 
U.S. bank mergers were more likely to be value enhancing, and post-acquisition operating 
performance more likely to be strong, when CEOs had high pay-for-performance compensation. 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find a negative relationship between the performance of financial 
intermediaries and CEO delta in the 2008 financial crisis, and DeYoung et al (2013), a positive 
relationship between CEO vega and bank risk-taking. 
2. Reward Culture 
 Extant research is predominantly focused on the compensation of top executives and their 
impact on firm performance. To better understand the role of incentives, I argue that it is 
essential to examine the impact of compensation throughout the organizational hierarchy, where 
compensation is set by top management and sometimes requires board approval. Reward culture 
embodies the incentives that encourage performance throughout the organization.  
  Corporate culture at its most basic level is the sum of an organization’s behaviors and 
practices. It reveals itself in big and small decisions as well as in daily practices that tend to 
perpetuate themselves. A firm’s founder naturally places her stamp on the organization – shaping 
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the culture through early hiring decisions and policies, as well as her own values, 
communication, and behavior. But most often, as the organization grows organically or through 
M&As, its culture naturally changes and evolves. Typically defined using a combination of 
corporate personality traits (such as “aggressive”, “collaborative”, or “results-oriented”), 
corporate culture is arguably one of the key drivers of corporate performance (Gandossy et al., 
2009). As Gandossy et al. (2009) put it,  
 “[Corporate] culture is easy to put your finger on … understanding its connection to 
 performance is more complex”.  
 In my paper, “reward culture” is defined and quantified as the common variations in the 
incentives of CEO, VPs, and all remaining employees. I present a detailed description of reward 
culture variable estimation in section C. 
  CEO total compensation, CEO delta and CEO vega are used to proxy for CEO incentives. 
Delta quantifies the change in dollar values of CEO wealth associated with a 1% change in stock 
price; and vega, the change in the dollar values of CEO wealth associated with a 0.01 change in 
stock return volatility. Increases in restricted stock grants (and to a lesser extent, stock option 
grants) will increase delta; increases in stock option grants will increase vega.  
  The pay gap between the total compensation of the CEO and the median VP is used to 
proxy for the tournament incentives of VPs. In a typical rank-order tournament, individuals with 
the best performance are promoted to the next level in the hierarchy, and others are passed over. 
Promotion to the next level, which carries higher pay, encourages higher effort by individuals 
that increase firm output and the chance of promotion. The effort expended by tournament 
participants will increase with the magnitude of promotion prize (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; 
Prendergast, 1999); and when individuals view the likelihoods of promotion to be equal, firms 
  
132 
 
can generate greater individual effort by increasing the size of promotion prizes (Bognanno, 
2001). Further, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue that promotion is the only viable incentive 
mechanism in situations where there is little or no information about the absolute performance of 
the employee or when systematic shocks affect an individual’s performance.  
 Because of data limitations, I employ compensation per employee as the best available 
proxy for employee incentives. This proxy essentially captures bonuses extensively utilized in 
banking, which sometimes have perverse incentive effects. As Acharya and Naqvi (2009) point 
out, when managerial compensation that increases in loan volume is needed to induce effort, 
investment risks are underpriced to justify extensions of credit. Moral hazard is created when 
banks are flush with liquidity. 
C. Sample Selection and Methodology 
1. Sample Selection 
 Banks are identified as financial firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6300.  And as in 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), firms primarily engaged in investment advisory, pure brokerage, 
or wire transfer businesses that do not match well with the definition of lending institutions are 
excluded. The resulting sample of 95 firms in 2006 includes commercial banks as well as 
investment banks. 
  Data on CEO and VP incentives for these banks are obtained from the Standard & Poor’s 
ExecuComp database. For firms listed in the S&P 1500, ExecuComp provides details on CEO 
cash compensation (salaries plus bonuses), stock options, and total compensation for the five 
highest paid executives. CEOs are people identified in ExecuComp as CEOANN = CEO, and all 
other executives are labeled as VPs. Employee compensation is extracted from total salary and 
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benefit expenses in Compustat. Companies are not required, however, to disclose employee 
compensation in financial statements, and sometimes Compustat simply fails to record this data 
item in its database. For banks that did not have this data item in Compustat, I manually searched 
their corporate filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). There are only three 
banks where data on employee compensation is unavailable. To be included in my sample, banks 
are required to have data on incentives for all three years from 2004 to 2006. The final sample 
contains 72 banks. 
  CEO total compensation, CEO delta and CEO vega are used as proxies for CEO 
incentives. CEO total compensation, which includes salaries, bonuses, stock option grants, 
restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation, is listed as item 
TDC1 in ExecuComp. CEO delta is the total stock and option portfolio delta computed as the 
dollar increase in portfolio wealth associated with a 1% increase in stock price. CEO vega is the 
total stock and option portfolio vega computed as the dollar increase in option portfolio wealth 
associated with a 0.01 standard deviation increase in stock volatility. These definitions are 
consistent with Core and Guay (1999, 2002), who use the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation 
model modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividends. Computation of CEO delta and vega 
follows the Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) procedure.  
  ExecuComp recently changed its reporting on compensation in line with expanded 
disclosure requirements for pension, severance, change-in-control payouts, and equity based 
compensation imposed by the SEC. The new rules are designed to improve tabular presentation 
and to offer material qualitative information regarding the manner and context in which 
compensation is awarded and earned. Firms have to comply with the new rules when their fiscal 
years end on or after December 15, 2006. The new table on outstanding equity awards at fiscal 
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year-ends provides detailed information on exercise prices and expiration dates for each 
outstanding option grant used to calculate CEO delta and vega for the year 2006. For all banks 
from 2004 to 2005 and those that have fiscal years ending before December 15, 2006, only 
aggregate information on exercisable and unexercisable past option grants is available. I use the 
methodology of Core and Guay (2002) to calculate the average characteristics of previously 
granted unexercisable and exercisable options. Core and Guay (2002) treat all previously granted 
unexercisable and all previously granted exercisable options as two single grants. The exercise 
price of each aggregated grant is then derived from the reported average realizable value of the 
options. In addition, Core and Guay (2002) assume that unexercisable options have a time-to-
maturity that is three years greater than that of the exercisable options. I use the two aggregated 
grants and their imputed characteristics to approximate CEO delta and vega of the previously 
grants options. Core and Guay (2002) ascertain the validity and robustness of their 
approximation. 
  VP pay gap proxies for VP tournament incentives, and consistent with prior literature, is 
computed as the difference between the CEO and median VP total compensation. In a total of 
216 bank-year observations (72 banks and 3 years), there were three negative VP pay gaps 
because CEO compensation is less than that of the median VP.19 As in Kale et al. (2009), all VP 
pay gaps are monotonically transformed by adding a constant equal to the absolute value of the 
minimum gap. 
   Compensation per employee used to proxy for all remaining employee incentives is 
defined as total labor expenses reported in Compustat or SEC 10-Ks minus total executive 
compensation from ExecuComp divided by the number of employees. When Compustat did not 
                                                 
19M&T Bank in 2004, Bank of Hawaii in 2004, and Goldman Sachs in 2006 
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report the number of employees, I manually searched SEC 10-Ks for this information. 
  Figure 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 report the means and medians of: (i) the total compensation as 
well as the delta and vega of CEO stock and option portfolios that proxy for CEO incentives; (ii) 
the gap between the total compensation of CEOs and VPs, that proxy for VP tournament 
incentives; and (iii) compensation per employee, that proxy for employee incentives. Incentives 
were generally higher in the pre-crisis years 2004-2006 and fell in the years leading to the 
financial crisis in 2008. Moreover, incentives are significantly right skewed, which suggests 
high-powered incentives may be concentrated among a few banks. 
Insert Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 here. 
2. Reward Culture Factor 
 I utilize factor analysis to estimate the reward culture factor score. Factor analysis seeks 
to isolate common dimensionality through the clustering together of interrelated variables. It is 
both an exploratory analysis that seeks to map domains of common influence and a method of 
data reduction. It outlines common patterns that underlie any large data set. Variables that are 
highly related cluster onto a factor, while unrelated ones (being orthogonal to one another in 
factor space) appear as different factors. In my factor analysis, I focus on three dimensions of 
incentives: CEO incentives, VP incentives and remaining employee incentives. I use three 
proxies for CEO incentives: CEO total compensation; CEO delta; and CEO vega. I use VP pay 
gap to proxy for VP incentives.  I use compensation per employee to proxy for all remaining 
employee incentives. All incentive variables are standardized using the transformation 
  
    1lnminlnmax
lnminln2)( 

xx
xxxz   (1) 
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where ( )z x  is distributed over the closed interval [ 1, 1]  . Table 3.1 reports the matrix of 
pairwise correlations in incentives and their z-transforms. The high correlations in incentives and 
their z-transforms exemplify common factors.  Table 3.2 reports summary statistics on incentives 
and their z-transforms as well as on bank return and risk measures together with other control 
variables used in subsequent analysis. 
Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 here. 
  I construct the reward culture factor score in two steps.  First, I apply factor analysis to 
the three proxies of CEO incentives – CEO total compensation, CEO delta and CEO vega – to 
generate a single common CEO incentive factor. Previous literature is inconclusive about the 
effect of these proxies on the risk-taking behavior of the CEO.  I posit that by incorporating the 
common variation of all three proxies, I can estimate the true influence of CEO incentives. Table 
3.3 reports results and summary statistics of factor analysis on the three proxies of CEO 
incentives. A single CEO incentive factor which captures 76.6% of the total variation in CEO 
incentives is highly correlated with all three individual CEO incentive variables, and is 
statistically significant. Second, I employ factor analysis on CEO incentive factor, VP pay gap, 
and compensation per employee, to construct the reward culture factor score. Table 3.4 reports 
the results and the summary statistics of my factor analysis of these variables. A single factor 
which explains 82.0% of the total variation in incentives across CEOs, VPs, and employees, is 
statistically significant, and embodies reward culture. 
Insert Tables 3.3 and 3.4 here. 
  The three-year averages of predicted reward culture factor scores for each bank over the 
period 2004 to 2006, standardized over the closed interval [ 1, 1]  , are used to classify banks by 
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reward culture.  Dividing the interval into three equal partitions, banks are grouped as high, 
average, and low reward culture banks. Table 3.5 reports the summary statistics on reward 
culture and incentives by group. 
Insert Table 3.5 here. 
  Table 3.6 lists the banks with high, average, and low reward culture, and their total assets 
as of 2006 year end. The combined assets of the 13 banks with high reward culture account for 
65% of the total assets of all banks in the sample; the combined assets of the 32 banks with low 
reward cultures, 4% total assets of all banks in the sample. Moreover, most of the banks 
characterized as high reward culture are banks that were the subject of considerable public 
attention as a result of severe distress or excessive executive compensation, and half either filed 
for bankruptcy or were acquired by other banks. The non-random assignment and distribution of 
banks across reward culture groups suggests that incentives across CEOs, VPs, and employees 
are endogenously determined.  Banks choose their reward cultures.   
Insert Table 3.6 here. 
D. Bank Return and Risk 
 In this section, I investigate the impact of the reward culture of banks at the end of fiscal 
year 2006 on bank return and risk in the 18-month period July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. 
1. Univariate Analysis of Bank Return and Bank Risk 
 I use two performance measures – buy-and-hold returns and compounded monthly 
returns. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) argue that buy-and-hold returns are better measures of 
long-run performance when performance can be affected by many factors. Following 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), when banks delist or merge prior to December 2008, proceeds 
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from liquidation or mergers are placed into a cash account until December 2008. Compounded 
monthly returns are calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus buy-and-hold returns divided 
by 18 months.  
  Figure 3.4 graphs the buy-and-hold returns and compounded monthly returns by reward 
culture. The inverse U-shaped lines indicate that incentive misalignment at both ends of the 
reward culture has an adverse effect on returns. Figure 3.5 graphs bank risk by reward culture 
using the standard deviations of daily stock returns in the crisis period as a proxy for risk. Again 
the U-shape line indicates incentive misalignment at both ends of the reward culture. Banks at 
both ends of reward culture have higher risk than banks with average reward culture. 
Insert Figures 3.4 and 3.5 here. 
 All control variables are measured at the end of fiscal year 2006. M/B is market-to-book 
ratio of equity. Equity ratio is total equity capital over total assets at the end of the year. High, 
Average, and Low are dummy variables equal 1 if the bank falls into the high, average, or low 
reward culture groups respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
2. Multivariate Analysis of Bank Return 
 Table 3.7 reports the cross-sectional OLS regression results with buy-and-hold returns 
and compounded monthly returns as dependent variables with bank characteristics as controls. 
The test variables are the Low, Average, and High dummy variables that represent reward 
culture. In columns (1) and (6), the intercepts are the average bank returns in the crisis. Columns 
(2) and (7) add the natural logarithm of market value, market-to-book equity, and equity ratio to 
control for bank size, charter value, and capital, respectively. Columns (3) and (8) introduce the 
dummy variables for reward culture. Columns (4) and (9) add the residuals of market value, 
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market-to-book equity and equity ratio regressions on reward culture. Columns (5) and (10) add 
the residuals of incentive regressions against reward culture as well as the residuals of market 
value, market-to-book equity, and equity ratio. 
Insert Table 3.7 here. 
 The coefficients on Low, Average, and High dummy variables are all negative and 
statistically significant. In general, all banks did poorly in the crisis. But, on average, banks in 
the average reward culture group did best, followed by banks in the low reward culture group, 
and banks in the high reward culture group. These effects persist even after controlling for the 
pure effect of incentives and other bank characteristics. In addition, high CEO delta results in 
lower bank returns. Consistent with moral hazard, larger banks realize lower returns; banks with 
higher charter value (M/B) and capital (Equity Ratio) achieve higher returns. 
Insert Table 3.8 here 
 To confirm the non-linear relationship between reward culture and bank return, Table 3.8 
reports cross-sectional regression results with buy-and-hold returns and compounded monthly 
returns as dependent variables and various bank characteristics as controls. The test variable here 
is (Reward culture factor)2. Columns (1) and (4) use the reward culture factor and its square to 
explain bank returns in the crisis. Columns (2) and (5) add the residuals of market value, market-
to-book equity and equity ratio regressions on reward culture. Columns (3) and (6) add the 
residuals of incentive regressions on reward culture as well as the residuals of market value, 
market-to-book equity, and equity ratio. 
 The coefficients on (Reward culture factor)2 are negative through all specifications, and 
statistically significant for compounded monthly returns. The relationship between bank return 
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and reward culture is non-monotonic and concave. All the signs on control variables are 
consistent across all specifications. 
3. Multivariate Analysis of Bank Risk 
 Table 3.9 reports cross-sectional OLS regression results with bank risk as the dependent 
variable. The test variables are three Low, Average, and High dummy variables. In column (1), 
the intercept is the average bank risk in the crisis. Column (2) adds the natural logarithm of 
market value, market-to-book equity, and equity ratio to control for bank size, charter value, and 
capital, respectively. Column (3) uses the dummy variables for high, average, and low reward 
culture. Column (4) adds the residuals of market value, market-to-book equity and equity ratio 
regressions on reward culture factor. Column (5) adds the residuals of incentive regressions on 
reward culture factor as well as the residuals of market value, market-to-book equity, and equity 
ratio. 
Insert Table 9 here. 
  The coefficients on Low, Average, and High dummy variables are all positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that all banks generally have high risk in the crisis. On 
average, banks in the average reward culture group have the lowest risk, followed by banks in 
the low reward culture group and banks in the high reward culture group, respectively. The 
differences in risk persist even after controlling for the pure effect of all incentives and other 
bank characteristics. Banks with higher charter value (M/B) and capital (Equity Ratio) experience 
lower risk. 
Insert Table 3.10 here. 
  To confirm the non-linear relationship between reward culture and bank risk, Table 3.10 
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reports the cross-sectional regression results with bank risk as a dependent variable and various 
bank characteristics as controls. The test variable here is (Reward culture factor)2. Column (1) 
uses the reward culture factor and its square to explain bank risk in the crisis. Column (2) adds 
the residuals of market value, market-to-book equity and equity ratio regressions on reward 
culture factor. Column (3) adds the residuals of incentive regressions on reward culture factor as 
well as the residuals of market value, market-to-book equity, and equity ratio. 
 The coefficients on (Reward culture factor)2 are positive through all specifications, and 
statistically significant. The relationship between bank risk and reward culture is non-monotonic 
and convex. In addition, the pure effect of CEO delta is risk increasing consistent with moral 
hazard. All the signs on control variables are consistent across all specifications. 
E. Conclusion 
 Incentives are designed to align the interests of principals and agents. Incentives that are 
not sensitive to performance attract low ability agents and discourage effort. But incentives that 
are overly sensitive to performance will engender the expropriation of shareholder wealth, rent 
extraction, and misallocation of effort when agents have private information about their ability 
and outcomes have random components unrelated to effort. Incentive misalignment can occur 
with too little and too much performance-based compensation. The incentive misalignment 
problem is more severe in the banking industry where deposit insurance and an implicit too-big-
to-fail government guarantee exacerbate moral hazard. 
 In the aftermath of the 2008 credit crisis, public attention and academic research focused 
on high-powered incentives to CEOs and the top management team. In this study, incentives that 
encourage performance throughout the bank are shown to be important in understanding the role 
of performance-based compensation. Reward culture captures the latent common factors that 
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underlie the incentives to CEOs, VPs, and employees. The impact of reward culture on 
performance is non-monotonic because incentive misalignment can result from too little as well 
as too much performance-based compensation. Furthermore, the non-random distribution 
suggests that banks choose their reward cultures. Further research is needed to identify the 
factors that influence the decision on ‘how much is too much incentive compensation?’.
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G. Figures 
Figure 3.1 – Bank CEO Incentives 
This figure reports the mean and median annual incentives of bank CEOs over the period 2000 to 
2008 measured in 2006 dollars (thousands). Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. CEO total compensation 
includes salary, bonus, stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, 
and other compensation. CEO delta is a CEO’s total portfolio delta computed as the dollar 
increase in her portfolio wealth associated with a 1% increase in stock price. CEO vega is the 
CEO’s total portfolio vega computed as the dollar increase in her option-based portfolio wealth 
associated with a 0.01 standard deviation increase in stock volatility. All variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. 
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Figure 3.2 – Bank VP Pay Gap 
This figure reports the mean and median of bank VP pay gap over the period 2000 to 2008 
measured in 2006 dollars (thousands). Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. VP Pay gap is the difference 
between the CEO’s total compensation and the total compensation of the median VP. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. 
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Figure 3.3 – Compensation per Employee 
This figure reports the mean and median of compensation per employee at banks over the period 
2000 to 2008 measured in 2006 dollars (thousands). Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by 
SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. Compensation per 
employee is the total labor expense minus annual salaries and bonuses of the top executive team, 
divided by the number of employees. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
levels. 
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Figure 3.4 – Bank Returns  
This figure graphs the buy-and-hold returns and compounded monthly returns on all banks in the 
sample by their reward culture factor scores. Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. Buy-and-hold returns are 
returns from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. Compounded monthly returns are calculated as 
the natural logarithm of one plus buy-and-hold returns divided by the 18 month period – from 
July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. 
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Figure 3.5 – Bank Risks 
This figure graphs the risk on all banks in the sample by their reward culture factor scores. 
Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 that are actively 
engaged in lending. Bank risk is the standard deviation of daily stock returns from July 1, 2007 
to December 31, 2008. 
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H. Tables 
Table 3.1 – Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the matrix of pairwise correlations across all incentive variables over the three-year period 2004 to 2006. Sample of 
72 banks are firms classified by SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. CEO total compensation 
includes salary, bonus, stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. CEO delta is 
a CEO’s total portfolio delta computed as the dollar increase in her portfolio wealth associated with a 1% increase in stock price. CEO 
vega is the CEO’s total portfolio vega computed as the dollar increase in her option-based portfolio wealth associated with a 0.01 
standard deviation increase in stock volatility. VP Pay gap is the difference between the CEO’s total compensation and total 
compensation of the median VP. Compensation per employee is total labor expenses minus annual salaries and bonuses to the top 
executive team divided by the number of employees. Logarithmic transforms on all incentive variables are computed as 
ln min(ln )
( ) 2 1
max(ln ) min(ln )
x x
z x
x x
    
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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Table 3.1 – Correlation Matrix (cont.) 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 216 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 CEO Total Comp 
CEO 
Delta CEO Vega 
VP Pay 
Gap 
Comp per 
Emp 
z[CEO Total 
Comp] 
z[CEO 
Delta] 
z[CEO 
Vega] 
z[VP Pay 
Gap] 
z[Comp 
per Emp] 
CEO Total Comp 1.000 0.789 0.507 0.904 0.661 0.877 0.595 0.293 0.871 0.662  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CEO Delta 0.789 1.000 0.585 0.725 0.460 0.718 0.773 0.402 0.700 0.464 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CEO Vega 0.507 0.585 1.000 0.507 0.050 0.605 0.559 0.556 0.579 0.138 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.463 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.043 
VP Pay Gap 0.904 0.725 0.507 1.000 0.490 0.814 0.582 0.263 0.930 0.492 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Comp per Emp 0.661 0.460 0.050 0.490 1.000 0.548 0.277 0.048 0.454 0.955 <.0001 <.0001 0.463 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.487 <.0001 <.0001 
z[CEO Total Comp] 0.877 0.718 0.605 0.814 0.548 1.000 0.697 0.398 0.915 0.597 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
z[CEO Delta] 0.595 0.773 0.559 0.582 0.277 0.697 1.000 0.557 0.672 0.323 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
z[CEO Vega] 0.293 0.402 0.556 0.263 0.048 0.398 0.557 1.000 0.386 0.148 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.487 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.029 
z[VP Pay Gap] 0.871 0.700 0.579 0.930 0.454 0.915 0.672 0.386 1.000 0.485 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 
z[Comp per Emp] 0.662 0.464 0.138 0.492 0.955 0.597 0.323 0.148 0.485 1.000 <.0001 <.0001 0.043 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.029 <.0001  
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Table 3.2 – Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics on incentive variables, firm characteristics, as well as bank returns and risks. Sample of 72 banks 
are firms classified by SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. Compensation variables are from 2004 
to 2006. CEO total compensation includes salary, bonus, stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, and 
other compensation. CEO delta is a CEO’s total portfolio delta computed as her dollar increase in portfolio wealth for a 1% increase 
in stock price. CEO vega is the CEO’s total portfolio vega computed as her dollar increase in option-based portfolio wealth for a 0.01 
standard deviation increase in stock volatility. VP Pay gap is the difference between the CEO’s total compensation and total 
compensation of the median VP. Compensation per employee is total labor expenses minus annual salaries and bonuses to the top 
executive team divided by the number of employees. Market value is the market capitalization as of year 2006. M/B is market-to-book 
ratio of equity as of year 2006. Equity ratio is total equity capital over total assets at the end of the year as of year 2006. Buy-and-hold 
returns are returns from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. Monthly compounded returns are calculated as the natural logarithm of 
one plus buy-and-hold returns, divided by 18 months – from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. Bank risk is the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. Logarithmic transforms of all incentive variables are computed as 
ln min(ln )
( ) 2 1
max(ln ) min(ln )
x x
z x
x x
    
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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Table 3.2 – Summary Statistics (cont.) 
 
 N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile Maximum 
Incentive Variables: 2004 to 2006  
Total Compensation (000s) 216 8,826.60 11,424.48 371.85 1,732.29 3,558.19 10,572.85 46,375.35 
Delta (000s) 216 1,693.17 1,983.23 3.57 320.47 951.26 2,287.42 10,807.70 
Vega (000s) 216 265.48 363.43 0.00 21.25 107.13 356.94 1,830.07 
VP Pay Gap (000s) 216 7,120.07 7,044.91 1,107.36 2,863.30 4,140.51 7,927.14 34,457.99 
Compensation per Employee 216 87.77 68.83 36.19 54.80 66.61 83.65 363.62 
z-transform[Total Compensation] 216 0.008 0.505 -1.000 -0.362 -0.064 0.387 1.000 
z-transform [Delta] 216 0.338 0.378 -1.000 0.122 0.394 0.612 1.000 
z-transform [Vega] 216 0.500 0.442 -1.000 0.382 0.606 0.773 1.000 
z-transform [VP Pay Gap] 216 -0.111 0.441 -1.000 -0.447 -0.233 0.145 1.000 
z-transform [Comp per Emp] 216 -0.376 0.437 -1.000 -0.640 -0.471 -0.274 1.000 
Firm Characteristics at 2006 Yr End         
Market Value (in millions) 72 23,884.42 50,255.87 484.52 1,566.76 4,625.16 20,859.76 273,598.07 
Ln[Market Value] 72 8.694 1.623 6.183 7.357 8.439 9.945 12.519 
M/B 72 2.090 0.703 0.888 1.584 1.984 2.400 5.277 
Ln[M/B] 72 0.689 0.305 -0.119 0.460 0.685 0.875 1.663 
Equity Ratio 72 0.092 0.034 0.031 0.073 0.091 0.104 0.246 
Return and risk from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008       
Buy-and-hold Returns 72 -0.434 0.380 -0.997 -0.754 -0.469 -0.086 0.345 
Compounded Monthly Returns 72 -0.056 0.069 -0.323 -0.078 -0.035 -0.005 0.016 
Bank Risks 72 0.051 0.026 0.000 0.036 0.045 0.065 0.129 
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Table 3.3 – Factor Analysis of CEO Incentives 
This table reports the results of an exploratory common factor analysis applied to CEO incentive 
variables over the period 2004 to 2006. Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. Principal factors extraction and 
proportion of total variance explained are used. CEO incentive variables used are CEO total 
compensation, CEO delta and CEO vega. CEO total compensation includes salary, bonus, stock 
option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. CEO 
delta is a CEO’s total portfolio delta computed as the dollar increase in her portfolio wealth 
associated with a 1% increase in stock price. CEO vega is the CEO’s total portfolio vega 
computed as the dollar increase in her option-based portfolio wealth associated with a 0.01 
standard deviation increase in stock volatility. Logarithmic transforms of all incentive variables 
are computed as 
ln min(ln )
( ) 2 1
max(ln ) min(ln )
x x
z x
x x
    
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Standardized Scoring Coefficients 
   CEO Total Compensation CEO Delta CEO Vega 
CEO Incentive Factor   0.303 0.522 0.181 
      
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (p-values) of CEO Incentive Variables with CEO Incentive Factor  
Predicted Sign   + + + 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient with CEO Incentive Factor 0.844*** 0.953*** 0.676*** 
(p-values) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0001) 
    
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of CEO Incentive Factor Score 
 Median Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CEO Incentive Factor 0.130 0.000 0.875 -3.067 1.598 
% Variation Explained 76.6%     
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Table 3.4 – Factor Analysis of Reward Culture 
This table reports the results of an exploratory common factor analysis applied to reward 
variables over the period 2004 to 2006. Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. Principal factors extraction and 
proportion of total variance explained are used. Reward variables used are CEO incentive factor 
score, VP pay gap and compensation per employee. CEO incentive factor score is the common 
factor extracted from factor analysis on CEO incentive variables. VP Pay gap is the difference 
between the CEO’s total compensation and total compensation of the median VP. Compensation 
per employee is total labor expenses minus annual salaries and bonuses to the top executive team 
divided by the number of employees. Logarithmic transforms of all incentive variables are 
computed as 
ln min(ln )
( ) 2 1
max(ln ) min(ln )
x x
z x
x x
    
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Standardized Scoring Coefficients 
   CEO Incentive Factor VP Pay Gap 
Compensation 
per Employee 
Reward Culture Factor   0.398 0.492 0.115 
      
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (p-values) of Incentive Variables with Reward Culture Factor 
Predicted Sign   + + + 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient with Reward Culture Factor 0.927*** 0.955*** 0.580*** 
(p-values) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0001) 
    
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Reward Culture Factor Score 
 Median Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Reward Culture Factor -0.181 0.000 0.905 -2.390 2.130 
% Variation Explained 82.0%     
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Table 3.5 – Reward Culture Factor Score 
For each bank, a reward culture factor score is computed as the three-year average over the 2004 to 2006 period of the predicted 
factor scores from a factor analysis of CEO, VP, and employee incentives. Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6300 that are actively engaged in lending. CEO total compensation includes salary, bonus, stock option grants, 
restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. CEO delta is a CEO’s total portfolio delta computed as 
the dollar increase in her portfolio wealth associated with a 1% increase in stock price. CEO vega is the CEO’s total portfolio vega 
computed as the dollar increase in her option-based portfolio wealth associated with a 0.01 standard deviation increase in stock 
volatility. VP Pay gap is the difference between the CEO’s total compensation and total compensation of the median VP. 
Compensation per employee is total labor expenses minus annual salaries and bonuses to the top executive team divided by the 
number of employees. To classify banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups, the reward culture factor score, which 
ranges from -1 to +1, is divided into three equal intervals [1,1/3], [1/3, –1/3], and [–1/3, –1]. Table reports summary statistics on 
reward culture factor scores and incentives by groups.
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Table 3.5 – Reward Culture Factor Score (cont.) 
 
Variables Ranking N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile Maximum 
Reward culture score Full sample 72 -0.178 0.498 -1.000 -0.560 -0.275 0.128 1.000 
 High 13 0.654 0.183 0.402 0.549 0.661 0.723 1.000 
 Average 27 -0.072 0.193 -0.312 -0.227 -0.125 0.013 0.322 
 Low 32 -0.605 0.186 -1.000 -0.758 -0.583 -0.471 -0.336 
Incentives          
CEO total compensation (000s) High 13 32,730.04 10,382.97 17,890.26 22,850.00 35,337.08 41,153.44 46,375.35 
 Average 27 7,320.44 5,597.37 843.61 3,289.74 5,795.71 9,952.12 24,871.61 
 Low 32 1,774.53 1,010.84 510.90 1,020.33 1,546.95 2,286.37 4,957.53 
CEO delta (000s) High 13 5,275.37 2,172.37 2,693.16 3,854.35 5,206.50 5,700.76 10,807.70 
 Average 27 1,535.55 849.21 3.57 836.07 1,634.33 2,135.92 3,435.18 
 Low 32 424.23 473.86 16.11 138.47 304.49 462.07 2,102.63 
CEO vega (000s) High 13 649.51 479.95 0.00 300.83 546.15 845.57 1,640.07 
 Average 27 223.64 171.56 0.00 89.88 185.37 304.52 658.27 
 Low 32 43.69 58.98 0.00 8.31 25.79 52.30 264.87 
VP Pay gaps (000s) High 13 21,770.98 7,459.54 9,659.48 16,571.68 20,272.42 25,319.31 34,457.99 
 Average 27 5,913.91 3,200.06 1,107.36 3,213.27 5,459.19 8,342.81 14,064.61 
 Low 32 2,965.41 736.59 2,024.44 2,437.25 2,712.37 3,320.37 5,053.21 
Compensation per employee (000s) High 13 170.41 117.27 59.14 78.67 100.38 301.20 343.34 
 Average 27 85.47 58.24 42.90 63.90 70.89 88.61 363.62 
 Low 32 66.25 27.94 42.66 51.55 58.32 68.50 162.64 
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Table 3.6 – List of Banks by Reward Culture Factor 
For each bank, a reward culture factor score is computed as the three-year average over the 2004 
to 2006 period of the predicted factor scores from a factor analysis of CEO, VP, and employee 
incentives. Sample of 72 banks are firms classified by SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 that are 
actively engaged in lending. CEO total compensation includes salary, bonus, stock option grants, 
restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. CEO delta is a 
CEO’s total portfolio delta computed as the dollar increase in her portfolio wealth associated 
with a 1% increase in stock price. CEO vega is the CEO’s total portfolio vega computed as the 
dollar increase in her option-based portfolio wealth associated with a 0.01 standard deviation 
increase in stock volatility. VP Pay gap is the difference between the CEO’s total compensation 
and total compensation of the median VP. Compensation per employee is total labor expenses 
minus annual salaries and bonuses to the top executive team divided by the number of 
employees. To classify banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups, the reward 
culture factor score, which ranges from -1 to +1, is divided into three equal intervals [1,1/3], 
[1/3, –1/3], and [–1/3, –1]. This table shows the list of banks in each group. 
Name 
Total Assets 
2006 Yr End 
(in millions) 
Notes 
High Reward Culture Group – 13 banks   
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 503,545 Filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP 199,946 Acquired by Bank of America on July 1, 2008 
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 841,299 Acquired by Bank of America on September 14, 2008 
JEFFERIES GROUP INC 17,900  
MORGAN STANLEY 1,120,645  
WELLS FARGO & CO 481,996  
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 350,433 Acquired by JP Morgan on March 16, 2008 
WACHOVIA CORP 707,121 Acquired by Wells Fargo on December 31, 2008 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP 1,459,737  
U S BANCORP 219,232  
WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 346,288 Failed on September 25, 2008 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 1,351,520  
SLM CORP 116,136  
Average Reward Culture Group – 27 banks   
CITIGROUP INC 1,524,046  
PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 101,820  
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 60,712  
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 838,201 Merged with Mellon Financial Corp on July 1, 2007 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 103,370  
KEYCORP 92,337  
COMMERCE BANCORP INC/NJ 45,272 Acquired by TD Banknorth on April 10, 2008 
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 56,230 Acquired by Bank of Montreal on December 17, 2010 
NATIONAL CITY CORP 140,191 Acquired by PNC Financial on December 31, 2008  
COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 34,200 Acquired by BBVA on September 7, 2007 
BB&T CORP 121,351  
ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP 21,555  
COMERICA INC 58,001  
SUNTRUST BANKS INC 182,202  
HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC 35,507 Acquired by M&T Bank on August 27, 2012 
TD BANKNORTH INC 40,159  
CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 8,027  
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 100,669  
WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 4,769  
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Table 3.6 – List of Banks by Reward Culture Factor (cont.) 
 
Name 
Total Assets 
2006 Yr End 
(in millions) 
Notes 
Average Reward Culture Group – 27 banks   
FIRST BANCORP P R 17,390  
INVESTORS FINANCIAL SVCS CP 11,558 Acquired by State Street Corp on February 5, 2007 
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP 6,238 Filed for bankruptcy on September 18, 2009 
EAST WEST BANCORP INC 10,824  
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 31,855  
MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORP 17,716 Acquired by PNC Financial on March 2, 2007 
CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 13,224  
ZIONS BANCORPORATION 46,970  
Low Reward Culture Group – 32 banks   
TCF FINANCIAL CORP 14,670  
COLONIAL BANCGROUP 22,784 Failed on August 25, 2009 
BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HOLDINGS 5,764  
INDYMAC BANCORP INC 29,495 Filed for bankruptcy on July 11, 2008 
SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 6,081  
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 35,329  
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP 37,918  
WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 9,572  
FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC 8,442  
NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC 28,482  
FIRSTMERIT CORP 10,253  
ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 20,861  
FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP/CA 9,296 Filed for bankruptcy on December 18, 2009 
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC 14,211 Acquired by TD Bank on September 28, 2010 
CHITTENDEN CORP 6,432 Merged with People’s United Bank on January 1, 2008 
DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES 3,173  
UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 6,718  
GREATER BAY BANCORP 7,371 Acquired by Wells Fargo on October 1, 2007 
POPULAR INC 47,404  
MAF BANCORP INC 11,120 Acquired by National City on September 4, 2007 
BROOKLINE BANCORP INC 2,373  
M & T BANK CORP 57,065  
ANCHOR BANCORP WISCONSIN INC 4,540  
PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 6,296 Acquired by M&T Bank on December 19, 2008 
PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 4,587  
FRANKLIN BANK CORP 5,537 Filed for bankruptcy on November 12, 2008 
STERLING BANCSHARES INC/TX 4,118 Acquired by Comerica Bank on January 18,  2011 
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 8,225  
BANK OF HAWAII CORP 10,572  
DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 16,209 Filed for bankruptcy on November 25, 2008 
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Table 3.7 – Bank Returns and Reward Culture Groups 
The table reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of bank returns. For each bank, a reward culture factor score is 
computed as the three-year average over the 2004 to 2006 period of the predicted factor scores from a factor analysis of CEO, VP, and 
employee incentives. Dependent variables are Buy-and-hold returns over the period from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008, and 
Monthly Compounded monthly returns, are computed as the natural logarithm of one plus buy-and-hold returns divided by 18 months. 
High, Averge, and Low are dummy variables equal 1if the bank falls in the high, average, and low reward culture groups respectively, 
and 0, otherwise. Market value is the market capitalization. M/B is market-to-book ratio of equity. Equity ratio is total equity capital 
over total assets at the end of the year. Residual market value, Residual M/B and Equity ratio are the residuals of ln[Market value], 
ln[M/B] and equity ratio regressions on reward culture factor, respectively. Residual CEO pay, CEO delta, CEO vega, VP pay gap, 
Comp per emp are the residuals of ln[CEO total compensation], ln[CEO delta], ln[CEO vega], and ln[Compensation per employee] 
regressions on reward culture factor, residual market value, residual M/B, and residual equity ratio, respectively. To classify banks 
into high, average, and low reward culture groups, the reward culture factor score, which ranges from -1 to +1, is divided into three 
equal intervals [1,1/3], [1/3, –1/3], and [–1/3, –1]. t-statistics are calculated from heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Buy-and-Hold Returns Compounded Monthly Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept   -0.434***   -0.786**            -0.056***   -0.201**           
 (-9.75) (-2.05)    (-6.92) (-2.37)    
Low         -0.417***   -0.394***   -0.393***         -0.058***   -0.053***   -0.054***  
   (-6.41) (-7.33) (-7.41)   (-4.13) (-4.94) (-5.08) 
Average        -0.339***   -0.378***   -0.371***         -0.035***   -0.044***   -0.043***  
   (-4.67) (-5.29) (-5.78)   (-4.45) (-4.45) (-4.33) 
High        -0.673***   -0.647***   -0.665***         -0.093***   -0.087***   -0.089***  
   (-8.30) (-8.66) (-7.54)   (-4.97) (-5.52) (-5.37) 
Ln[Market Value]     -0.052**               -0.002           
  (-2.12)     (-0.42)    
Ln[M/B]     0.467***               0.098***           
  (2.87)     (3.17)    
Equity Ratio     5.202***               1.037***           
  (3.60)     (3.33)    
Residual of CEO Pay              0.027               -0.008  
     (0.10)     (-0.15) 
Residual of CEO Delta              -0.324**               -0.053*  
     (-2.31)     (-1.87) 
Residual of CEO Vega              0.089               0.01  
     (1.25)     (0.42) 
Residual of VP Pay Gap              0.131               0.016  
     (0.72)     (0.42) 
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Table 3.7 – Bank Returns and Reward Culture Groups (cont.) 
 
 Buy-and-Hold Returns Compounded Monthly Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Residual of Comp per Emp              -0.202              -0.021  
     (-1.37)     (-0.82) 
Residual of Market Value           -0.068*   -0.068*            -0.003   -0.003  
    (-1.84) (-1.93)    (-0.45) (-0.46) 
Residual of M/B           0.448***   0.445***            0.093***   0.093***  
    (2.80) (2.93)    (3.12) (3.20) 
Residual of Equity Ratio           5.151***   5.117***            0.993***   0.986***  
    (3.79) (4.68)    (3.27) (3.44) 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.683 0.594 0.677 0.681 0.391 0.556 0.427 0.56 0.546 
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Table 3.8 – Bank Returns and Reward Culture  
The table reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of bank returns. For each bank, a 
reward culture factor score is computed as the three-year average over the 2004 to 2006 period 
of the predicted factor scores from a factor analysis of CEO, VP, and employee incentives. 
Dependent variables are Buy-and-hold returns over the period from July 1, 2007 to December 
31, 2008, and Monthly Compounded monthly returns, are computed as the natural logarithm of 
one plus buy-and-hold returns divided by 18 months. Market value is the market capitalization. 
M/B is market-to-book ratio of equity. Equity ratio is total equity capital over total assets at the 
end of the year. Residual market value, Residual M/B and Equity ratio are the residuals of 
ln[Market value], ln[M/B] and equity ratio regressions on reward culture factor, respectively. 
Residual CEO pay, CEO delta, CEO vega, VP pay gap, Comp per emp are the residuals of 
ln[CEO total compensation], ln[CEO delta], ln[CEO vega], and ln[Compensation per employee] 
regressions on reward culture factor, residual market value, residual M/B, and residual equity 
ratio, respectively. t-statistics are calculated from heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
and are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Buy-and-Hold Returns Compounded Monthly Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept   -0.401***  -0.424***  -0.409***  -0.039***  -0.044***   -0.034*** 
 (-6.34) (-7.07) (-6.97) (-3.97) (-4.73) (-3.65) 
Reward Culture Factor  -0.212***  -0.207***  -0.210***  -0.026   -0.025*   -0.027*  
 (-3.01) (-3.72) (-3.51) (-1.51) (-1.75) (-1.96) 
(Reward Culture Factor)2  -0.255*   -0.170   -0.225   -0.079**   -0.060**   -0.096*** 
 (-1.77) (-1.34) (-1.40) (-2.15) (-2.04) (-2.87) 
Residual of CEO Pay        0.018         -0.064  
   (0.06)   (-1.22) 
Residual of CEO Delta        -0.360**         -0.077**  
   (-2.45)   (-2.52) 
Residual of CEO Vega        0.095         0.006  
   (1.42)   (0.32) 
Residual of VP Pay Gap        0.11         0.062*  
   (0.50)   (1.67) 
Residual of Comp per Emp        -0.182         -0.005  
   (-1.18)   (-0.23) 
Residual of Market Value     -0.070*   -0.071**      -0.004   -0.004  
  (-1.99) (-2.18)  (-0.58) (-0.70) 
Residual of M/B     0.457***   0.453***      0.093***   0.09***  
  (2.82) (2.86)  (3.13) (3.14) 
Residual of Equity Ratio     5.196***   5.13***      0.974***   0.930***  
  (3.78) (4.63)  (3.43) (3.75) 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.594 0.681 0.684 0.444 0.576 0.581 
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Table 3.9 – Bank Risk and Reward Culture Groups 
The table reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of bank risks. For each bank, a 
reward culture factor score is computed as the three-year average over the 2004 to 2006 period 
of the predicted factor scores from a factor analysis of CEO, VP, and employee incentives. 
Dependent variable is Bank risks, computed as the standard deviation of daily stock returns from 
July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. High, Average, and Low are dummy variables equal 1 if the 
bank falls in the high, average, and low reward culture groups respectively, and 0, otherwise. 
Market value is the market capitalization. M/B is market-to-book ratio of equity. Equity ratio is 
total equity capital over total assets at the end of the year. Residual market value, Residual M/B 
and Equity ratio are the residuals of ln[Market value], ln[M/B] and equity ratio regressions on 
reward culture factor, respectively. Residual CEO pay, CEO delta, CEO vega, VP pay gap, 
Comp per emp are the residuals of ln[CEO total compensation], ln[CEO delta], ln[CEO vega], 
and ln[Compensation per employee] regressions on reward culture factor, residual market value, 
residual M/B, and residual equity ratio, respectively. To classify banks into high, average, and 
low reward culture groups, the reward culture factor score, which ranges from -1 to +1, is 
divided into three equal intervals [1,1/3], [1/3, –1/3], and [–1/3, –1]. t-statistics are calculated 
from heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Bank Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept   0.051***  0.106***           
 (16.76) (4.17)    
Low        0.052***  0.050***   0.050***  
   (11.01) (13.27) (13.30) 
Average        0.041***  0.045***   0.044***  
   (10.05) (11.81) (12.63) 
High        0.068***  0.066***   0.066***  
   (11.13) (13.56) (12.69) 
Ln[Market Value]    0.001           
  (0.69)    
Ln[M/B]     -0.038***          
  (-3.71)    
Equity Ratio     -0.419***          
  (-3.80)    
Residual of CEO Pay              0.004  
     (0.26) 
Residual of CEO Delta              0.014  
     (1.52) 
Residual of CEO Vega              -0.002  
     (-0.22) 
Residual of VP Pay Gap              -0.001  
     (-0.07) 
Residual of Comp per Emp              0.003  
     (0.40) 
Residual of Market Value           0.001   0.001  
    (0.59) (0.60) 
Residual of M/B           -0.036***  -0.036***  
    (-3.79) (-3.80) 
Residual of Equity Ratio           -0.392***  -0.39***  
    (-3.73) (-3.80) 
N 72 72 72 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.859 0.816 0.866 0.858 
  
165 
 
Table 3.10 – Bank Risk and Reward Culture 
The table reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regression of bank risks. For each bank, a 
reward culture factor score is computed as the three-year average over the 2004 to 2006 period 
of the predicted factor scores from a factor analysis of CEO, VP, and employee incentives. 
Dependent variable is Bank risks, computed as the standard deviation of daily stock returns from 
July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. Market value is the market capitalization. M/B is market-to-
book ratio of equity. Equity ratio is total equity capital over total assets at the end of the year. 
Residual market value, Residual M/B and Equity ratio are the residuals of ln[Market value], 
ln[M/B] and equity ratio regressions on reward culture factor, respectively. Residual CEO pay, 
CEO delta, CEO vega, VP pay gap, Comp per emp are the residuals of ln[CEO total 
compensation], ln[CEO delta], ln[CEO vega], and ln[Compensation per employee] regressions 
on reward culture factor, residual market value, residual M/B, and residual equity ratio, 
respectively. t-statistics are calculated from heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Bank Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept   0.045***  0.047***   0.044***  
 (11.32) (13.77) (12.85) 
Reward Culture Factor  0.012**   0.011**   0.012***  
 (2.14) (2.62) (2.79) 
(Reward Culture Factor)2  0.030***  0.023***   0.030***  
 (2.73) (2.78) (2.89) 
Residual of CEO Pay        0.016  
   (0.79) 
Residual of CEO Delta        0.020*  
   (1.96) 
Residual of CEO Vega        -0.001  
   (-0.17) 
Residual of VP Pay Gap        -0.009  
   (-0.58) 
Residual of Comp per Emp        -0.001  
   (-0.10) 
Residual of Market Value     0.002   0.002  
  (0.72) (0.81) 
Residual of M/B     -0.036***  -0.036***  
  (-3.72) (-3.68) 
Residual of Equity Ratio     -0.392***  -0.382***  
  (-3.76) (-3.92) 
N 72 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.815 0.866 0.862 
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V. Conclusion 
 In the first essay, I show that firms attempt to influence their stock liquidity via share 
repurchase programs. Acting as buyers of last resort for their own shares, share repurchases by 
financially constrained firms enhance stock liquidity, which alleviates the cost of external 
financing and underinvestment. Increased stock liquidity improves information efficiency, 
including higher value-added from incremental capital investments. Further, higher stock 
liquidity lowers stock volatility and allows financially constrained firms to issue equity. This 
essay also explains a counter-intuitive fact about share repurchase in constrained firms. While 
share repurchases reduce cash balances and add financial leverage, constrained firms seem to be 
especially sensitive to this decline in corporate liquidity. However, by acting as buyers of last 
resort, these firms see their stock liquidity improves and advance their financial status. These 
findings show economic meaning linking market microstructure with corporate finance. 
 In the second essay, I use the recent financial crisis as a natural experiment to show bank 
CEO compensation incentives to increase risk, and to increase risk relative to increase stock 
price, lead to comparatively risky investment and debt policies and increased risk. I show that the 
relation between bank CEO compensation risk taking incentives tends to change between non-
crisis vs. crisis periods. Bank CEO risk taking incentives lead CEOs to adopt riskier investments, 
including asset growth, loans to core deposits, and commercial real estate loans, to implement 
riskier debt policy by increasing leverage, and to increase bank risk, where bank risk is measured 
by the volatility of stock returns, non-performing loans to assets, and a bank risk factor score. I 
conclude that recent efforts by the press, politicians, and regulators, to portray bank CEO 
compensation incentives as the cause of excessive risk taking and financial collapse are 
premature. 
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 In the third essay, I construct and examine whether the “reward culture” of banks was a 
contributing factor to the 2008 credit crisis. Reward culture reflects three dimensions: (i) CEO 
incentives – total CEO compensation and the incentive effects of CEO stock and option 
portfolios; (ii) tournament incentives – pay gap in total compensation between CEOs and Vice 
Presidents; and (iii) employee incentives – total compensation per employee. A reward culture 
factor score, constructed by applying factor analysis to the CEO, VP, and employee incentives, 
represents the common factor in incentives across all levels of the bank. I employ the reward 
culture factor to examine the impact of reward culture on bank performance and risk. First, I find 
strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between reward culture and bank returns and risk. 
Second, classifying banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups in the pre-crisis year 
2006, I find that during the 2008 crisis period, banks either at the high or low reward culture 
groups performed worse, and were more risky than banks in the average reward culture group. 
The findings are consistent with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard associated 
with incentive misalignment when incentives are too low or too high. 
  
